[cabfpub] Ballot 97 - Prevention of Unknown Certificate Contents

Håvard Molland haavardm at opera.com
Wed Feb 20 08:47:58 UTC 2013

Opera Software votes yes

On 02/07/2013 05:44 AM, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> If passed, the motion will restrict CAs from issuing Certificates with 
> extensions and other contents that the CA doesn't understand or have a 
> purpose of including in the certificate.
> -----
> Jeremy Rowley made the following motion, and Ryan Hurst and Robin 
> Alden endorsed it:
> ... Motion Begins ...
> ... Erratum Begins ...
> A. In Section 10.2.3, after the first paragraph, insert: "The CA SHALL 
> establish and follow a documented procedure for verifying all data 
> requested for inclusion in the Certificate by the Applicant."
> B. In Appendix B, add paragraph numbers to the headings: "(1) Root CA 
> Certificate", "(2) Subordinate CA Certificate", and "(3) Subscriber 
> Certificate".
> C. In three places in Appendix B, delete: "All other fields and 
> extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 5280."
> D. In Appendix B, insert paragraph 4, as follows
> "(4) All Certificates
> All other fields and extensions MUST be set in accordance with RFC 
> 5280. The CA SHALL NOT issue a Certificate that contains a keyUsage 
> flag, extendedKeyUsage value, Certificate extension, or other data not 
> specified in this Appendix B unless the CA is aware of a reason for 
> including the data in the Certificate.
> CAs SHALL NOT issue a Certificate with:
> a) Extensions that do not apply in the context of the public Internet 
> (such as an extendedKeyUsage value for a service that is only valid in 
> the context of a privately managed network), unless:
> i. such value falls within an OID arc for which the Applicant 
> demonstrates ownership; or
> ii. the Applicant can otherwise demonstrate the right to assert the 
> data in a public context; or
> b) semantics that, if included, will mislead a Relying Party about the 
> certificate information verified by the CA (such as including 
> extendedKeyUsage value for a smart card, where the CA is not able to 
> verify that the corresponding Private Key is confined to such hardware 
> due to remote issuance).
> ... Erratum ends ...
> The review period for this ballot shall commence at 21:00 UTC on 7 
> February 2013 and will close at 21:00 UTC on 14 February 2013. Unless 
> the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period 
> will start immediately thereafter and will close at 21:00 UTC on 21 
> February 2013. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this 
> thread.
> ... Motions ends ...
> A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear 'yes' in the 
> response.
> A vote against must indicate a clear 'no' in the response. A vote to 
> abstain must indicate a clear 'abstain' in the response. Unclear 
> responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any 
> representative of a voting member before the close of the voting 
> period will be counted.
> Voting members are listed here: http://www.cabforum.org/forum.html
> In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes 
> cast by members in the CA category and one half or more of the votes 
> cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Also, at 
> least six members must participate in the ballot, either by voting in 
> favor, voting against or abstaining.
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