[Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot - Debian Weak Keys (and related vulnerabilities)

Roman Fischer roman.fischer at swisssign.com
Thu Aug 18 15:28:23 UTC 2022


Dear all,

I am unsure how to interpret the following parts of the suggested change:

>iii) All RSA Public Key lengths supported by the CA up to and including 4096 bits;
>>CAs MUST check for Debian weak keys for all RSA modulus lengths and exponents that they accept.

Isn’t the “up to and including 4096 bits” redundant as it is included in “all RSA modulus lengths and exponents that they accept” ? Or is there a reason why iii) limits the size to 4096 bits?


>For Debian weak keys not covered above, the CA SHALL take actions to minimize the probability of certificate issuance.

What other Debian weak keys are there besides the ones described by i)…iv) ? Is this again referring to key with lengths >4096 bits?


Kind regards
Roman Fischer, SwissSign

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Chris Kemmerer via Servercert-wg
Sent: Montag, 25. Juli 2022 18:19
To: Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek at digicert.com>; Aaron Gable <aaron at letsencrypt.org>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Cc: Hanno Böck <hanno at hboeck.de>
Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot - Debian Weak Keys (and related vulnerabilities)


Based on discussion in the SCWG call of July 21 2022, we are 1) removing the language directing readers to external "suggested tools" and 2) seeking endorsers.

Many thanks to all for the useful input.

Chris K

=====
--- Motion Begins ---

This ballot is intended to clarify CA responsibilities regarding weak key vulnerabilities (including specific guidance for Debian weak key, ROCA and Fermat attack vulnerabilities) and modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version 1.8.4:

Proposed ballot language:


4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate


Replace:


4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber’s Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.debian.org%2FSSLkeys&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=latOg7wd1Q10qU8amos9cHEkPzJRO3SM5tw7QSD9Bto%3D&reserved=0>)


With:


4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber’s Private Key (such as those identified in 6.1.1.3(4)).


---


6.1.1.3. Subscriber Key Pair Generation


Replace:


The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more of the following conditions are met:


1. The Key Pair does not meet the requirements set forth in Section 6.1.5 and/or Section 6.1.6;
2. There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed;
3. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Applicant's Private Key to compromise;
4. The CA has previously been made aware that the Applicant's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise, such as through the provisions of Section 4.9.1.1;
5. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method to easily compute the Applicant's Private Key based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key, see https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.debian.org%2FSSLkeys&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=latOg7wd1Q10qU8amos9cHEkPzJRO3SM5tw7QSD9Bto%3D&reserved=0>).


With:


The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more of the following occurs:


1) The requested Public Key does not meet the requirements set forth in Sections 6.1.5 and/or 6.1.6;
2) The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise;
3) The CA has previously been made aware that the Subscriber's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise, such as through the provisions of Section 4.9.1.1;
4) The Public Key corresponds to an industry demonstrated weak Private Key, in particular:

a) In the case of ROCA vulnerability, the CA SHALL reject keys identified by the tools available at https://github.com/crocs-muni/roca<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcrocs-muni%2Froca&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=kSu3V5P64d4Deja2OK5EvHg8jlqlfGovpUmGRQybwTs%3D&reserved=0> or equivalent.
b) In the case of Debian weak keys (https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.debian.org%2FSSLkeys&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=latOg7wd1Q10qU8amos9cHEkPzJRO3SM5tw7QSD9Bto%3D&reserved=0>), the CA SHALL reject at least keys generated by the flawed OpenSSL version with the combination of the following parameters:

i) Big-endian 32-bit, little-endian 32-bit, and little-endian 64-bit architecture;
ii) Process ID of 0 to 32767, inclusive;
iii) All RSA Public Key lengths supported by the CA up to and including 4096 bits;
iv) rnd, nornd, and noreadrnd OpenSSL random file state.

c) In the case of Close Primes vulnerability, the CA SHALL reject weak keys identified within 100 rounds using Fermat’s factorization method

For Debian weak keys not covered above, the CA SHALL take actions to minimize the probability of certificate issuance.

CAs MUST check for Debian weak keys for all RSA modulus lengths and exponents that they accept.

--- Motion Ends ---

=====
On 7/13/2022 3:51 PM, Tim Hollebeek wrote:
I agree with the strategy of stating the requirements and then using requirements-free language to reference the ancillary resources, but a lowercased 2119 word is still a 2119 word (“These words are *often* capitalized” – RFC 2119, emphasis mine).

It’s best to rephrase non-requirements to avoid MUST, SHALL, SHOULD, and MAY entirely.  As well as required, recommended, and optional 😊

Something like: “CAs might find these tools useful”, or even something like: “Additional information is available from these resources.”

Referencing something does not in any way imply it is free from errors or even that it can be used in a BR-compliant way.  I give you the BR reference to the original RFC 6844 as an example.  The original RFC 6844 had multiple errors and was rather incompatible with the BRs, but got added to the BRs anyway.  Oops.

We should make sure the resources we reference are high enough quality to be useful, but I think the standard ballot / discussion process can handle that.

-Tim

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org><mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Aaron Gable via Servercert-wg
Sent: Friday, July 8, 2022 12:44 PM
To: Chris Kemmerer <chris at ssl.com><mailto:chris at ssl.com>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org><mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Cc: Hanno Böck <hanno at hboeck.de><mailto:hanno at hboeck.de>
Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot - Debian Weak Keys (and related vulnerabilities)

It seems to me like the appropriate line to walk would be:
First, state the requirements (such as blocking debian weak keys, or blocking ROCA keys) in plain language, much as the current ballot does. This makes the requirement that CAs must abide by clear.
Second, provide links to tools that may be helpful. Do not preface these links with any normative language, i.e. say "CAs may find these tools useful: ...", not "CAs MAY use these tools: ...". This serves the purpose of providing easy access to the helpful external resources, but without stating that their contents have been vetted and fully approved.

Does that makes sense?
Aaron

On Fri, Jul 1, 2022 at 12:13 PM Chris Kemmerer via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>> wrote:
INTRO

Thanks to all who participated in the very useful discussion regarding this proposed ballot in our June 23 2022 call.

An important point was raised about how to handle external links to recommended (but not required) resources. In "Section 6.1.1.3. Subscriber Key Pair Generation" of the proposed language, we require CAs to reject requests for certificates with "industry demonstrated weak Private Keys" (as "SHALL" and "MUST" directives), then provide links to "Suggested tools that CAs MAY use" to judge requests.

THE QUESTIONS

The questions here are:

  1.  If we direct issuers to external resources in CABF documents, what level of CABF-level vetting should be required or expected for those links?
  2.  And is the ballot process itself sufficient vetting for such links?
OUR ASSUMPTION AND EXISTING LINKS

We are assuming that for, weak key detection, we DO want to provide useful links to help guide certificate issuers (see sidebar below). Note that the current BR language already includes one such link, to a page maintained by Debian (https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.debian.org%2FSSLkeys&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=latOg7wd1Q10qU8amos9cHEkPzJRO3SM5tw7QSD9Bto%3D&reserved=0>), though with a vetted status unknown to us.

Our proposed ballot language also adds a requirement to reject keys "identified by the tools available at https://github.com/crocs-muni/roca<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcrocs-muni%2Froca&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=kSu3V5P64d4Deja2OK5EvHg8jlqlfGovpUmGRQybwTs%3D&reserved=0> or equivalent". As we recall it, this resource was suggested by a CABF participant now departed, and again the status of vetting for this link is unknown.

For what it's worth, a quick scan of the BRs shows that, apart from weak key guidance, we do include links to other external resources which are presumably foundational enough to not require vetting. These include:

  1.  IETF (various RFCs, ex. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5890<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ftools.ietf.org%2Fhtml%2Frfc5890&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Opg6%2B7kfu651E7Svw8C0sejKk1LGzhc1%2Bnnj7m2WYwU%3D&reserved=0>)
  2.  IANA (registry information, ex. https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.iana.org%2Fassignments%2Fiana-ipv4-special-registry%2Fiana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=fdA0UVGthAK3F77jPHAqKii%2BPGNt%2B2rS3NjJ%2BFtf6Wg%3D&reserved=0>)
  3.  NIST (publications, ex. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-89/SP-800-89_November2006.pdf<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fcsrc.nist.gov%2Fpublications%2Fnistpubs%2F800-89%2FSP-800-89_November2006.pdf&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=y9UB0uSnhXYKtbiN4ESMcmwIM4sr8qJbJDFDwwlsUWA%3D&reserved=0>)
  4.  and the Mozilla Foundation (the Public Suffix List, https://publicsuffix.org/<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fpublicsuffix.org%2F&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=jJqAqKptXud2SZjkbcI92YUdb0DvteoD%2FEsHEZt%2FpcA%3D&reserved=0>).
"CROSS-VETTING" OF PROPOSED RESOURCES

As Dimitris stated in the call, the two other links included as resources which MAY be utilized:

  1.  https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FCVE-2008-0166&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=0k5QBvjZyyvebSJVBx51MH0OqUupkg9TBxaLvyk9nn4%3D&reserved=0>
  2.  https://github.com/HARICA-official/debian-weak-keys<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FHARICA-official%2Fdebian-weak-keys&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=WukZBHITM0CSeLIi8gXDByEqTlVmKKa1jitOkvIbwDY%3D&reserved=0>
... have been "cross-vetted" by their respective providers (HARICA and Sectigo).

This discussion was spurred by a suggestion from Adriano Santoni to consider adding a third resource (Hanno Böck's badkeys tool):

  1.  https://github.com/badkeys/badkeys<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fbadkeys%2Fbadkeys&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=6AuSRWfjrDjwVXCZFsSvAUs7%2BjI26EidYiFCfAQ8mNY%3D&reserved=0> (web version: https://badkeys.info/<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbadkeys.info%2F&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=h2m22Xc%2BkA32ApknLTy%2FxPUfTTvAc33PYnPoRbY%2BJss%3D&reserved=0>)
...for which no such CABF-level "cross-vetting" has been performed (as far as we know).
We ourselves very much appreciate the effort that went into creating these tools and intend to utilize them. However:
TO RESTATE THE QUESTIONS

  1.  Is the ballot process itself considered adequate vetting for external links in CABF documents?
  2.  If not, what vetting would we consider adequate?
SIDEBAR: OTHER OPTIONS

  1.  In the June 23 call, an external, CABF-supported resource (i.e. a separate web page with appropriate links) was considered, discussed, and rejected as likely to increase overhead and decrease reliability. Based on this, our sense is that any links deemed useful should indeed be included in the actual ballot language itself.
  2.  And finally, as raised in previous discussions: Would some sort of disclaimer be appropriate for external links, and if so should it extend beyond the 6.1.1.3 links to cover external resources more generally?
CLOSING REMARKS

Thanks.
________________________________
From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>> on behalf of Adriano Santoni via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>>
Sent: Sunday, June 12, 2022 7:11 PM
To: servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> <servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>>
Cc: Hanno Böck <hanno at hboeck.de<mailto:hanno at hboeck.de>>
Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot - Debian Weak Keys (and related vulnerabilities)


Might a third option be the tool developed by Hanno Boeck?

https://github.com/badkeys/badkeys<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fbadkeys%2Fbadkeys&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=6AuSRWfjrDjwVXCZFsSvAUs7%2BjI26EidYiFCfAQ8mNY%3D&reserved=0>

From our point of view it's an effective tool.

Adriano


Il 09/06/2022 15:18, Chris Kemmerer via Servercert-wg ha scritto:
Suggested tools that CAs MAY use to obtain lists of Debian weak keys include:

  - https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FCVE-2008-0166&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=0k5QBvjZyyvebSJVBx51MH0OqUupkg9TBxaLvyk9nn4%3D&reserved=0> provides a generator, for the complete set of parameters listed above, that runs on any modern 64-bit Linux system; it also provides complete sets of pregenerated keys for the most common RSA key sizes.
  - https://github.com/HARICA-official/debian-weak-keys<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FHARICA-official%2Fdebian-weak-keys&data=05%7C01%7Croman.fischer%40swisssign.com%7Cbdb3cc7572be4c0ddf6608da6e596272%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637943628629168093%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=WukZBHITM0CSeLIi8gXDByEqTlVmKKa1jitOkvIbwDY%3D&reserved=0> provides a generator, for a subset of the parameters listed above, that can take advantage of a computer cluster.
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