[Servercert-wg] Draft ballot SC-XX: Profiles cleanup ballot

[Wendy Brown - QT3LB-C]

Corey -
not according to some CA products - these additional certificates are
created automatically at the time a new CA is established - so if they are
not excluded those products are no longer eligible for use as Root CAs.  It
was my understanding that the original language that you are proposing to
eliminate was put there so these products could continue to be used.

Wendy


Wendy Brown

Supporting GSA

FPKIMA Technical Liaison

Protiviti Government Services
703-965-2990 (cell)


On Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 8:19 AM Corey Bonnell <Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com>
wrote:

> Hi Wendy,
>
> The intent behind the certificate profiles ballot was that the profile of
> all allowed certificate types issued from a BR-compliant CA were completely
> specified within the BRs. Adding a carve-out to allow the issuance of
> certificates whose profile is not specified and not intended for use
> outside the CA’s infrastructure would seem to go against that goal.
>
>
>
> Is the use of a private PKI not feasible for these internal infrastructure
> certificates?
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Corey
>
>
>
> *From:* Wendy Brown - QT3LB-C <wendy.brown at gsa.gov>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, July 19, 2023 3:54 PM
> *To:* Corey Bonnell <Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com>; CA/B Forum Server
> Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [Servercert-wg] Draft ballot SC-XX: Profiles cleanup ballot
>
>
>
> I would not like to see #3 exclusion for Root CAs removed
>
>
>
> Some CA products when a new CA is established, automatically create some
> internal certificates that are necessary for the operation of the CA
> including possibly a key pair used to sign audit logs with a certificate
> signed by the Root CA that can be used to verify the integrity of the logs
> by verifying the signature. In addition to enabling cert-based
> authentication for trusted roles needing to access the CA, including for
> actions like manually instigating the issuance of a subordinate CA
> certificate or manually issuing a new CRL when there has not been a
> revocation.
>
>
>
> This change would make it so those products could not be compliant with
> the BRs, even though such certificates would never be seen outside the
> supporting infrastructure.
>
>
>
> If the rationale is there are no profiles for internal certificates, then
> I suggest a better fix would be to add the word public in the conflicting
> language in 7.1.2, as the internal certificates that have no BR profile
> should never be seen outside the CA's infrastructure. But removing the
> allowance would potentially trigger a non-compliance during an audit.:
>
> “If the CA asserts compliance with these Baseline Requirements, all
> *public *certificates that it issues MUST comply with one of the
> following certificate profiles, which incorporate, and are derived from RFC
>
> 5280.”
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Wendy
>
>
>
> Wendy Brown
>
> Supporting GSA
>
> FPKIMA Technical Liaison
>
> Protiviti Government Services
>
> 703-965-2990 (cell)
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 10:16 AM Corey Bonnell via Servercert-wg <
> servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
> While adding support for SC-62 linting for TLS certificates in pkilint, a
> few issues were identified with the current language in section 6 and 7 of
> the BRs. To address these issues, I created a draft ballot on Github. The
> draft ballot text can be viewed here:
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/SC63..CBonnell:servercert:sc62-cleanup
> .
>
>
>
> Chris Clements of the Chrome team reviewed and offered to endorse, so
> we’re looking for one more endorser to push this ballot forward.
>
>
>
> Please let me know if you have any feedback on the proposed language or if
> you’d be willing to endorse.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Corey
>
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>
>
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