[cabf_validation] Validation WG meeting minutes 2019-10-10

[Doug Beattie]

If I omitted anything or mis-represented your statements, please let me
know.  This was one heck of a meeting to take minutes for.

 

Attendees

Ben

Bruce

Daniela

Doug

Enrico

Gordon

Janet Hines

Kirk

Li-Chun

Rich

Ryan

Shelly

Stephan

Tim H.

 

 

 

1.       Anti-trust statement

 

2.       Assign note taker

Doug

 

3.       Other ballots

Spring cleanup ballot:  Ryan: took over and received some comments.  Will
take one more look and merge in changes. Push out draft ballot tomorrow.

 

Method 6: Doug to take a look at that soon.

 

 

 

4.       Further LEI discussion

The LEI discussions was very long and intense, so this is a summary of the
key points by the primary participants in this discussion and I've omitted
the details in order to get the minutes out in a more consumable format.

 

Stephan:

*         Provided concrete use cases (server to server) and never heard
back, thus he didn't believe there were any technical security issues with
the approach

o    Ryan commented that this was a good example for where non publicly
trusted certificates would sufficient.  More on this below

*         ETSI and ISO are both pushing for LEIs in TLS certificates

*         LEIs add an incredible value

*         EV certificate data cannot change once issued, but LIE data can
and thus will be more up to date and accurate

o    Ryan said that if data can change in the certificates, then there is a
risk because it can't be changed quickly and efficiently.

 

Gordon:

*         LEIs add more readability to the similar info that is in the EV
certificate today, but extends it

*         How relevant is this consumption to the browsers?

*         LEI is at least as valuable as the EV information already

*         Gordon is working with some students to build a plug-in that pulls
LEI number from the certificate and then displays the data to the user.  The
intent is to help address the Stripe type issue

o    Ryan replied that this isn't tied to TLS and that perhaps the right
location for this additional data in in DNS, it's data associated with the
domain and not with setting up a secure TLS session.

*         Separating this data our of TLS certificates sounds all good and
great, but this is going to take a long time to build out and get rolling

o    Ryan replied that it was quite the opposite.  Following the suggestions
posted on the list, one could get this going more quickly than:

*         What does it mean when including this in TLS certificates

*         What is the validation process

*         Etc.

Ryan

*         Ryan repeated this multiple times: The core question is not why
LEI (there are lots of valuable use of this data), but the question is why
in TLS certificates.  There needs to be compelling reason that it belongs
there without introducing risk

*         What are the befits to the Root Stores that store the Roots vs.
the risks for those (non-TLS specific) use cases that are not needed
directly by the browsers

*         Every cert use not intended to interact with browsers introduces
risks, and the goal is to remove all of these external risks.

*         The risk of external, non-browser based dependencies only
increases over time, so to bring new fields and uses into TLS certificates
needs to be very closely reviewed to be sure that the value is greater than
the risk for the Root Store programs (Browses). 

*         One of the greatest risks to the Browsers' users: Challenge to
being compliant with non-browser driven requirements and use cases.  Need to
minimize to the maximum extent possible to limit harm to the browser
community

*         There are risks to the eco system and more specifically to the
browsers.  Browsers use TLS certificates for the purposes of securing
browser to server sessions.  The additional of any more data into the
certificates represents risks, technical risks

o    Slows down issuance and replacement because the data needs to be
accurate and up-to date

o    Additional data can be added incorrectly and can result in misissuance
which would have been otherwise avoided if the data was not present to begin
with

*         Note the recent issues with states in certificates

o    Ryan has proposed alternatives to including data within the TLS
certificates which he believes can be accomplished more quickly than by
including similar data in TLS certificates

o    There are challenges when different users start using the browser root
stores for unintended ways, for example:

*         SHA-1: Payment systems should have used non-public roots

*         1024 bit migrations were hindered by non-browser implementations 

*         Server to server should be private PKI 

*         One CA mentioned that shortening validity period of the TLS
certificates would impact their customer who is using them for non- browser
purposes.

*         There are numerous open questions about the inclusion of LEIs into
certificates which will need to be address if the Why is answered.

*         In addressing the topic of X.509 and how this specifies the
important organization attributes:

o    The structure of the subject DN of certificates was intended to be a
pointer into an X500 directory where additional attributes could be obtained
and used.

o    X500 directory's never materialized

 

*         The Root programs trust CAs for the purposes of enabling secure
browser sessions and any additional reliance on TLS certificates for other
purposes, or for conveying additional data increases risk without
necessarily adding any value

 

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