[cabfpub] Draft Ballot 185 - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates

Ryan Sleevi sleevi at google.com
Tue Jan 31 21:37:19 MST 2017


Except what we're seeing is that subscribers aren't renewing annually -
they're renewing every 13 months (or 27 or 39).

That is, it's unclear that the practical benefit of the buffer is there,
but it'd be great to understand if something is being missed.

Put differently, why cant CAs begin reaching out to their customers one
month before it expires (e.g. on month 11)? What makes month 12 more
special than month 11, from the perspective of the
customer/subscriber/applicant?

For that matter, it would seem like 12 months is *more* customer friendly,
because then they can get into an annual habit of replacing their cert. If
it were 13 months, and CAs continued the current practice of notifying at
some point of (T-1 month / T-2 months), then every year, the subscriber
will be installing the cert one month later - until suddenly they find
themselves in that November/December/January "production freeze" and find
themselves scrambling.

Seems like it's a net-win for everybody at 12 months.

On Tue, Jan 31, 2017 at 8:33 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
wrote:

> I like the concept of shorter validity periods, but I’d suggest a 13 month
> validity period rather than 12. That way subscribers can renew annually
> with a one month buffer period.
>
>
>
> Jeremy
>
>
>
> *From:* Public [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] *On Behalf Of *Ryan
> Sleevi via Public
> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 31, 2017 8:50 PM
> *To:* CABFPub <public at cabforum.org>
> *Cc:* Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com>
> *Subject:* [cabfpub] Draft Ballot 185 - Limiting the Lifetime of
> Certificates
>
>
>
> I'm looking for two endorsers to publicly endorse this ballot.
>
>
>
> Background:
>
> The validity period of certificates represents the single greatest
> impediment towards improving the security of the Web PKI. This is because
> it sets the upper-bound on when legacy behaviours may be safely deprecated,
> while setting a practical lower-bound for how long hacks and workarounds
> need to be carried around by clients.
>
>
>
> Further, in the event of misissuance related to internal control failures,
> rather than external security failures - for example, misissuance due to
> failing to properly vet subject information - the validity period
> represents the risk and exposure to customers and relying parties in the
> absence of revocation information (for example, constrained environments).
>
>
>
> To keep this vote simple, it avoids any discussion of the reuse of
> validation information, described in Section 4.2.1 of the Baseline
> Requirements and Section 11.14.3 of the EV Guidelines.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Sleevi of Google, Inc and
> endorsed by ___ of ___ and ___ of ___ to introduce new Final Maintenance
> Guidelines for the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the
> Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" and the
> "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation
> Certificates"
>
>
>
> -- MOTION BEGINS --
>
> Modify Section 6.3.2 of the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for
> the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" as follows:
>
>
>
> Replace Section 6.3.2 with:
>
> """
>
> 6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods
>
>
>
> Subscriber Certificates issued on or after 1 May 2017 MUST NOT have a
> Validity Period greater than twelve (12) months.
>
>
>
> Subscriber Certificates issued prior to 1 May 2017 MUST NOT have a
> Validity Period greater than thirty-nine (39) months.
>
> """
>
>
>
> Modify Section 9.4 of the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of
> Extended Validation Certificates" as follows:
>
>
>
> Replace Section 9.4 with:
>
> """"
>
> 9.4 Maximum Validity Period for EV Certificate
>
> EV Certificates issued on or after 1 May 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity
> Period greater than twelve (12) months.
>
>
>
> EV Certificates issued prior to 1 May 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period
> greater than twenty seven (27) months.
>
> """
>
> -- MOTION ENDS --
>
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