[Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-063 V2: “Make OCSP Optional, Require CRLs, and Incentivize Automation”

[Ryan Dickson]

Purpose of Ballot SC-063

This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates related to making Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) services optional for CAs. This proposal
does not prohibit or otherwise restrict CAs who choose to continue
supporting OCSP from doing so. If CAs continue supporting OCSP, the same
requirements apply as they exist today.

Additionally, this proposal introduces changes related to CRL requirements
including:

   -

   CRLs must conform with the proposed profile.
   -

   CAs must generate and publish either:
   -

      a full and complete, or
      -

      a set partitioned CRLs (sometimes called “sharded” CRLs), that when
      aggregated, represent the equivalent of a full and complete CRL.
      -

   CAs issuing Subscriber Certificates must update and publish a new CRL…
   -

      within twenty-four (24) hours after recording a Certificate as
      revoked; and
      -

      Otherwise:
      -

         at least every seven (7) days if all Certificates include an
         Authority Information Access extension with an id-ad-ocsp accessMethod
         (“AIA OCSP pointer”), or
         -

         at least every four (4) days in all other cases.


Finally, the proposal revisits the concept of a “short-lived” certificate,
introduced in Ballot 153
<https://cabforum.org/2015/11/11/ballot-153-short-lived-certificates/>. As
described in this ballot, short-lived certificates (sometimes called
“short-term certificates” in ETSI specifications
<https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319400_319499/31941201/01.04.04_60/en_31941201v010404p.pdf>)
are:

   -

   optional. CAs will not be required to issue short-lived certificates.
   For TLS certificates that do not meet the definition of a short-lived
   certificate introduced in this proposed update, the current maximum
   validity period of 398 days remains applicable.


   -

   constrained to an initial maximum validity period of ten (10) days. The
   proposal stipulates that short-lived certificates issued on or after 15
   March 2026 must not have a Validity Period greater than seven (7) days.


   -

   not required to contain a CRLDP or OCSP pointer and are not required to
   be revoked. The primary mechanism of certificate invalidation for these
   short-lived certificates would be through certificate expiry. CAs may
   optionally revoke short-lived certificates. The initial maximum
   certificate validity is aligned with the existing maximum values for CRL
   “nextUpdate” and OCSP response validity allowed by the BRs today.


Additional background, justification, and considerations are outlined here
<https://docs.google.com/document/d/180T6cDSWPy54Rb5d6R4zN7MuLEMShaZ4IRLQgdPqE98/edit>
.


The set of updates resulting from the first
<https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2023-April/003685.html>
round of discussion are presented here
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/3/files>.

The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Dickson and Chris Clements
of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Kiran Tummala of Microsoft
and Tim Callan of Sectigo.


— Motion Begins —

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”),
based on Version 2.0.0.

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b68d0224fa0b3..e2ac49ff90d1e74e9f08a398cd2df2d58e65b0ec



— Motion Ends —

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (14+ days)

   -

   Start time: 2023-05-12 14:45:00 UTC
   -

   End time: Not before 2023-05-26 14:45:00 UTC


Vote for approval (7 days)

   -

   Start time: TBD
   -

   End time: TBD
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