[Smcwg-public] Approved Minutes of SMCWG September 15, 2021

[Stephen Davidson]

Minutes of SMCWG


September 15, 2021

 

These are the Approved Minutes of the Teleconference described in the
subject of this message. Corrections and clarifications where needed are
encouraged by reply.


Attendees 


Ali Gholami (Telia Company), Andrea Holland (SecureTrust), Andreas Henschel
(D-TRUST), Atsushi Inaba  (GlobalSign), Ben Wilson (Mozilla), Bruce Morton
(Entrust), Chris Kemmerer  (SSL.com), Clint Wilson (Apple), Corey Bonnell
(DigiCert), David Kluge (Google), Don Sheehy (WebTrust), Eusebio Herrera
(Camerfirma), Inigo Barreira (Sectigo), Joanna Fox (TrustCor), Mads
Henriksveen  (BuyPass), Mauricio Fernandez (TeleTrust), Miguel Sanchez
(Google), Morad Abou Nasser (TeleTrust), Mrugesh Chandarana (IdenTrust),
Patrycja Tulinska (PSW), Rebecca Kelley (Apple), Renne Rodriguez (Apple),
Sebastian Schulz (GlobalSign), Stefan Selbitschka (rundQuadrat), Stephen
Davidson (DigiCert), Tadahiko Ito (SECOM Trust Systems), Thomas Connelly
(Federal PKI), Tim Crawford (WebTrust), Tsung-Min Kuo  (Chunghwa Telecom),
Wendy Brown (Federal PKI)


1. Roll Call


The Roll Call was taken.


2. Read Antitrust Statement


The Antitrust/Compliance Statement was read.


3. Review Agenda


4. Approval of minutes from last teleconference


The minutes of the September 1 teleconference were approved.  


5. Discussion 


Ben Wilson raised whether the Certificate Issuers could be informally polled
regarding the current and planned usage of ECC in S/MIME certificates, which
information would be useful for Certificate Consumers.  Subsequently a
survey has been sent to the Management list, seeking Certificate Issuer
feedback by October 8.  The aggregate information (not CA specific) will be
shared later with the WG.

 

Stephen Davidson noted an issue that the WG had ruled out the use of
dataEncipherment as a keyUsage as this was typically not relevant to the
S/MIME use case.  However, research has identified that key management certs
do exist that include dataEncipherment, possible as some dual use scenario.
After discussion it was agreed that dataEncipherment should be allowed for
the Legacy and Multipurpose profiles but not the Strict.

Stephen raised that an alternative suggestion had been made for the
certificate profile OIDs.  The current proposal is that each certificate
type (mailbox, org, etc) each of whose arcs would be expanded for the
validation (strict, multipurpose, etc).  This creates 12 OIDs at this time.
Another approach would have two types of OIDs: one for certificate type
(mailbox, org, etc) and one for validation (strict, multipurpose, etc).
This would create 7 OIDs, and leaf certs would express the relevant two
OIDs.  Clint Wilson and Ben Wilson expressed support for the current "single
OID" proposal, using a single OID in the cert. Stefan Selbitschka did not
note any obvious benefit to software. Corey Bonnell noted that the "two OID"
option might lead to confusion when defining policy qualifiers specific to
OIDs.

 

Discussion moved to the Individual Personal-validation profile.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gEq-o4jU1FWvKBeMoncfmhAUemAgGuvVRSLQ
b7PedLU/edit#gid=0

 

There was discussion relating to the commonName being programmatically
created from givenName+surname versus email.  Clint Wilson voiced support
for there being one option rather than choices.  Stephen noted that the WG
had feedback that enterprise users in particular preferred having options
for display name in the CN, and the proposal was already a significant
reform of existing practice.  

 

This led to a discussion whether Pseudonym might be allowed in CN, and an
extended discussion regarding the use of Pseudonym attribute with input from
Inigo Barreiro and Eusebio Herrera.  Concrete guidance on the use of
Pseudonym is difficult to find in standards. It was decided to retain
Pseudonym in the Mailbox profiles but to drop it from the Personal profiles.

 

Title will tentatively be allowed subject to defining a verification regime
later.

 

Wendy Brown questioned if we are leaving enough scope to ensure Subject
uniqueness from a CA. Clint said that spoke in favor of requiring an email
in the Subject while Stephen pointed out that serialNumber is also available
to the CA.

 

Renne Rodriguez indicated that we move to verification we would be well
advised to provide guidance for the insertion of multiple/hyphenated names
or surname-firstname formats into certs.

 


6. Any Other Business


 

None


7. Next call


Next call: Wednesday, September 29, 2021 at 11:00 am Eastern Time 


Adjourned


 

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