[cabfpub] Ballot 97 - Prevention of Unknown Certificate Contents
robin at comodo.com
Wed Feb 20 17:38:52 UTC 2013
Comodo votes 'yes'.
From: public-bounces at cabforum.org [mailto:public-bounces at cabforum.org]
On Behalf Of Jeremy Rowley
Sent: 07 February 2013 04:45
To: public at cabforum.org
Subject: [cabfpub] Ballot 97 - Prevention of Unknown Certificate
If passed, the motion will restrict CAs from issuing Certificates with
extensions and other contents that the CA doesn't understand or have a
purpose of including in the certificate.
Jeremy Rowley made the following motion, and Ryan Hurst and Robin Alden
... Motion Begins ...
... Erratum Begins ...
A. In Section 10.2.3, after the first paragraph, insert: "The CA SHALL
establish and follow a documented procedure for verifying all data
requested for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant."
B. In Appendix B, add paragraph numbers to the headings: "(1) Root CA
Certificate", "(2) Subordinate CA Certificate", and "(3) Subscriber
C. In three places in Appendix B, delete: "All other fields and
extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280."
D. In Appendix B, insert paragraph 4, as follows
"(4) All Certificates
All other fields and extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280.
The CA SHALL NOT issue a Certificate that contains a keyUsage flag,
extendedKeyUsage value, Certificate extension, or other data not
specified in this Appendix B unless the CA is aware of a reason for
including the data in the Certificate.
CAs SHALL NOT issue a Certificate with:
a) Extensions that do not apply in the context of the public Internet
(such as an extendedKeyUsage value for a service that is only valid in
the context of a privately managed network), unless:
i. such value falls within an OID arc for which the Applicant
demonstrates ownership; or
ii. the Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the data
in a public context; or
b) semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party about the
certificate information verified by the CA (such as including
extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to
verify that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware
due to remote issuance).
... Erratum ends ...
The review period for this ballot shall commence at 21:00 UTC on 7
February 2013 and will close at 21:00 UTC on 14 February 2013. Unless
the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will
start immediately thereafter and will close at 21:00 UTC on 21 February
2013. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.
... Motions ends ...
A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the
A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to
abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear
responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any
representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period
will be counted.
Voting members are listed here: http://www.cabforum.org/forum.html
In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes
cast by members in the CA category and one half or more of the votes
cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Also, at least
six members must participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor,
voting against or abstaining.
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