[cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain Authorization Document

Wed Jan 3 20:17:20 UTC 2018

Given the impact of this, while I don't suggest that the VWG shouldn't take
this up, I also don't think that should be reason not to continue the
discussion on the public list.

While I understand that Mads and Adriano have suggested they see value in
3.2.2.4.1, I do not think there's a sufficiently compelling demonstration
that it remotely approaches the level of assurance of the other methods, or
that it fundamentally can. Given that, I do not think 3.2.2.4.1 should be
considered - even in modified form - to be equivalent.

In considering how one might theorhetically reform 3.2.2.4.1, I would
suggest it's incumbent upon those supporting it to demonstrate how it could
achieve that level of assurance. Barring that, we are much better as an
industry and a Forum from removing 3.2.2.4.1 unless and until such time as
an appropriate demonstration can be made. This avoids introducing
significant security risk to the ecosystem due to the Forum's (rather slow)
deliberative process.

On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 11:08 AM, Kirk Hall via Public <public at cabforum.org>
wrote:

> Tim H, you are chairing the Validation Working Group now – can the VWG
> take up possible revisions to BR 3.2.2.4.1 as an agenda item?
>
>
>
> *From:* Public [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] *On Behalf Of *Adriano
> Santoni via Public
> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 3, 2018 5:12 AM
> *To:* public at cabforum.org
> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and
> Domain Authorization Document
>
>
>
> I also concur with Mads, and would support the addition of more
> requirements to method 3.2.2.4.1.
>
> I like the solution proposed by Mad, but (if I am not mistaken) there is
> not a specific Whois record field for that information (org number), and I
> would avoid inserting that information in a field that's not expressly
> designed for it.
>
> Other solutions may also work, and would be easier to implement, like e.g.
> mandating a full Registrant address, in the Whois record, which must be one
> of the official addresses of the Registrant as found in a QIIS/QGIS
> (excluding, however, all information sources that just publish
> self-reported organization information, which cannot be regarded as
> "qualified" information sources and IMO should not be used in the vetting
> process), and then the "reliable method of communication" should be one
> that is found in the matching QIIS/QGIS record.
>
> Not sure about method 3.2.2.4.5, at this time, as I have not yet seen a
> sufficient discussion on it, and I am not sure how it can effectively be
> used "as is" to obtain a fraudulent certificate.
>
> Adriano
>
>
> Il 03/01/2018 13:27, Doug Beattie via Public ha scritto:
>
> I agree with Mads and am also supportive of a ballot that removes
> 3.2.2.4.5 and adds some more detail to 3.2.2.4.1.
>
>
>
> Doug
>
>
>
> *From:* Public [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org
> <public-bounces at cabforum.org>] *On Behalf Of *Mads Egil Henriksveen via
> Public
> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 3, 2018 7:11 AM
> *To:* Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
> <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List
> <public at cabforum.org> <public at cabforum.org>; geoffk at apple.com
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain
> Authorization Document
>
>
>
>
>
> Then I think we should change the requirements.
>
>
>
> As a representative for a CA with a background in strong identity
> validation (both for natural and legal persons) I find these examples from
> Ryan and Jeremy to represent a very bad practice. If this really reflects
> the current practice in the industry, we need to tighten up the
> requirements and make them much more specific.
>
>
>
> From my point of view (and with my background) I find method 3.2.2.4.1
> useful. We must remember that the domain validation methods also are used
> for EV (and not only OV) and when we have a strongly validated and verified
> organization (e.g. based on the EV requirements) it makes sense to allow
> for the organization to apply for certificates including domain names owned
> by the organization itself.
>
>
>
> I understand that there are doubts about how to ensure that the
> organization really owns the domain (like in Jeremy’s example), but it
> should not be too hard to “strengthen” the link between the applicant and
> the domain owner in terms of rewriting section 3.2.2.4.1. A match in the
> organization name only should of course not be allowed.
>
>
>
> In Norway every organization is given a unique organization number by a
> national authority and in the registry for the TLD=.no domains (see
> www.norid.no) we find this organization number as a part of the domain
> name registrant information. In such cases, we allow for issuance based on
> 3.2.2.4.1 if the domain name registrant information exactly match
> organization information (i.e. by country, organization name and
> organization number).  I think this is a reasonable use case for method
> 3.2.2.4.1.
>
>
>
> Personally I am more concerned about the possibility we give to any
> stakeholder in the ecosystem who takes a role in controlling a domain to
> get an OV (and EV) certificate based on domain control only. This was
> discussed also in the F2F meeting in Bilbao last year – see
> https://cabforum.org/2016/05/25/2016-05/#The-Role-of-
> Identity-in-TLS-Certificates.
>
>
>
> Therefore, I am supportive for a ballot which removes 3.2.2.4.5 and keep
> 3.2.2.4.1 but strengthen this up to allow for use cases like the one
> described above.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Mads
>
>
>
> *From:* Public [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org
> <public-bounces at cabforum.org>] *On Behalf Of *Jeremy Rowley via Public
> *Sent:* onsdag 3. januar 2018 05:47
> *To:* geoffk at apple.com; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List
> <public at cabforum.org> <public at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain
> Authorization Document
>
>
>
> I disagree. The requirements do not specify that.  All that is required is
> the name of the applicant was verified under 3.2.2.1 and that the register
> specify the domain contact is the applicant. If Google, Inc. is specified
> as the domain contact, no address matching is required.
>
>
>
> *From:* geoffk at apple.com [mailto:geoffk at apple.com <geoffk at apple.com>]
> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 2, 2018 4:34 PM
> *To:* Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>; CA/Browser Forum Public
> Discussion List <public at cabforum.org>
> *Cc:* Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com>; Adriano Santoni <
> adriano.santoni at staff.aruba.it>
> *Subject:* Re: [cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain
> Authorization Document
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Dec 22, 2017, at 12:09 PM, Jeremy Rowley via Public <
> public at cabforum.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> The attack vector is easier than that.
>
>    1. I use very stringent processes to verify that Google, Inc. is a
>    legit company in Utah.
>    2. I verify that Jeremy did indeed incorporate Google, Inc.
>    3. I call Jeremy at the phone listed for Google, Inc., the Utah
>    corporation
>    4. The domain information shows Google, Inc. as owning google.com
>    5. Certificate issues.
>
>
>
> Obviously this would be caught in every CA’s high risk checks, but the
> point remains valid. Regardless of the expertise and thoroughness of the
> org check, the specs lack any time between the verified org and the actual
> domain because orgs are not unique on a global basis.
>
>
>
>
>
> For item 4, you have to verify that “the Applicant is the Domain
> Contact”.  Obviously it’s insufficient to just compare names—you must
> verify every element of the WHOIS contact matches the Applicant, that’s
> typically name, postal address, phone number, and e-mail.
>
>
>
>
>
>
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