[Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-080 V2: "Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and relying DCV Methods”
Ryan Dickson
ryandickson at google.com
Thu Oct 10 14:41:02 UTC 2024
Hi Yoshihiko,
Thanks for clarifying your question.
In my opinion, as currently written, the phrase “direct contact" is not
well-defined by the TLS BRs.
My interpretation of “direct contact" between a CA and the Domain Name
Registrar is a phone-call or email between representatives of the two
organizations, possibly also involving some sort of automated system.
To help better describe my interpretation, please see the illustrative
examples below:
Phone or Email:
- CA representative calls/emails the Registrar.
- A representative of the Registrar authenticates the CA representative.
- The CA representative asks the Registrar representative to look up the
Domain Contact information for the target domain.
- The Registrar representative looks up the Domain Contact information by
relying on its authoritative database / source of truth, and shares this
with the CA representative.
- The CA representative uses the Domain Contact information as permitted by
the TLS BRs.
Automated System:
- CA representative submits a form requesting Domain Contact information
from the Registrar.
- The Registrar authenticates the requestor.
- The Registrar looks up the Domain Contact information by relying on its
authoritative database / source of truth, and shares this with the CA
representative (e.g., phone or email).
- The CA representative uses the Domain Contact information as permitted by
the TLS BRs.
My interpretation is heavily influenced by language in the TLS EVGs which,
in my opinion, establishes framing for the communication mechanisms
considered by “direct contact" through phrasing such as “or by direct
contact with the Incorporating or Registration Agency in person or via
mail, e‐mail, Web address, or telephone, using an address or phone number
obtained directly from the Qualified Government Information Source,
Incorporating or Registration Agency, or from a Qualified Independent
Information Source.” (from 3.2.2.2.2 (“Acceptable Method of Verification"))
Consequently, I would not consider querying a Registrar’s WHOIS service to
constitute “direct contact.” I further interpret the WatchTowr report [1]
to have demonstrated flaws with several Registrar WHOIS-function websites.
If this interpretation is misaligned with others’ expectations, discussion
is welcome.
Thanks,
Ryan
[1]
https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/
On Thu, Oct 10, 2024 at 6:27 AM Matsuo Yoshihiko <yoshihiko at jprs.co.jp>
wrote:
> Hi Ryan,
>
> Thank you for your reply.
>
> I feel like I didn't express my points clearly in the previous email, so
> please disregard it.
>
> I apologize for the confusion, but I have reorganized the point I would
> like to confirm as follows:
>
> I am considering updating our system implementation for obtaining Domain
> Contact in light of this revision.
>
> BR defines the source of Domain Contact as follows.
> #1 WHOIS record
> #2 DNS SOA record
> #3 direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar
>
> The questions I would like to ask is...
>
>
> Could it be interpreted that retrieving Domain Contact information from
> the Whois operated by the Domain Name Registrar itself falls under "3
> direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar"?
> I would like to hear your opinion on this.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Yoshihiko Matsuo(JPRS)
>
>
> On Tue, 8 Oct 2024 15:10:38 -0400
> Ryan Dickson <ryandickson at google.com> wrote:
>
> > Hi Yoshihiko,
> >
> > The definition for “Domain Contact" (unchanged by the proposal) is: “The
> > Domain Name Registrant, technical contact, or administrative contact (or
> > the equivalent under a ccTLD) as listed in the WHOIS record of the Base
> > Domain Name or in a DNS SOA record, or as obtained through direct contact
> > with the Domain Name Registrar.”
> >
> > The definition for “Domain Name Registrar" (also unchanged by the
> proposal)
> > is: “A person or entity that registers Domain Names under the auspices of
> > or by agreement with:
> > - the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
> > - a national Domain Name authority/registry, or
> > *- a Network Information Center (including their affiliates, contractors,
> > delegates, successors, or assignees)*.”
> >
> > For the circumstances described in your message, can you please confirm
> > whether the organization operating the CA is considered:
> > - ONLY the ccTLD Domain Name Authority/Registry
> > - ONLY the Domain Name Registrar
> > - BOTH the ccTLD Domain Name Authority/Registry and sometimes a Domain
> Name
> > Registrar
> > - BOTH the ccTLD Domain Name Authority/Registry and always the Domain
> Name
> > Registrar
> >
> > Given the definition of “Domain Contact" and its reference in 3.2.2.4.2,
> > 3.2.2.4.12, and 3.2.2.4.15, I believe the distinction between roles
> (Domain
> > Name Authority/Registry and Domain Name Registrar) is important.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Ryan
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Oct 8, 2024 at 7:29?AM Yoshihiko Matsuo via Servercert-wg <
> > servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:
> >
> > > All,
> > >
> > > > The only method relying on identifying a “Domain Contact" via
> > > registration data left by the ballot is 3.2.2.4.12 (“Validating
> Applicant
> > > as a Domain Contact"). This was originally excluded from the scope of
> > > sunsets given the expectation that in cases where the organization
> > > operating the CA was also the Domain Name Registrar (or an Affiliate),
> > > there would be (1) a lower likelihood of unreliable Domain Contact
> > > information given a direct relationship with the subscriber/subscriber
> > > organization, and (2) a higher potential for seamless certificate
> lifecycle
> > > management because of that relationship. Regardless of whether this
> > > expectation is misguided, nothing stops a future ballot from
> contemplating
> > > the further improvement or sunset of 3.2.2.4.12 (“Validating Applicant
> as a
> > > Domain Contact").
> > >
> > > We are the CA, and at the same time we are also the gTLD Registrar and
> the
> > > ccTLD Registry.
> > > In this case, I understand that it is acceptable to use the Domain
> > > Contacts we hold as The gTLD Registrar for DCV.I would like to hear
> your
> > > opinions on whether the same can be said for the Domain Contacts we
> hold as
> > > the ccTLD Registry.
> > >
> > > Note: We require that ccTLD Domain Contacts be kept current as the
> contact
> > > information for the domain name registrant.
> > >
> > > With this question, I would like to clarify whether the BR allows the
> > > following cases.
> > >
> > > 1. The CA that is also the ccTLD Registry retrieves Domain Contacts
> from
> > > its own database and performs validation in accordance with 3.2.2.4.2.
> > >
> > > 2. The CA that is also the ccTLD Registry retrieves Domain Contacts
> from
> > > the WHOIS operated by the ccTLD Registry (which is also a CA) and
> performs
> > > validation in accordance with 3.2.2.4.2.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Yoshihiko Matsuo(JPRS)
> > >
> > >
> > > On 2024/10/08 4:49, Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg wrote:
> > > > Hi Doug,
> > > >
> > > > > The title, purpose and background of this ballot define the
> removal
> > > of WHOIS and does not discuss any other changes, but we’re actually
> > > sunsetting other aspects of domain validation while also leaving method
> > > 3.2.2.4.12 that can continue to use WHOIS.
> > > >
> > > > I feel “Objective 2", included in the “Background" section, makes the
> > > intent to sunset methods clear (the objective's description is:
> "/Sunset
> > > Methods 3.2.2.4.2 (“Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain
> Contact”) and
> > > 3.2.2.4.15 (“Phone Contact with Domain Contact")/").
> > > >
> > > > Would changing the title to something like “/Strengthen registration
> > > data lookups and Sunset Methods 3.2.2.4.2 and 3.2.2.4.15/" help?
> > > >
> > > > > I understand the desire to remove WHOIS based on the recent
> > > incident(s), but if we’re going to focus on sunsetting WHOIS, we should
> > > 100% sunset it for all uses and we should not include the removal of
> other
> > > methods within this ballot.
> > > >
> > > > All methods relying on identifying Domain Contacts via registration
> data
> > > are strengthened by this ballot, beginning January 15, 2025. This
> includes
> > > methods:
> > > > - 3.2.2.4.2 (“Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact")
> > > > - 3.2.2.4.12 (“Validating Applicant as a Domain Contact")
> > > > - 3.2.2.4.15 (“Phone Contact with Domain Contact")
> > > >
> > > > The ballot goes on to sunset the following methods, beginning July
> 15,
> > > 2025:
> > > > - 3.2.2.4.2 (“Email, Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact")
> > > > - 3.2.2.4.15 (“Phone Contact with Domain Contact")
> > > >
> > > > The only method relying on identifying a “Domain Contact" via
> > > registration data left by the ballot is 3.2.2.4.12 (“Validating
> Applicant
> > > as a Domain Contact"). This was originally excluded from the scope of
> > > sunsets given the expectation that in cases where the organization
> > > operating the CA was also the Domain Name Registrar (or an Affiliate),
> > > there would be (1) a lower likelihood of unreliable Domain Contact
> > > information given a direct relationship with the subscriber/subscriber
> > > organization, and (2) a higher potential for seamless certificate
> lifecycle
> > > management because of that relationship. Regardless of whether this
> > > expectation is misguided, nothing stops a future ballot from
> contemplating
> > > the further improvement or sunset of 3.2.2.4.12 (“Validating Applicant
> as a
> > > Domain Contact").
> > > >
> > > > If there’s a case to make for including 3.2.2.4.12 in the sunsets
> > > covered in the proposal, it’s also welcome.
> > > >
> > > > > The VWG can be tasked to review methods we think are weak and
> discuss
> > > removing them, for example, imo, all the methods that rely on phone
> calls
> > > (Domain and IP address both), which to me are weaker than automated
> methods
> > > like using they SOA record.
> > > >
> > > > I agree that it’s important for this community to routinely
> re-evaluate
> > > the DCV methods permitted by the TLS BRs and consider them against a
> set of
> > > desirable security and operational properties that best enable
> subscriber
> > > organizations to make securely managing their TLS implementations
> “boring"
> > > (effortless, routine, reliable, and without excitement - even when
> facing
> > > the unexpected).
> > > >
> > > > Periodically over the past three years (when I joined this
> community),
> > > I’ve participated in discussions where members have expressed a desire
> for
> > > improved DCV methods, which has included suggestions to remove
> perceived
> > > weak methods (with those that are phone or email-based cited as
> examples).
> > > While very few of these discussions have led to direct action, this
> ballot
> > > presents a proactive opportunity to address some of those concerns,
> along
> > > with mitigating concerns related to registration data lookups
> identified by
> > > recent events.
> > > >
> > > > I do not believe a holistic evaluation of the DCV-methods permitted
> by
> > > the TLS BRs needs to be a blocking function on this ballot, and that
> both
> > > activities can take place independently of one another.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > Ryan
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Oct 7, 2024 at 7:35?AM Doug Beattie <
> doug.beattie at globalsign.com
> > > <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com>> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > Hi Ryan,____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > The title, purpose and background of this ballot define the
> removal
> > > of WHOIS and does not discuss any other changes, but we’re actually
> > > sunsetting other aspects of domain validation while also leaving method
> > > 3.2.2.4.12 that can continue to use WHOIS. Part of this is the
> > > unfortunately extremely broad definition of “Domain Contact” and
> “Domain
> > > Name Registrant” and the wide scope of 3.2.2.4.2, which I agree we
> need to
> > > clarify and fix. I understand the desire to remove WHOIS based on the
> > > recent incident(s), but if we’re going to focus on sunsetting WHOIS, we
> > > should 100% sunset if for all uses and we should not include the
> removal of
> > > other methods within this ballot. The VWG can be tasked to review
> methods
> > > we think are weak and discuss removing them, for example, imo, all the
> > > methods that rely on phone calls (Domain and IP address both), which
> to me
> > > are weaker than automated methods like using they SOA record.____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > Doug____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > *From:*Ryan Dickson <ryandickson at google.com <mailto:
> > > ryandickson at google.com>>
> > > > *Sent:* Friday, October 4, 2024 2:55 PM
> > > > *To:* Doug Beattie <doug.beattie at globalsign.com <mailto:
> > > doug.beattie at globalsign.com>>
> > > > *Cc:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <
> > > servercert-wg at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>>
> > > > *Subject:* Re: [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot
> > > SC-080 V2: "Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and
> relying
> > > DCV Methods”____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > Hi Doug,____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > Your interpretation of the latest version of the ballot is
> correct.
> > > ____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > As currently presented, Method 3.2.2.4.2 (“Email, Fax, SMS, or
> > > Postal Mail to Domain Contact”) and Method 3.2.2.4.15 (“Phone Contact
> with
> > > Domain Contact”) are sunset, in their entirety, effective July 15,
> 2025.
> > > ____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > Specific to domain contact email addresses from SOA records, can
> you
> > > share your perspective for adding this specific option given the
> existence
> > > of (1) other email-based alternatives (e.g., 3.2.2.4.4, 3.2.2.4.13 and
> > > 3.2.2.4.14) and (2) other far more heavily relied upon DCV methods that
> > > present an opportunity for improved automation and scalability (and
> also
> > > benefit from MPIC)?____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > For example, detailing responses below would be helpful for
> > > understanding:____
> > > >
> > > > * existing reliance on this specific approach in comparison to
> the
> > > other DCV methods offered?____
> > > > * how this reliance has trended over time (e.g., last 1 / 3 / 5
> > > years)?____
> > > > * how the sunset would affect subscribers?____
> > > > * a general description of the level of effort for affected
> > > subscribers to transition to another method?____
> > > > * what barriers exist that prevent subscribers from
> transitioning
> > > to other methods?____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > I think it’s reasonable for the community to approach RNAME
> lookups
> > > with the same degree of concern for accuracy and reliability as
> > > registration data due to the potential for:____
> > > >
> > > > * neglected configurations (e.g., in 2020, [1] indicated only
> > > 39.74% of a set of “top” 1M domains contained “reachable” SOA
> contacts, and
> > > only approximately 20% of the sampled .com and .net domains did).____
> > > > * potential CA reliance on third-party tools with unknown
> > > operational characteristics for performing SOA lookups (the same
> concern as
> > > WHOIS lookups using HTTPS websites).____
> > > > * a lack of oversight and enforcement for ensuring SOA record
> > > updates (e.g, accuracy/correctness and timeliness).____
> > > > * use of automated DNS management solutions that can result in
> an
> > > unintended and/or unknown delegation of authority to approve TLS
> > > certificates, while also representing a single point of failure (or
> > > attack).____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,____
> > > >
> > > > Ryan____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > [1] https://mkorczynski.com/WTMC2020.pdf <
> > > https://mkorczynski.com/WTMC2020.pdf>____
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > __ __
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, Oct 3, 2024 at 9:57?AM Doug Beattie <
> > > doug.beattie at globalsign.com <mailto:doug.beattie at globalsign.com>>
> > > wrote:____
> > > >
> > > > Hey Ryan,____
> > > >
> > > > ____
> > > >
> > > > The way I read the ballot is that using domain approver email
> > > addresses from SOA records is being removed since that’s part of
> > > 3.2.2.4.2. Should we add a new method specifically for that, or was
> the
> > > intent to remove that as a valid location to obtain domain approver
> email
> > > addresses?____
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Doug____
> > > >
> > > > ____
> > > >
> > > > *From:*Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org
> > > <mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>> *On Behalf Of *Ryan
> Dickson
> > > via Servercert-wg
> > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, October 1, 2024 12:59 PM
> > > > *To:* ServerCert CA/BF <servercert-wg at cabforum.org <mailto:
> > > servercert-wg at cabforum.org>>
> > > > *Subject:* [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot
> > > SC-080 V2: "Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and
> relying
> > > DCV Methods”____
> > > >
> > > > ____
> > > >
> > > > *_Purpose of Ballot SC-080 V2:
> > > > _*This ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements
> for
> > > the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates
> > > (TLS BRs) to address concerns regarding the use of WHOIS and HTTPS
> websites
> > > for identifying Domain Contacts.
> > > >
> > > > *_Background:
> > > > _*This ballot intends to accomplish two objectives,
> originally
> > > described in [1].____
> > > >
> > > > Objective 1: Enhance WHOIS/RDAP validation of gTLDs with
> > > comparable security properties to DNS-based validation and sunset
> > > WHOIS/RDAP for ccTLDs.
> > > >
> > > > _Justification:_____
> > > >
> > > > * A recent disclosure [2] demonstrated how threat actors
> could
> > > exploit deficiencies in the WHOIS protocol and WHOIS tools served via
> HTTPS
> > > websites to obtain fraudulent TLS certificates.____
> > > > * Discussions within the Mozilla Dev Security Policy (MDSP)
> > > community [3] further expressed corresponding risks related to WHOIS,
> while
> > > also noting that ccTLDs may not maintain accurate or up-to-date WHOIS
> > > server records. Several examples of inoperative WHOIS servers for
> ccTLDs
> > > were identified.____
> > > > * Discussion in [4] further called into question the
> > > reliability of ccTLD WHOIS servers given, per IANA, there is no global
> > > policy requirement for ccTLD managers to operate a WHOIS server, and if
> > > they do, what kind of information is provided.____
> > > > * Solutions to strengthen existing WHOIS lookup methods
> were
> > > proposed in [5] and are considered in this ballot.____
> > > >
> > > > ____
> > > >
> > > > Objective 2: Sunset Methods 3.2.2.4.2 (“Email, Fax, SMS, or
> > > Postal Mail to Domain Contact”) and 3.2.2.4.15 (“Phone Contact with
> Domain
> > > Contact”).
> > > >
> > > > _Justification:_____
> > > >
> > > > * While solutions to strengthen WHOIS-relying DCV methods
> are
> > > considered in this ballot (see above), there is limited public
> evidence of
> > > significant reliance on these methods, including in response to [3] and
> > > [6].____
> > > > * Instead, discussion has identified at least one CA Owner
> has
> > > already sunset reliance on WHOIS [7], and another that has changed its
> > > approach [8] for relying on WHOIS since disclosure of [2].____
> > > > * More modern and heavily relied-upon DCV methods offer
> > > advantages over the existing WHOIS-based methods, including greater
> > > opportunity for seamless certificate lifecycle management automation
> (e.g.,
> > > [9] and [10]), while also benefiting from recently improved security
> > > practices [11]. These methods can also more effectively align
> subscriber
> > > capabilities with agility and resilience expectations necessary to
> respond
> > > to the revocation timelines described in the TLS BRs [12].____
> > > > * Beyond the above, previous discussions within the
> CA/Browser
> > > Forum have raised concerns about the perceived value (e.g., [13]) and
> > > security (e.g., [14]) of the DCV methods relying on WHOIS, further
> > > supporting the rationale for their gradual sunset.____
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > *_Benefits of adoption:_*____
> > > >
> > > > * Enhanced Security: Eliminates reliance on outdated and
> > > vulnerable DCV methods that cannot consistently provide the security
> > > required by the TLS BRs, or benefit from recent DCV security
> enhancements
> > > (i.e., Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration [11]). ____
> > > > * Increased Agility: Encourages site owners to transition
> to
> > > modern DCV methods, creating opportunities for faster, more efficient,
> and
> > > less error-prone certificate lifecycle management. ____
> > > > * Opportunity for Innovation: Promotes the development of
> new
> > > and/or improved DCV methods, fostering innovation that may enhance the
> > > overall security and agility of the ecosystem.____
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > *_Proposed Key Dates:_*____
> > > >
> > > > The effective dates considered in this update are intended
> to 1)
> > > address the immediate concerns identified by [2], and 2) offer
> near-term
> > > and longer-term transition periods for subscribers and CA Owners
> relying on
> > > existing implementations of these methods.____
> > > >
> > > > * January 15, 2025: (1) Prohibit the use of RFC 3912
> (WHOIS)
> > > and HTTPS websites to identify Domain Contact information. (2)
> Prohibit the
> > > reuse of DCV relying on information obtained using these technologies.
> (3)
> > > Prohibit WHOIS-based DCV methods for Subscriber Certificates containing
> > > ccTLDs. (4) CAs MUST NOT rely on cached WHOIS/RDAP data more than 48
> hours
> > > old. ____
> > > > * July 15, 2025: (1) Sunset DCV Methods 3.2.2.4.2 ("Email,
> > > Fax, SMS, or Postal Mail to Domain Contact") and 3.2.2.4.15 ("Phone
> Contact
> > > with Domain Contact"). (2) Prior validations using these methods and
> > > validation data gathered therein MUST NOT be used to issue new
> Subscriber
> > > Certificates.____
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > *_Proposal Revision History:_*____
> > > >
> > > > * Pre-Ballot Version #1 [4]____
> > > > * Ballot Version #1 [7]____
> > > > * Version #2 Pre-Release [17] and discussion [18]____
> > > > * Version #2 (this version) [19]____
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Dickson and
> Chris
> > > Clements of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Arvid Vermote
> > > (GlobalSign) and Pedro Fuentes (OISTE).____
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ? Motion Begins ?
> > > >
> > > > This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the
> Issuance
> > > and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline
> > > Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.7.
> > > >
> > > > MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the
> following
> > > Redline:
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7f2b54cfa5b89f41458a88211566ce508c464804
> > > <
> > >
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7f2b54cfa5b89f41458a88211566ce508c464804
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ? Motion Ends ?
> > > >
> > > > This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The
> > > procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
> > > >
> > > > _Discussion (no less than 7 days)_____
> > > >
> > > > * Start: 2024-10-01 17:00:00 UTC____
> > > > * End no earlier than: 2024-10-08 17:00:00 UTC____
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > _Vote for approval (7 days)_____
> > > >
> > > > * Start: TBD____
> > > > * End: TBD____
> > > >
> > > > ____
> > > >
> > > > Comments are welcome either on-list or with suggested edits
> via
> > > GitHub (preferred) at [19].____
> > > >
> > > > ____
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,____
> > > >
> > > > Ryan____
> > > >
> > > > ____
> > > >
> > > > ____
> > > >
> > > > *References:*____
> > > >
> > > > [1]
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004900.html
> > > <
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004900.html
> > > >
> > > > [2]
> > >
> https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/
> > > <
> > >
> https://labs.watchtowr.com/we-spent-20-to-achieve-rce-and-accidentally-became-the-admins-of-mobi/
> > > >
> > > > [3]
> > >
> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/FuOi_uhQB6U/m/hKJOz3XzAAAJ
> > > <
> > >
> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/FuOi_uhQB6U/m/hKJOz3XzAAAJ
> > > >
> > > > [4]
> > >
> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/mAl9XjieSkA/m/oDNWxtPwAQAJ
> > > <
> > >
> https://groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/mAl9XjieSkA/m/oDNWxtPwAQAJ
> > > >
> > > > [5]
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004839.html
> > > <
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004839.html
> > > >
> > > > [6]
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004844.html
> > > <
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004844.html
> > > >
> > > > [7]
> > >
> https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/
> > > <
> > >
> https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/aws-certificate-manager-will-discontinue-whois-lookup-for-email-validated-certificates/
> > > >
> > > > [8] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1917896 <
> > > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1917896>
> > > > [9]
> > >
> https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#32247-dns-change
> > > <
> > >
> https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#32247-dns-change
> > > >
> > > > [10]
> > >
> https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#322419-agreed-upon-change-to-website---acme
> > > <
> > >
> https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#322419-agreed-upon-change-to-website---acme
> > > >
> > > > [11]
> > >
> https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#3229-multi-perspective-issuance-corroboration
> > > <
> > >
> https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#3229-multi-perspective-issuance-corroboration
> > > >
> > > > [12]
> > >
> https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#491-circumstances-for-revocation
> > > <
> > >
> https://cabforum.org/working-groups/server/baseline-requirements/requirements/#491-circumstances-for-revocation
> > > >
> > > > [13]
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2018-August/000113.html
> > > <
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2018-August/000113.html
> > > >
> > > > [14]
> > > https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/2024-July/001995.html
> <
> > > https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/validation/2024-July/001995.html>
> > > > [15]
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004825.html
> > > <
> > >
> https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-September/004825.html
> > > >
> > > > [16]
> > >
> https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/356799f0dcfe11deb0a375a11233403236ab72c9..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac
> > > <
> > >
> https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/356799f0dcfe11deb0a375a11233403236ab72c9..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac
> > > >
> > > > [17]
> > >
> https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac
> > > <
> > >
> https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/compare/ba28d04894d69c8fac62850b9d0de5061658c7c5..7a2ea7b33611bebf006a99a9a82729f183143eac
> > > >
> > > > [18] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/9 <
> > > https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/9>
> > > > [19] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/551 <
> > > https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/551>____
> > > >
> > > > ____
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > Servercert-wg mailing list
> > > > Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> > > > https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > Servercert-wg mailing list
> > > Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> > > https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
> > >
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/attachments/20241010/d40b362e/attachment-0001.html>
More information about the Servercert-wg
mailing list