[cabfpub] WAS: RE: [cabfman] Update of Yngve's BR 1.1 issues + #10

[Carsten.Dahlenkamp at t-systems.com]

Yngve, All,


This is not related to your suggested changes in the first place, I was wondering about this item before - hopefully someone can help :-) 

>  10.  The Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made
>  arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificate;
>
>  11.  The Subordinate CA’s right to issue Certificates under these
>  Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Subordinate CA
>  has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;
 

This item seems to allow, that a CA "A" ceasing their operation may "hand-over" their revocation infrastructure (CRLs, OCSP) to another CA "B" - so there is no need to revoke all the still valid EE certs issued by "B" (let's assume "A" was not compromised and therefore there is no need to revoke EE certificates).


How would this be compliant to the BR's section 13.2.5 OCSP Signing:

<snip> OCSP responses MUST either:
1. Be signed by the CA that issued the Certificates whose revocation status is being checked, or
2. Be signed by an OCSP Responder whose Certificate is signed by the CA that issued the Certificate whose
revocation status is being checked


Maybe I'm totally wrong, but as far as I understand item 1. is not an allowed scenario here (unless "A" and "B" are operated by the same organization), because it would mean that "A"'s private key is handed-over to "B", which is defined as key compromise leading to revoke "A"'s CA certificate. 

I'm not quite sure how item 2. could work. Is it something like:
- "A" signs an OSCP responder certificate
- "B" is running this OCSP responder on behalf of "A"

Ignoring the question whether "A" is allowed to issue an OCSP responder certificate to be operated by "B" (private key must be available to "B"), I am wondering what SHALL or SHOULD happen with "A"'s CA certificate/private key. If "A" ceases operation I would expect that at least the private key SHALL be destroyed. But from my understanding the OCSP responder certificate would be no longer valid, too.
I'm aware, that for OCSP responses the chain of trust is not validated, but as far as I understand this is more a performance issue.


Maybe there's a quite simply answer and my argumentation is not correct. I would really appreciate someone pointing me to the mistake I made :-) 


Thanks
   Carsten


Carsten Dahlenkamp 
T-Systems International GmbH 
Trust Center Applications 
Untere Industriestraße 20, 57250 Netphen, Germany 
+49 271 708-1643 (Tel.) 
E-Mail: carsten.dahlenkamp at t-systems.com 
http://www.t-systems.com, http://www.telesec.de