[Smcwg-public] Approved Minutes of SMCWG January 19, 2022

[Adriano Santoni]

As to the validity period of the Random Value, we believe it should be 
30 days as for TLS certs.

Adriano

Il 15/02/2022 21:49, Stephen Davidson via Smcwg-public ha scritto:
>
> Dimitris Zacharopoulos questioned why the Random Value in the 3.2.2.2 
> method was required to be reset within 24 hours, noting that this 
> caused issues for users acting on messages over a weekend or a 
> vacation, or where emails are delayed in spam filters.  Corey Bonnell 
> pointed out that the equivalent text for random values in the TLS BR 
> was 30 days. Stephen indicated that it had been taken from the NIST 
> 800-63 standard.  Fotis Loukos mentioned that current best practice 
> was for a “timed out” user to generate a new random value.  It was 
> suggested that a compromise time span of a week might be found, or 
> that the timing issue might also be addressed within the TLS BR.
>
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