[cabfpub] Use of wildcard certificates by cloud operators

[Geoff Keating]

On 6 May 2014, at 12:58 pm, Kelvin Yiu <kelviny at exchange.microsoft.com> wrote:

> It sounds like we have some consensus to move forward on the issue. I can draft a proposal that include the following:
> 
> 1. Update Section 11.1.3 to clarify that wildcard is allowed for domains for cloud operators. I hear that when the forum last updated section 11.1.3, there was a lot of headache involved, so I will try to be precise and keep the changes to a minimum. 
> 2. Update Section 13.1.5 to allow cloud operators a chance to remedy fraudulent sub domains and within a reasonable time period. The idea is that CAs would still be required to contact the cloud operator. But if the cloud operator can take down any fraudulent site within n days (I think n should be less than 7 days) and can attest the private key is not compromised, revocation is not necessary. 

I'd like to also see some kind of filtering for phishing-related domains, some kind of 'best effort' to keep misleading names out in the first place.
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