[cabfpub] Draft Ballot 185 - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates
jeremy.rowley at digicert.com
Tue Jan 31 21:40:43 MST 2017
We see the opposite. Most customers renew annually (at 12 months) despite the certificate being valid an additional month. I think that is primarily because of how we provide the certificates though. We typically start notifying customers three months prior to expiration to ensure a new certificate is in place before the 12 month mark.
From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:sleevi at google.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2017 9:37 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com>
Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <public at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Draft Ballot 185 - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates
Except what we're seeing is that subscribers aren't renewing annually - they're renewing every 13 months (or 27 or 39).
That is, it's unclear that the practical benefit of the buffer is there, but it'd be great to understand if something is being missed.
Put differently, why cant CAs begin reaching out to their customers one month before it expires (e.g. on month 11)? What makes month 12 more special than month 11, from the perspective of the customer/subscriber/applicant?
For that matter, it would seem like 12 months is *more* customer friendly, because then they can get into an annual habit of replacing their cert. If it were 13 months, and CAs continued the current practice of notifying at some point of (T-1 month / T-2 months), then every year, the subscriber will be installing the cert one month later - until suddenly they find themselves in that November/December/January "production freeze" and find themselves scrambling.
Seems like it's a net-win for everybody at 12 months.
On Tue, Jan 31, 2017 at 8:33 PM, Jeremy Rowley <jeremy.rowley at digicert.com <mailto:jeremy.rowley at digicert.com> > wrote:
I like the concept of shorter validity periods, but I’d suggest a 13 month validity period rather than 12. That way subscribers can renew annually with a one month buffer period.
From: Public [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org> ] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via Public
Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2017 8:50 PM
To: CABFPub <public at cabforum.org <mailto:public at cabforum.org> >
Cc: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com <mailto:sleevi at google.com> >
Subject: [cabfpub] Draft Ballot 185 - Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates
I'm looking for two endorsers to publicly endorse this ballot.
The validity period of certificates represents the single greatest impediment towards improving the security of the Web PKI. This is because it sets the upper-bound on when legacy behaviours may be safely deprecated, while setting a practical lower-bound for how long hacks and workarounds need to be carried around by clients.
Further, in the event of misissuance related to internal control failures, rather than external security failures - for example, misissuance due to failing to properly vet subject information - the validity period represents the risk and exposure to customers and relying parties in the absence of revocation information (for example, constrained environments).
To keep this vote simple, it avoids any discussion of the reuse of validation information, described in Section 4.2.1 of the Baseline Requirements and Section 11.14.3 of the EV Guidelines.
The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Sleevi of Google, Inc and endorsed by ___ of ___ and ___ of ___ to introduce new Final Maintenance Guidelines for the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" and the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates"
-- MOTION BEGINS --
Modify Section 6.3.2 of the "Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" as follows:
Replace Section 6.3.2 with:
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods
Subscriber Certificates issued on or after 1 May 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period greater than twelve (12) months.
Subscriber Certificates issued prior to 1 May 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period greater than thirty-nine (39) months.
Modify Section 9.4 of the "Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates" as follows:
Replace Section 9.4 with:
9.4 Maximum Validity Period for EV Certificate
EV Certificates issued on or after 1 May 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period greater than twelve (12) months.
EV Certificates issued prior to 1 May 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period greater than twenty seven (27) months.
-- MOTION ENDS --
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