[Servercert-wg] Proposal to update logging requirements

[Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)]

Without agreeing with some parts of the justification around OCSP, I 
support the proposed changes and I believe they capture a fair meaning 
of Firewall and router "activities".

I assume that the original authors couldn't decide on a minimum list of 
specific events that should be kept by CAs regarding firewalls and 
routers. For example, a router's CPU usage is a router activity, and 
some CAs monitor and produce graphs of CPU usage, just like they do for 
servers. However, there is no explicit requirement to capture the CPU 
usage for Certificate Systems, therefore listing explicit events that 
should be kept for firewalls and routers is very useful.


Thanks,
Dimitris.


On 13/9/2023 12:00 μ.μ., Martijn Katerbarg via Servercert-wg wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> During our last WebTrust audit cycle it became clear that our 
> interpretation of “Firewall and router activities” and CPA Canada’s 
> interpretation were meaningfully different. In particular it came to 
> light that in its most aggressive possible interpretation, the actual 
> logging of a firewall activity would itself constitute a firewall 
> activity, which would itself require logging, as would the log of the 
> log entry of that log entry, the log of this newest log entry, and 
> etcetera into infinity. In our opinion, too much “valid traffic” 
> logging, makes it harder to find “bad traffic”.
>
> We offer a simple rewrite to reflect the difference between valuable 
> and necessary logged information and unproductive (and potentially 
> absurd) logging.
>
> Similarly, several Certificate Consumers have expressed the wish to 
> move away from OCSP, while, depending on interpretation of the 
> language, CAs that do support OCSP may need to log every GET/POST 
> request for OCSP responses, and keep this data for at least 2 years.
>
> The requirement for CAs to monitor OCSP requests is the product of a 
> different time, when thinking around OCSP was very different.  As 
> privacy concerns and other structural weaknesses move the community 
> away from its position on OCSP, it no longer makes sense to include 
> requirements for CAs to watch and record OCSP requests.
>
> Ballot SC-063 v4 madeit optional for CAs to provide OCSP at all. (We 
> recognize that there is still a root program requirement that 
> pragmatically prevents CAs from eliminating OCSP, but within the scope 
> of CABF requirements this is a critical change.)  For the BRs to 
> strongly recommend (via this SHOULD requirement) monitoring OCSP is 
> incongruous and out of keeping with current thinking.
>
> Even if we did want such monitoring to take place, any such 
> requirement would present serious and perhaps insurmountable technical 
> challenges:
>
> For a typical OCSP responder that is only aware of unexpired 
> certificates, it's impossible to tell the difference between an 
> "unused" serial number and the serial number of an expired 
> certificate. To disambiguate would require the ongoing 
> cross-referencing of OCSP responder logs against the CA's cert 
> issuance logs, requiring additional code development and maintenance 
> and significant production overhead.
>
> Furthermore, as most OCSP services are fronted by CDNs, there's no 
> guarantee that the CA will even have access to the full OCSP request 
> logs. If the CA can't enumerate all the IP addresses of OCSP clients 
> that send requests for "unused" serial numbers, then this vastly 
> diminishes whatever value we attribute to this monitoring requirement.
>
> Our proposed changes are available for review on 
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/main...XolphinMartijn:servercert:LoggingRequirements.
>
> With this email I’m hoping to receive feedback and thoughts on this 
> proposal.
>
> Regards,
>
> Martijn
>
> Sectigo
>
>
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> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
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