[Smcwg-public] some thoughts on s/mime requirement sets

Henschel, Andreas a.henschel at d-trust.net
Thu Aug 20 05:20:32 MST 2020


Dear smcwg members,

please let me share some thoughts on our yesterdays call of the smcwg.

S/mime certificates are kind of different to all other certificates handled
by cabforum so far, because of the very different usecases and user
environments.

Just to bring some cases and related topics up:

a. certificates on (highly) secure token
	-> it is not a good idea to encrypt anything with keys, which could
not have any backups, but encryption is one of the key features of s/mime
certificates

b. group or domain certificates
	-> key management done by an email gateway
	-> just copy and distribute the encrypted key to any user of the
group address

c. certificates on mobile devices
	-> nearly no key management possible done by the user
	-> quite impossible to use hardware token on mobiles

d. certificates stored in an OS keystore

e. different purposes or different combinations of purposes
	-> signing mails to guarantee integrity
	-> signing mails to claim authenticity
	-> encrypting mails to guarantee confidentiality
	-> signing mails for content commitment or wilful acts


I think, we could find a lot more usecases and user environments of s/mime
certificates easily. 
But from my point of view, it could be quite impossible to find all
usecases, where thoses certificates are allready used.

So it could be more helpful for the first step of collecting the
requirements, to start with the absolute minimum level, such for example to
set the maximum validity period in general to 39 months or even a bit
longer. As far as I know, many CAs offer certificates with a validity period
of three years, but i've seen even five years. 
For example, if we start just with the purpose of "signing mails to
guarantee integrity" the validity periode of the certificate does not even
really matter.

With this mind set, we should step through all points of applicable
requirements for the first draft.

After having a basic and accepted (and usable) minimum level, we can and
should tighten security requirements where applicable.


Kind regards,
Andreas



Andreas Henschel

Principal product certification ETSI / eIDAS
DTr PCS CM
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