[cabf_validation] Using 3.2.2.4.2/.3 for future domains

[Peter Bowen]

> On Mar 17, 2018, at 7:43 AM, Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com> wrote:
> 
> Consider the use of .7, in which we already permit (by virtue of CNAME) an expression of delegation to a separate entity via DNS. If the entire concern is that the respondant in WHOIS is not the PKI approver (preventing .2 and .3), and that the domain operator "for reasons" cannot configure one of the mailboxes (.4), would the expression of a domain record that allowed for a designated approver suffice? This could be established for all new/additional domains, can be verified technically, can be checked, and is "no worse" than setting a mailbox under .2/.4 or a CNAME under .7 to delegate to a PKI approver. Does this meet the needs?
> 
> Or consider during the F2F, there was a discussion of expanding .12 in a way that the DNS Owner could put in a "challenge token" (of sorts) into WHOIS, which allowed them to uniquely and unambiguously link back to the notion of a CA account. Would such a link - in which the CA validated the existence (under the proposed ".13" rules, to be fleshed out) of this random token - suitably replace the need to do an organization-identity link? I think so.
> 
> However, if the proposal of the .1 supporters is that they should not have to consult DNS to verify an explicit authorization to delegate - such as a DNS record or (additional) WHOIS configuration - and instead rely on the mere existence of information that ICANN requires of domain holders - then that will remain unacceptable, as it's a fundamentally weak proposition.

These are both things worth introducing to the BRs and seeing if they meet needs.  

We should be biased towards including more validation methods in the BRs if they meet the bar for security, rather than trying to limit the number of options.  The BRs are very different from IETF RFCs as they are mandatory and validation methods are a closed set, so we cannot reasonably say “at least two independent interoperable implementations” as we likely won’t even have the first implementation of a method until well after a method is approved.

I put text forward for the .13 method in another email.  I hope that we can get it to a ballot soon so we can start to try it i the real world.  I also think DNS discovery of delegation of approval that you propose seems like a good path; it has the potential to allow delegation via multiple protocols via URI, which could offer a number of opportunities to improve the system.

Thanks,
Peter
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