[Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins: Ballot SC-076v2 "Clarify and Improve OCSP Requirements"

Wed Oct 2 07:04:49 UTC 2024

Sectigo votes yes

De: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> En nombre de Aaron
Gable via Servercert-wg
Enviado el: jueves, 26 de septiembre de 2024 21:01
Para: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List
<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Asunto: [Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins: Ballot SC-076v2 "Clarify and
Improve OCSP Requirements"

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Purpose of Ballot 

This is v2 of this ballot; you can see the discussion thread for v1 here:
https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-August/004798.html
<https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.cab
forum.org%2Fpipermail%2Fservercert-wg%2F2024-August%2F004798.html&data=05%7C
02%7Cinigo.barreira%40sectigo.com%7Cad6a8ec3bd554aad559408dcde5d94d1%7C0e9c4
8946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638629740770516485%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZ
sb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%
7C%7C%7C&sdata=vm%2FO70AL6ZZfObcJO8RU1EU%2FPqy5RDwOcx4gXE6lDe8%3D&reserved=0
> 

This ballot attempts to address three concerns:
- The confusion around "reserved" serials, which do not actually exist
because all Precertificate serials are assumed to also exist in
corresponding Certificates and are therefore actually "assigned";
- Confusion around whether, and how quickly, OCSP responders must begin
providing authoritative responses for Certificates and Precertificates; and
- Confusion around whether and how the OCSP requirements apply to
Certificates which do not contain an AIA OCSP URL, but for which the CA's
OCSP responder is still willing to provide responses.

These concerns have been previously discussed in this Mozilla policy bug
<https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co
m%2Fmozilla%2Fpkipolicy%2Fissues%2F280&data=05%7C02%7Cinigo.barreira%40secti
go.com%7Cad6a8ec3bd554aad559408dcde5d94d1%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7
%7C0%7C0%7C638629740770547304%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLC
JQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=nU00INmr0wWe
%2BkSAdTw55KULyq1182ZbwUeyDUScxTg%3D&reserved=0> , this ServerCert WG bug
<https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co
m%2Fcabforum%2Fservercert%2Fissues%2F422&data=05%7C02%7Cinigo.barreira%40sec
tigo.com%7Cad6a8ec3bd554aad559408dcde5d94d1%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49f
b7%7C0%7C0%7C638629740770565549%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAi
LCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=jmFs6f0fy3
npxAVU8D4fT6ZnV9EF0xz%2FGTdst1vGSdo%3D&reserved=0> , and this Bugzilla
incident
<https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fbugzilla.
mozilla.org%2Fshow_bug.cgi%3Fid%3D1905419&data=05%7C02%7Cinigo.barreira%40se
ctigo.com%7Cad6a8ec3bd554aad559408dcde5d94d1%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49
fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638629740770580398%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDA
iLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=vWxmwt9zO
pRBcO67uxLIAnkSoShNRjhs8gEnPkNJjnY%3D&reserved=0> .

It addresses these concerns by:
- Stating that OCSP responses must be available within 15 minutes of signing
a certificate containing an AIA OCSP URL;
- Removing the concept of a "reserved" serial entirely;
- Moving all OCSP requirements into Section 4.9.9, leaving Section 4.9.10
(which RFC 3647 says is meant to place requirements on relying parties, not
on CAs) empty; and
- Organizing the requirements in Section 4.9.9 into three clusters:
  - Definitions of "validity interval", "assigned", and "unassigned";
  - Requirements on OCSP Responders, which apply only to responses from AIA
OCSP URLs found in issued certs; and
  - Requirements on OCSP Responses, which apply to all responses regardless
of whether the certificate in question has an AIA OCSP URL.

GitHub PR representing this ballot:
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/535
<https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co
m%2Fcabforum%2Fservercert%2Fpull%2F535&data=05%7C02%7Cinigo.barreira%40secti
go.com%7Cad6a8ec3bd554aad559408dcde5d94d1%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7
%7C0%7C0%7C638629740770594923%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLC
JQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=ykDDpZPdIBlQ
DsFqgyGpy6BNr8G%2FoolpQzLU4bWNFb4%3D&reserved=0> 

Rendered view of the resulting text:
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700
a5357bd3/docs/BR.md#499-on-line-revocationstatus-checking-availability

Motion

The following motion has been proposed by Aaron Gable (Let's Encrypt /
ISRG), and is endorsed by Ben Wilson (Mozilla) and Antonis Eleftheriadis
(HARICA).

Motion Begins

Modify the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates", based on Version 2.0.6, as
specified in the following redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/929d9b4a1ed1f13f92f6af672ad6f
6a2153b8230...a8a36690802250cdbe508a6c1f99f700a5357bd3

Motion Ends

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion Period (at least 7 days)

Start: August 29, 2024 19:00 UTC

End: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC

Voting Period (7 days)

Start: September 26, 2024 19:00 UTC

End: October 3, 2024 19:00 UTC

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