[Servercert-wg] SC-59 Weak Key Guidance

Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) dzacharo at harica.gr
Fri May 26 06:53:46 UTC 2023

Hi Tom,

Historically, the SCWG has been trying to avoid effective dates during 
January or December. I recommend using September 15, 2023 or March 15, 
2024 as possible effective dates. These two dates seem to be more 
than others.


On 25/5/2023 10:51 μ.μ., Tom Zermeno via Servercert-wg wrote:
> Purpose of Ballot SC-059 V3
> Several events within the community have led to concerns that the 
> Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of 
> Publicly-Trusted Certificates (BRs) lacked a specificity required to 
> properly guide CAs on matters dealing with the identification and 
> processing of digital certificates based on private keys considered 
> weak, or easy to ascertain.  In the hopes that elaboration and clarity 
> on the subject would be beneficial to the community, we are presenting 
> updates to §“Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate) 
> and § (Subscriber Key Pair Generation) of the BRs.
> The first update is to § and is made to expand the scope of 
> easily computable Private Keys from “Debian weak keys” to “those 
> listed in section”.  While the initial language in the BRs 
> did not exclude other concerns, the use of a single example could be 
> interpreted to mean that other easily computable Private Keys are few 
> and far between.  The next update was to §, wherein we added 
> specific actions to be taken for ROCA vulnerability, Debian weak keys 
> - both RSA and ECDSA – and Close Primes vulnerability.  We also added 
> a link to suggested tools to be used for checking weak keys. Finally, 
> an implementation date of December 1, 2023 was added to allow CAs time 
> to update processes to meet the requirements.
> The following motion has been proposed by Thomas Zermeno of SSL.com 
> and endorsed by Ben Wilson of Mozilla and Martijn Katerbarg of Sectigo.
> --Motion Begins—
> This ballot is intended to clarify CA responsibilities regarding weak 
> key vulnerabilities, including specific guidance for Debian weak key, 
> ROCA and Close Primes attack vulnerabilities, and modifies the 
> “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of 
> Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version 2.0.0.
> Notes: Upon beginning discussion for SC-59, the then-current version 
> of the BRs was 1.8.4; since that time several ballots have been 
> approved, leading to the increment of the version to 1.8.7 and 
> eventually 2.0.0, which is the latest approved version of the BRs.  
> The changes introduced in SC-59 do not conflict with any of the recent 
> ballots. As observed with other ballots in the past, minor 
> administrative updates must be made to the proposed ballot text before 
> publication such that the appropriate Version # and Change History are 
> accurately represented (e.g., to indicate these changes will be 
> represented in Version 2.0.1).
> MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following 
> Redline: 
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b68d0224fa0b3...SSLcom:servercert:3b0c6de32595d02fbd96762cda98cdc88addef00 
> <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b68d0224fa0b3...SSLcom:servercert:3b0c6de32595d02fbd96762cda98cdc88addef00>
> --Motion Ends—
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for 
> approval of this ballot is as follows:
> Discussion (11+ days) • Start time: 2023-05-25 19:00:00 UTC • End 
> time: 2023-06-08 18:59:00 UTC
> Vote for approval (7 days) • Start time: TBD • End time: TBD
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
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