[Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-063 V2: “Make OCSP Optional, Require CRLs, and Incentivize Automation”

Bruce Morton Bruce.Morton at entrust.com
Wed May 17 18:31:50 UTC 2023

Hi Ryan,

Per the Short-lived Subscriber Certificate definition, many CAs may already issue certificates with a short validity period. I also think the definition is missing the intended use which is a certificate with no certificate status. How about this definition?

**Short-lived Subscriber Certificate**: Certificate issued with a short Validity Period, where the CA MAY NOT provide Subscriber Certificate status.

The validity period does not need to go in the definition as it is addressed in section 6.3.2.

Thanks, Bruce.

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg
Sent: Friday, May 12, 2023 10:45 AM
To: ServerCert CA/BF <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-063 V2: “Make OCSP Optional, Require CRLs, and Incentivize Automation”

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Purpose of Ballot SC-063

This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates related to making Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) services optional for CAs. This proposal does not prohibit or otherwise restrict CAs who choose to continue supporting OCSP from doing so. If CAs continue supporting OCSP, the same requirements apply as they exist today.

Additionally, this proposal introduces changes related to CRL requirements including:

  *   CRLs must conform with the proposed profile.
  *   CAs must generate and publish either:

     *   a full and complete, or
     *   a set partitioned CRLs (sometimes called “sharded” CRLs), that when aggregated, represent the equivalent of a full and complete CRL.

  *   CAs issuing Subscriber Certificates must update and publish a new CRL…

     *   within twenty-four (24) hours after recording a Certificate as revoked; and
     *   Otherwise:

        *   at least every seven (7) days if all Certificates include an Authority Information Access extension with an id-ad-ocsp accessMethod (“AIA OCSP pointer”), or
        *   at least every four (4) days in all other cases.

Finally, the proposal revisits the concept of a “short-lived” certificate, introduced in Ballot 153<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/cabforum.org/2015/11/11/ballot-153-short-lived-certificates/__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!ec7WaYy6SmcqHXzp4ZUC07gxOu6FbC6Vv3mv5zUfK7RBVFAxnC-_yZF22eVUywU7Bh27z1QMTxACUx4jxgPzZJc1Xh8HuQ$>. As described in this ballot, short-lived certificates (sometimes called “short-term certificates” in ETSI specifications<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319400_319499/31941201/01.04.04_60/en_31941201v010404p.pdf__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!ec7WaYy6SmcqHXzp4ZUC07gxOu6FbC6Vv3mv5zUfK7RBVFAxnC-_yZF22eVUywU7Bh27z1QMTxACUx4jxgPzZJcV9nswVQ$>) are:

  *   optional. CAs will not be required to issue short-lived certificates. For TLS certificates that do not meet the definition of a short-lived certificate introduced in this proposed update, the current maximum validity period of 398 days remains applicable.

  *   constrained to an initial maximum validity period of ten (10) days. The proposal stipulates that short-lived certificates issued on or after 15 March 2026 must not have a Validity Period greater than seven (7) days.

  *   not required to contain a CRLDP or OCSP pointer and are not required to be revoked. The primary mechanism of certificate invalidation for these short-lived certificates would be through certificate expiry. CAs may optionally revoke short-lived certificates. The initial maximum certificate validity is aligned with the existing maximum values for CRL “nextUpdate” and OCSP response validity allowed by the BRs today.

Additional background, justification, and considerations are outlined here<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/docs.google.com/document/d/180T6cDSWPy54Rb5d6R4zN7MuLEMShaZ4IRLQgdPqE98/edit__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!ec7WaYy6SmcqHXzp4ZUC07gxOu6FbC6Vv3mv5zUfK7RBVFAxnC-_yZF22eVUywU7Bh27z1QMTxACUx4jxgPzZJd5hnh1NA$>.

The set of updates resulting from the first<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2023-April/003685.html__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!ec7WaYy6SmcqHXzp4ZUC07gxOu6FbC6Vv3mv5zUfK7RBVFAxnC-_yZF22eVUywU7Bh27z1QMTxACUx4jxgPzZJdnKNNEeA$> round of discussion are presented here<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/3/files__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!ec7WaYy6SmcqHXzp4ZUC07gxOu6FbC6Vv3mv5zUfK7RBVFAxnC-_yZF22eVUywU7Bh27z1QMTxACUx4jxgPzZJdDevajIg$>.

The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Dickson and Chris Clements of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Kiran Tummala of Microsoft and Tim Callan of Sectigo.

— Motion Begins —

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.0.

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:


— Motion Ends —

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (14+ days)

·  Start time: 2023-05-12 14:45:00 UTC

·  End time: Not before 2023-05-26 14:45:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

·  Start time: TBD

·  End time: TBD

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