[Servercert-wg] - Sunsetting use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts

Tue Sep 17 17:38:58 UTC 2024

The suggestion for that date is based on our discussions with customers about the time that it will take for organizations to change their practices, rather than the specific motivation for the deprecation.

From: Ryan Dickson <ryandickson at google.com>
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2024 12:48 PM
To: Ponds-White, Trev <trevolip at amazon.com>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Cc: Ben Wilson <bwilson at mozilla.com>; Pedro FUENTES <pfuentes at wisekey.com>
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] [Servercert-wg] - Sunsetting use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts

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Hi Trev,

I interpret the motivation<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/#:~:text=Why%20are%20we,of%20this%20post.> for the behavior described in the link you shared as a matter of overcoming the low success rate of WHOIS-based communications (“Over the past several years, we’ve observed that the WHOIS lookup success rate has declined to less than 5 percent. If you rely on the contact addresses listed in the WHOIS database provided by your domain registrar to validate your domain ownership, this might create an availability risk.”)

The motivation for the ballot is focused on managing a separate risk, closing circumstances that can be actively exploited and result in fraudulent certificate issuance (and worse, abuse given the existence of that certificate). Given this perspective, can you help me better understand what you'd consider an appropriate timeline to close what could be considered an open vulnerability with this DCV method?

Thanks,
Ryan

On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 1:12 PM Ponds-White, Trev via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>> wrote:
Thanks for putting this together Ryan. As some might be aware Amazon began a process earlier this year to remove use of this method. (https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/)

We got feedback from customers that for some this is a non-trivial dependency to remove. It’s not uncommon for companies to have built automation on top of email validation. Based on the information we got I recommend a date of April 30, 2025.

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>> On Behalf Of Ben Wilson via Servercert-wg
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2024 9:16 AM
To: Pedro FUENTES <pfuentes at wisekey.com<mailto:pfuentes at wisekey.com>>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>>
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] [Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL]- Sunsetting use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts

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Mozilla will endorse, too, if needed.
Thanks,
Ben

On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 9:06 AM Pedro FUENTES via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>> wrote:
OISTE would endorse this initiative

On 16 Sep 2024, at 16:32, Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg <Servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:Servercert-wg at cabforum.org>> wrote:

All,

In light of recent events where research from WatchTowr Labs demonstrated how threat actors could exploit WHOIS to obtain fraudulently issued TLS certificates [1] and follow-on discussions in MDSP [2][3], we drafted an introductory proposal [4] to sunset the use of WHOIS for identifying Domain Contacts.

The proposal sets a prohibition against relying on WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts beginning 11/1/2024.

While publicly-trusted CA Owners are required to disclose and maintain in-use DCV methods to the CCADB [5], the collected data lacks specificity, hindering our ability to assess the extent of reliance on WHOIS and the potential impact of transitioning away from it.

Feedback on the proposal (preferably using comments or suggestions on the Pull Request via GitHub) along with volunteers for endorsers would be appreciated.
Thanks,
Ryan

P.S., I apologize if this effort is redundant to discussions already taking place in the Forum, I was traveling last week and am catching up on email.

[1] https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__labs.watchtowr.com_we-2Dspent-2D20-2Dto-2Dachieve-2Drce-2Dand-2Daccidentally-2Dbecame-2Dthe-2Dadmins-2Dof-2Dmobi_&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=qZzpnP-57sE4nQ6LxHM50ULVrjSKSIk2Fccl0d8PESE&e=>
[2] https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/FuOi_uhQB6U<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__groups.google.com_a_mozilla.org_g_dev-2Dsecurity-2Dpolicy_c_FuOi-5FuhQB6U&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=31lolz5JP-8ykEL9HDAxaX6AcVj3rFj7LwOwRxwFkZg&e=>
[3] https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/mAl9XjieSkA<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__groups.google.com_a_mozilla.org_g_dev-2Dsecurity-2Dpolicy_c_mAl9XjieSkA&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=37YIE6Jw_R8c8obIjNP3qo3yo9YW36r4WMZH76HyUGM&e=>
[4] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/548<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_cabforum_servercert_pull_548&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=vBGh-YJqmgDPKGnq5cAcEuu__uSmeZaCK_EGoFkB-Kc&e=>
[5] https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1IXL8Yk12gPQs8GXiosXCPLPgATJilaiVy-f9SbsMA28/edit?gid=268412787#gid=268412787<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_spreadsheets_d_1IXL8Yk12gPQs8GXiosXCPLPgATJilaiVy-2Df9SbsMA28_edit-3Fgid-3D268412787-23gid-3D268412787&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=nHPN4vmJhl30c7Nh_y7NmG73eUtxjUstZR6YNcUH0o4&e=>

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