[cabfpub] [cabfquest] FW: SHA1 Deprecation Ballot

Ben Wilson ben at digicert.com
Thu Feb 20 15:41:18 UTC 2014

The problem is that we need more certainty for planning purposes and to be able to make meaningful progress in order to accomplish what Microsoft is recommending for us to do.  This is merely ratifying what we all know is the de facto policy due to Microsoft's position, which they have indicated will not change.  We can tweak this plan later in July 2015 if  Microsoft tweaks its policy, and between now and then we'll have the opportunity to collect data.  For now, I believe most CAs are already in compliance.

-----Original Message-----
From: "Bruce Morton" <bruce.morton at entrust.com>
Sent: ‎2/‎20/‎2014 6:38 AM
To: "questions at cabforum.org" <questions at cabforum.org>
Subject: [cabfquest] FW: [cabfpub] SHA1 Deprecation Ballot

I’m concerned with this ballot.
Microsoft has stated a policy, but have also stated that they may change the policy in 2015. Nevertheless, all CAs must comply with Microsoft’s policy as it evolves.
If a change is made to the Baseline Requirements, then the CAB Forum should consider that they will change the policy if Microsoft does.
If the CAB Forum wants to manage this policy themselves, then there should be work done to get data to justify the policy. When should we protect against collision? When should we protect against Preimage and Second-Preimage? When will SHA2 be sufficiently supported? If the CAB Forum is not doing work to get this data, then how do you justify the policy?
If Microsoft is doing the work to create the plan for SHA1 deprecation, then I think that the CAs should just follow their lead. When the plan is finalized, then it should be incorporated into the BRs.
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of Ben Wilson
Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2014 3:02 PM
To: public at cabforum.org
Subject: [cabfpub] SHA1 Deprecation Ballot
I’m not sure whether I’ve captured it all, but here is a rough draft of a possible ballot for the Baseline Requirements. 
Effective immediately CAs SHOULD begin migrating away from using the SHA-1 hashing algorithm to sign SSL/TLS and code signing certificates.   
Beginning January 1, 2016, CAs SHALL NOT use the SHA-1 hashing algorithm to sign SSL/TLS or code signing certificates.
Please provide your comments, edits, etc., 
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/public/attachments/20140220/0a3f0b6f/attachment-0002.html>

More information about the Public mailing list