[Cscwg-public] Potential problem (procedural) with Ballot CSC-13: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements

Mon Apr 4 20:26:29 UTC 2022

I think it is, you're right. Perhaps people were confused because they were thinking of the redline versions posted by SCWG ballots what contain a link to github. I was also looking for a link to the redline but the attachment works fine.

Apologies for the confusion.

DZ.

Apr 4, 2022 23:01:48 Dean Coclin <dean.coclin at digicert.com>:

> I’m not sure I follow this. Are you referring to 2.4 (1)?
> I see that Ian puts a pointer to the changes (in the “attached version”) within the motion.  Isn’t that sufficient?
>  
> *From:* Cscwg-public <cscwg-public-bounces at cabforum.org> *On Behalf Of *Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Cscwg-public
> *Sent:* Monday, April 4, 2022 3:05 PM
> *To:* cscwg-public at cabforum.org
> *Subject:* [Cscwg-public] Potential problem (procedural) with Ballot CSC-13: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements
>  
> It was noted to me that the procedure of this ballot may have some issues.
> 
> In the "Motion" section of the ballot, there is no reference to the *actual language changes* of the Guideline as noted in the attached redline when the voting started. Instead, the motion section contains "descriptions" of the changes.
> 
> I'm afraid this is inconsistent with section 2.4 of the Bylaws[https://github.com/cabforum/forum/blob/main/Bylaws.md#24-requirements-for-draft-guideline-ballots]. More specifically, the ballot should contain either the "Ballot Version" type of changes or a redline within the motion section. If they both appear, the "Ballot Version" takes precedence. This ballot was submitted with the redline outside the motion.
> 
> I understand that it's disappointing that this is identified so late in the process. Perhaps I'm wrong with this interpretation but I'd like other Members to also review and share their opinion.
> 
> 
> Best regards,
> Dimitris.
> 
> PS: We should also avoid including links of websites that are not publicly accessible when posting on the public list.
> 
> 
> On 30/3/2022 8:01 μ.μ., Ian McMillan via Cscwg-public wrote:
> Ballot CSC-13: Update to Subscriber Private Key Protection Requirements[https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwiki.cabforum.org%2Fcscwg%2Fcsc_13_-_update_to_subscriber_private_key_protection_requirements&data=04%7C01%7Cianmcm%40microsoft.com%7C31d96159f5ed42ea367808da0ceebaa5%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C0%7C0%7C637836517169400423%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=W9JW6jbaoIP9q5eo5kI9KtC%2FbyLkrPw4%2BknyEac9Fa8%3D&reserved=0]
> Purpose of this ballot: Update the subscriber private key protection requirements in the Baseline Requirement for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates v2.7. The following motion has been proposed by Ian McMillan of Microsoft and endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Bruce Morton of Entrust.
>  
> — MOTION BEGINS —
>  
> This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 2.7 according to the attached redline which includes:
>  
1. > Update section 16.3 “Subscriber Private Key Protection” to “Subscriber Private Key Protection and Verification”
2. > Update section 16.3 “Subscriber Private Key Protection” to include sub-sections “16.3.1 Subscriber Private Key Protection” and “16.3.2 Subscriber Private Key Verification”
3. > Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.1 to remove allowance of TPM key generation and software protected private key protection, and remove private key protection requirement differences between EV and non-EV Code Signing Certificates
4. > Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.1 to include the allowance of key generation and protection using a cloud-based key protection solution providing key generation and protection in a hardware crypto module that conforms to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+
5. > Update section 16.3 under new sub-section 16.3.2 to include verification for Code Signing Certificates' private key generation and storage in a crypto module that meets or exceeds the requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 2 or Common Criteria EAL 4+ by the CAs. Include additional acceptable methods for verification including cloud-based key generation and protection solutions and a stipulation for CAs to satisfy this verification requirement with additional means specified in their CPS. Any additional means specified by a CA in their CPS, must be proposed to the CA/Browser Forum for inclusion into the acceptable methods for section 16.3.2 by November 15, 2022.
>  
> — MOTION ENDS —
>  
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
>  
> Discussion (7 days)
> Start Time: 2022-03-23, 13:00 Eastern Time (US)
> End Time: 2022-03-30, 13:00 Eastern Time (US)
>  
> Vote for approval (7 days)
> Start Time: 2022-03-30, 13:00 Eastern Time (US)
> End Time: 2022-04-06, 13:00 Eastern Time (US)
>  
> 
> 
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>  
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