[cabfpub] downgrade DV UI RE: OIDs for DV and OV

Dean Coclin Dean_Coclin at symantec.com
Wed Nov 5 02:07:17 UTC 2014

I also disagree with that blanket statement, especially the word "downgrade". There are many legitimate uses for DV certs and that shouldn't be diminished or "downgraded". I agree with Gerv that DV should not "go away"

For the majority of consumers though, do you think it's sufficient to know that they are connected to "match.com"? I would think it would be better for them to know that they are connected to "Match.com, Inc". More specifically, is DV a sufficient use case for the majority of Internet e-commerce? 

-----Original Message-----
From: Gervase Markham [mailto:gerv at mozilla.org] 
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2014 8:39 PM
To: Richard Wang; Dean Coclin; public at cabforum.org
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] downgrade DV UI RE: OIDs for DV and OV

On 04/11/14 01:52, Richard Wang wrote:
> I think we not only need to add DV and OV OID to end user certificate, 
> but also the browsers *should downgrade the DV UI* to tell users that 
> this site true identity is not verified!

I disagree with that as a blanket statement.

There are many Internet businesses which are known simply by their domain name. "match.com", and so on. For them, a DV certificate, which proves that the holder of the certificate owns match.com, has verified their identity to a degree which is often sufficient.

Clearly, this is not all you need in every case, but it's not true to say that "identity is not verified" for DV certificates. It depends what sort of identity verification an end user needs.

> Chrome display a GREEN padlock like OV and say “Identity verified”, is 
> this info correct?

It says that underneath a reprint of the domain name - which is the piece of identity which has been verified.

> All comments are welcome, I wish the DV SSL will die in the future 
> since the site identity is more important than encryption, spoof site 
> has SSL is no any good meaning and is more dangerous than no SSL.

DV is the only plausible route to the web being secure by default. It is not going to go away.


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