<div dir="ltr">Given the impact of this, while I don't suggest that the VWG shouldn't take this up, I also don't think that should be reason not to continue the discussion on the public list.<div><br></div><div>While I understand that Mads and Adriano have suggested they see value in 3.2.2.4.1, I do not think there's a sufficiently compelling demonstration that it remotely approaches the level of assurance of the other methods, or that it fundamentally can. Given that, I do not think 3.2.2.4.1 should be considered - even in modified form - to be equivalent.</div><div><br></div><div>In considering how one might theorhetically reform 3.2.2.4.1, I would suggest it's incumbent upon those supporting it to demonstrate how it could achieve that level of assurance. Barring that, we are much better as an industry and a Forum from removing 3.2.2.4.1 unless and until such time as an appropriate demonstration can be made. This avoids introducing significant security risk to the ecosystem due to the Forum's (rather slow) deliberative process.</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 11:08 AM, Kirk Hall via Public <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">Tim H, you are chairing the Validation Working Group now – can the VWG take up possible revisions to BR 3.2.2.4.1 as an agenda item?<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span style="color:windowtext"> Public [mailto:<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public-bounces@<wbr>cabforum.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Adriano Santoni via Public<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, January 3, 2018 5:12 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain Authorization Document<u></u><u></u></span></p>
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</div><div><div class="h5">
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<p>I also concur with Mads, and would support the addition of more requirements to method 3.2.2.4.1.<span style="font-size:12.0pt"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p>I like the solution proposed by Mad, but (if I am not mistaken) there is not a specific Whois record field for that information (org number), and I would avoid inserting that information in a field that's not expressly designed for it.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Other solutions may also work, and would be easier to implement, like e.g. mandating a full Registrant address, in the Whois record, which must be one of the official addresses of the Registrant as found in a QIIS/QGIS (excluding, however, all information
sources that just publish self-reported organization information, which cannot be regarded as "qualified" information sources and IMO should not be used in the vetting process), and then the "reliable method of communication" should be one that is found in
the matching QIIS/QGIS record.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p>Not sure about method 3.2.2.4.5, at this time, as I have not yet seen a sufficient discussion on it, and I am not sure how it can effectively be used "as is" to obtain a fraudulent certificate.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">Adriano<br>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Il 03/01/2018 13:27, Doug Beattie via Public ha scritto:<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">I agree with Mads and am also supportive of a ballot that removes 3.2.2.4.5 and adds some more detail to 3.2.2.4.1.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">Doug</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a name="m_-921283618691426301__MailEndCompose"><span style="color:#1f497d"> </span></a><u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Public [<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">mailto:public-bounces@<wbr>cabforum.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Mads Egil Henriksveen via Public<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, January 3, 2018 7:11 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> Jeremy Rowley <a href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com" target="_blank"><jeremy.rowley@digicert.com></a>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List
<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank"><public@cabforum.org></a>; <a href="mailto:geoffk@apple.com" target="_blank">
geoffk@apple.com</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain Authorization Document<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="NO-BOK" style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">Then I think we should change the requirements.
</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">As a representative for a CA with a background in strong identity validation (both for natural and legal persons) I find these examples from Ryan and Jeremy to represent a very bad practice. If this really reflects
the current practice in the industry, we need to tighten up the requirements and make them much more specific.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">From my point of view (and with my background) I find method 3.2.2.4.1 useful. We must remember that the domain validation methods also are used for EV (and not only OV) and when we have a strongly validated
and verified organization (e.g. based on the EV requirements) it makes sense to allow for the organization to apply for certificates including domain names owned by the organization itself.
</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">I understand that there are doubts about how to ensure that the organization really owns the domain (like in Jeremy’s example), but it should not be too hard to “strengthen” the link between the applicant and
the domain owner in terms of rewriting section 3.2.2.4.1. A match in the organization name only should of course not be allowed.
</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">In Norway every organization is given a unique organization number by a national authority and in the registry for the TLD=.no domains (see
<a href="http://www.norid.no" target="_blank">www.norid.no</a>) we find this organization number as a part of the domain name registrant information. In such cases, we allow for issuance based on 3.2.2.4.1 if the domain name registrant information exactly match organization
information (i.e. by country, organization name and organization number). I think this is a reasonable use case for method 3.2.2.4.1.
</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">Personally I am more concerned about the possibility we give to any stakeholder in the ecosystem who takes a role in controlling a domain to get an OV (and EV) certificate based on domain control only. This was
discussed also in the F2F meeting in Bilbao last year – see <a href="https://cabforum.org/2016/05/25/2016-05/#The-Role-of-Identity-in-TLS-Certificates" target="_blank">
https://cabforum.org/2016/05/<wbr>25/2016-05/#The-Role-of-<wbr>Identity-in-TLS-Certificates</a>.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">Therefore, I am supportive for a ballot which removes 3.2.2.4.5 and keep 3.2.2.4.1 but strengthen this up to allow for use cases like the one described above.</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">Regards</span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1f497d">Mads </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="NO-BOK" style="color:#1f497d"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #e1e1e1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Public [<a href="mailto:public-bounces@cabforum.org" target="_blank">mailto:public-bounces@<wbr>cabforum.org</a>]
<b>On Behalf Of </b>Jeremy Rowley via Public<br>
<b>Sent:</b> onsdag 3. januar 2018 05:47<br>
<b>To:</b> <a href="mailto:geoffk@apple.com" target="_blank">geoffk@apple.com</a>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List
<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank"><public@cabforum.org></a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain Authorization Document<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="NO-BOK"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I disagree. The requirements do not specify that. All that is required is the name of the applicant was verified under 3.2.2.1 and that the register specify the domain contact is the applicant. If Google, Inc. is specified as the domain
contact, no address matching is required.<u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> <a href="mailto:geoffk@apple.com" target="_blank">geoffk@apple.com</a> [<a href="mailto:geoffk@apple.com" target="_blank">mailto:geoffk@apple.com</a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, January 2, 2018 4:34 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Jeremy Rowley <<a href="mailto:jeremy.rowley@digicert.com" target="_blank">jeremy.rowley@digicert.com</a>>; CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a>><br>
<b>Cc:</b> Ryan Sleevi <<a href="mailto:sleevi@google.com" target="_blank">sleevi@google.com</a>>; Adriano Santoni <<a href="mailto:adriano.santoni@staff.aruba.it" target="_blank">adriano.santoni@staff.aruba.<wbr>it</a>><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [cabfpub] Verification of Domain Contact and Domain Authorization Document<u></u><u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">On Dec 22, 2017, at 12:09 PM, Jeremy Rowley via Public <<a href="mailto:public@cabforum.org" target="_blank">public@cabforum.org</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">The attack vector is easier than that.<span class="m_-921283618691426301apple-converted-space"> </span><u></u><u></u></p>
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<ol style="margin-top:0in" start="1" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal">I use very stringent processes to verify that Google, Inc. is a legit company in Utah.<u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal">I verify that Jeremy did indeed incorporate Google, Inc.<span class="m_-921283618691426301apple-converted-space"> </span><u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal">I call Jeremy at the phone listed for Google, Inc., the Utah corporation<u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal">The domain information shows Google, Inc. as owning<span class="m_-921283618691426301apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://google.com/" target="_blank"><span style="color:purple">google.com</span></a><u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal">Certificate issues.<u></u><u></u></li></ol>
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<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Obviously this would be caught in every CA’s high risk checks, but the point remains valid. Regardless of the expertise and thoroughness of the org check, the specs lack any time between the verified org and the actual domain because orgs
are not unique on a global basis.<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">For item 4, you have to verify that “the Applicant is the Domain Contact”. Obviously it’s insufficient to just compare names—you must verify every element of the WHOIS contact matches the Applicant, that’s typically name, postal address,
phone number, and e-mail.<u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"><br>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
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