[cabfpub] Use of wildcard certificates by cloud operators

Rich Smith richard.smith at comodo.com
Wed May 7 15:18:11 UTC 2014

We have wording in the BRs already regarding high risk request checking.
Are there any specific short-comings with that that you'd like to see
addressed in regards to this topic?

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Geoff Keating [mailto:geoffk at apple.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 07, 2014 10:02 AM
> To: Kelvin Yiu
> Cc: richard.smith at comodo.com; ben at digicert.com; Gervase Markham;
> sleevi at google.com; public at cabforum.org
> Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Use of wildcard certificates by cloud operators
> On 6 May 2014, at 12:58 pm, Kelvin Yiu <kelviny at exchange.microsoft.com>
> wrote:
> > It sounds like we have some consensus to move forward on the issue. I
> can draft a proposal that include the following:
> >
> > 1. Update Section 11.1.3 to clarify that wildcard is allowed for
> domains for cloud operators. I hear that when the forum last updated
> section 11.1.3, there was a lot of headache involved, so I will try to
> be precise and keep the changes to a minimum.
> > 2. Update Section 13.1.5 to allow cloud operators a chance to remedy
> fraudulent sub domains and within a reasonable time period. The idea is
> that CAs would still be required to contact the cloud operator. But if
> the cloud operator can take down any fraudulent site within n days (I
> think n should be less than 7 days) and can attest the private key is
> not compromised, revocation is not necessary.
> I'd like to also see some kind of filtering for phishing-related
> domains, some kind of 'best effort' to keep misleading names out in the
> first place.
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