[Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL] Voting Period Begins: Ballot SC-076v2 "Clarify and Improve OCSP Requirements"

[Bruce Morton]

Entrust votes Yes to ballot SC-076v2.


Bruce.

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Aaron Gable via Servercert-wg
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2024 3:01 PM
To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins: Ballot SC-076v2 "Clarify and Improve OCSP Requirements"

Purpose of Ballot This is v2 of this ballot; you can see the discussion thread for v1 here:  https: //lists. cabforum. org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-August/004798. html This ballot attempts to address three concerns: - The confusion around "reserved"

Purpose of Ballot

This is v2 of this ballot; you can see the discussion thread for v1 here: https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-August/004798.html<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-August/004798.html__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YdqLZYKa0cz-kruY2RzvU0KH9P1BHpxCrIbZEqeO4PP3urv7ZIZY6hpy2CjC09L2EGG83W2sazkCju1M3U9InSVHMEPRjg$>

This ballot attempts to address three concerns:
- The confusion around "reserved" serials, which do not actually exist because all Precertificate serials are assumed to also exist in corresponding Certificates and are therefore actually "assigned";
- Confusion around whether, and how quickly, OCSP responders must begin providing authoritative responses for Certificates and Precertificates; and
- Confusion around whether and how the OCSP requirements apply to Certificates which do not contain an AIA OCSP URL, but for which the CA's OCSP responder is still willing to provide responses.

These concerns have been previously discussed in this Mozilla policy bug<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/280__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YdqLZYKa0cz-kruY2RzvU0KH9P1BHpxCrIbZEqeO4PP3urv7ZIZY6hpy2CjC09L2EGG83W2sazkCju1M3U9InSWpuB28sA$>, this ServerCert WG bug<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/servercert/issues/422__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YdqLZYKa0cz-kruY2RzvU0KH9P1BHpxCrIbZEqeO4PP3urv7ZIZY6hpy2CjC09L2EGG83W2sazkCju1M3U9InSVpZ2icDg$>, and this Bugzilla incident<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1905419__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YdqLZYKa0cz-kruY2RzvU0KH9P1BHpxCrIbZEqeO4PP3urv7ZIZY6hpy2CjC09L2EGG83W2sazkCju1M3U9InSWJ873c7w$>.

It addresses these concerns by:
- Stating that OCSP responses must be available within 15 minutes of signing a certificate containing an AIA OCSP URL;
- Removing the concept of a "reserved" serial entirely;
- Moving all OCSP requirements into Section 4.9.9, leaving Section 4.9.10 (which RFC 3647 says is meant to place requirements on relying parties, not on CAs) empty; and
- Organizing the requirements in Section 4.9.9 into three clusters:
  - Definitions of "validity interval", "assigned", and "unassigned";
  - Requirements on OCSP Responders, which apply only to responses from AIA OCSP URLs found in issued certs; and
  - Requirements on OCSP Responses, which apply to all responses regardless of whether the certificate in question has an AIA OCSP URL.

GitHub PR representing this ballot: https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/535<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/535__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YdqLZYKa0cz-kruY2RzvU0KH9P1BHpxCrIbZEqeO4PP3urv7ZIZY6hpy2CjC09L2EGG83W2sazkCju1M3U9InSWikIIu8A$>
Rendered view of the resulting text: https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3/docs/BR.md#499-on-line-revocationstatus-checking-availability<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3/docs/BR.md*499-on-line-revocationstatus-checking-availability__;Iw!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YdqLZYKa0cz-kruY2RzvU0KH9P1BHpxCrIbZEqeO4PP3urv7ZIZY6hpy2CjC09L2EGG83W2sazkCju1M3U9InSXaZaeJrA$>

Motion

The following motion has been proposed by Aaron Gable (Let's Encrypt / ISRG), and is endorsed by Ben Wilson (Mozilla) and Antonis Eleftheriadis (HARICA).

Motion Begins

Modify the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates", based on Version 2.0.6, as specified in the following redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/929d9b4a1ed1f13f92f6af672ad6f6a2153b8230...a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/929d9b4a1ed1f13f92f6af672ad6f6a2153b8230...a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!YdqLZYKa0cz-kruY2RzvU0KH9P1BHpxCrIbZEqeO4PP3urv7ZIZY6hpy2CjC09L2EGG83W2sazkCju1M3U9InSUa3e0hTQ$>

Motion Ends

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion Period (at least 7 days)

Start: August 29, 2024 19:00 UTC
End: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC

Voting Period (7 days)

Start: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC
End: October 3, 2024 19:00 UTC
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