[Servercert-wg] - Sunsetting use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts

Mon Sep 16 19:47:36 UTC 2024

Hi Trev,

I interpret the motivation
<https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/#:~:text=Why%20are%20we,of%20this%20post.>
for the behavior described in the link you shared as a matter of overcoming
the low success rate of WHOIS-based communications (“*Over the past several
years, we’ve observed that the WHOIS lookup success rate has declined to
less than 5 percent. If you rely on the contact addresses listed in the
WHOIS database provided by your domain registrar to validate your domain
ownership, this might create an availability risk.*”)

The motivation for the ballot is focused on managing a separate risk,
closing circumstances that can be actively exploited and result in
fraudulent certificate issuance (and worse, abuse given the existence of
that certificate). Given this perspective, can you help me better
understand what you'd consider an appropriate timeline to close what could
be considered an open vulnerability with this DCV method?

Thanks,
Ryan

On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 1:12 PM Ponds-White, Trev via Servercert-wg <
servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:

> Thanks for putting this together Ryan. As some might be aware Amazon began
> a process earlier this year to remove use of this method. (
> https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/
> )
>
>
>
> We got feedback from customers that for some this is a non-trivial
> dependency to remove. It’s not uncommon for companies to have built
> automation on top of email validation. Based on the information we got I
> recommend a date of April 30, 2025.
>
>
>
> *From:* Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> *On Behalf Of *Ben
> Wilson via Servercert-wg
> *Sent:* Monday, September 16, 2024 9:16 AM
> *To:* Pedro FUENTES <pfuentes at wisekey.com>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate
> WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* RE: [EXTERNAL] [Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL]- Sunsetting use of
> WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts
>
>
>
> *CAUTION*: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not
> click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know
> the content is safe.
>
>
>
> Mozilla will endorse, too, if needed.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ben
>
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 16, 2024 at 9:06 AM Pedro FUENTES via Servercert-wg <
> servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:
>
> OISTE would endorse this initiative
>
>
>
> On 16 Sep 2024, at 16:32, Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg <
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> All,
>
>
>
> In light of recent events where research from WatchTowr Labs demonstrated
> how threat actors could exploit WHOIS to obtain fraudulently issued TLS
> certificates [1] and follow-on discussions in MDSP [2][3], we drafted an
> introductory proposal [4] to sunset the use of WHOIS for identifying Domain
> Contacts.
>
>
>
> The proposal sets a prohibition against relying on WHOIS to identify
> Domain Contacts beginning 11/1/2024.
>
>
>
> While publicly-trusted CA Owners are required to disclose and maintain
> in-use DCV methods to the CCADB [5], the collected data lacks specificity,
> hindering our ability to assess the extent of reliance on WHOIS and the
> potential impact of transitioning away from it.
>
>
>
> Feedback on the proposal (preferably using comments or suggestions on the
> Pull Request via GitHub) along with volunteers for endorsers would be
> appreciated.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ryan
>
>
>
> P.S., I apologize if this effort is redundant to discussions already
> taking place in the Forum, I was traveling last week and am catching up on
> email.
>
>
>
> [1]
> https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__labs.watchtowr.com_we-2Dspent-2D20-2Dto-2Dachieve-2Drce-2Dand-2Daccidentally-2Dbecame-2Dthe-2Dadmins-2Dof-2Dmobi_&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=qZzpnP-57sE4nQ6LxHM50ULVrjSKSIk2Fccl0d8PESE&e=>
>
> [2]
> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/FuOi_uhQB6U
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__groups.google.com_a_mozilla.org_g_dev-2Dsecurity-2Dpolicy_c_FuOi-5FuhQB6U&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=31lolz5JP-8ykEL9HDAxaX6AcVj3rFj7LwOwRxwFkZg&e=>
>
> [3]
> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/mAl9XjieSkA
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__groups.google.com_a_mozilla.org_g_dev-2Dsecurity-2Dpolicy_c_mAl9XjieSkA&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=37YIE6Jw_R8c8obIjNP3qo3yo9YW36r4WMZH76HyUGM&e=>
>
> [4] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/548
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_cabforum_servercert_pull_548&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=vBGh-YJqmgDPKGnq5cAcEuu__uSmeZaCK_EGoFkB-Kc&e=>
>
> [5]
> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1IXL8Yk12gPQs8GXiosXCPLPgATJilaiVy-f9SbsMA28/edit?gid=268412787#gid=268412787
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.google.com_spreadsheets_d_1IXL8Yk12gPQs8GXiosXCPLPgATJilaiVy-2Df9SbsMA28_edit-3Fgid-3D268412787-23gid-3D268412787&d=DwMFaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=1CJcldkOKNaH6Tu9kiTliBmTMzTdtFrQ0USL5juRHSkA78re2Z_FuT3Hr1z1Cd6m&s=nHPN4vmJhl30c7Nh_y7NmG73eUtxjUstZR6YNcUH0o4&e=>
>
>
>
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