[cabfpub] Need exception to 1024-bit revocation requirement
rob.stradling at comodo.com
Fri Jun 7 20:06:52 UTC 2013
On 07/06/13 18:32, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> 1) Are there any intermediates involved that may be 1024-bit in order
> to accommodate these devices?
Assuming the Visa devices can handle Intermediates, might the following
- Issue a dedicated Intermediate that, after Dec 31st 2013, will issue
new 1024-bit certs for Visa devices.
- Ask the browsers to blacklist that Intermediate.
- Declare (by adding an exception to the BRs and/or by updating Root
Program policies) that certs issued by blacklisted Intermediates are
considered out-of-scope for the BRs / WebPKI.
(I realize this isn't quite what Microsoft's disallowedcert.stl, NSS's
active distrust flags, etc, were intended to be used for! But could
this idea work?)
> 2) Can you share the certificate extension profile(s) used in the
> issuance of these certificates, for any other concerns that may
> involve "exceptions" to the BRs. For example, basicConstraints and the
> While I'm extremely sympathetic to the real world issues that come up
> with any change to the Web PKI, I'm also extremely uncomfortable with
> the notion of exceptions because something is hard or expensive,
> because it creates certain perverse incentives.
>>From the perspective of the Trust Store Program, what message does it
> send all the other members (who may or may not participate in the
> CA/Browser Forum) who proceeded to phase these out, and may have also
> incurred significant costs in doing so - financial or technical. It's
> very difficult to establish a reasonable and equitable bar here -
> saying exceptions will be granted if it costs $X to comply would
> naturally favour larger parties, while other approaches, such as
> percentages, advantage others.
> "Security" is far from black and white, a point I well understand, but
> I think we stand at the edge of a very slippery slope, and I want to
> make sure we recognize that in these discussions.
> When we talk about the Web PKI, we must realize there's two layers
> 1) How people "intend" for things to work
> 2) How it actually works.
> I hear your argument for an exception to be arguing from a position of
> the first point. I'm trying to understand the implications from the
> position of the second point, since in the end, that's the only one
> that matters.
> On Fri, Jun 7, 2013 at 9:29 AM, Rick Andrews <Rick_Andrews at symantec.com> wrote:
>> The problem is that any CA that has issued such SSL certs to such non-web PKI applications, and needs to continue to issue them for business continuity, will fail their audit and will have to engage in a discussion with each trust store owner to convince them to retain their roots.
>> It's not just us and its not just this particular usage. Other CAs have the same issue.
>> On Jun 7, 2013, at 9:13 AM, "Phillip" <philliph at comodo.com> wrote:
>>> I thought that the original point of the drop dead date was that the browsers are going to stop trusting 1024 bit certs at some point in the future.
>>> Ergo there should be no need for an exception. Mozilla, IE, Google etc. just turn off support for the 1024 bit certs in their browsers. The Visa certs are issued as before but the only devices that will accept them are the Visa POS terminals. (Point of Sale)
>>> So what is the problem?
>> Public mailing list
>> Public at cabforum.org
> Public mailing list
> Public at cabforum.org
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