[Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 v2 - Pre-sign linting

[Inigo Barreira]

Hi,

 

I´ll accept this vote as valid but next time be sure to vote to the latest
version, which in this case is v3. As you can see in this email, there´s no
voting period at the bottom.

 

Regards

 

De: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> En nombre de
lv_hui--- via Servercert-wg
Enviado el: martes, 25 de junio de 2024 5:45
Para: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr>; CA/B Forum
Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Asunto: Re: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 v2 - Pre-sign linting

 

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iTrusChina votes YES to Ballot SC-75.

 

  _____  

lv_hui at itrus.cn <mailto:lv_hui at itrus.cn> 

 

From: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg
<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> 

Date: 2024-06-10 18:36

To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List
<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> 

Subject: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 v2 - Pre-sign linting


SC-75 v2 Pre-sign linting


Summary


There have been numerous compliance incidents publicly disclosed by CAs in
which they failed to comply with the technical requirements described in
standards associated with the issuance and management of publicly-trusted
TLS Certificates. However, the industry has developed open-source tools,
linters, that are free to use and can help CAs avoid certificate
misissuance. Using such linters before issuing a precertificate from a
Publicly-Trusted CA (pre-issuance linting) can prevent the mis-issuance in a
wide variety of cases.

The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA
and endorsed by Corey Bonnell of Digicert and Ben Wilson of Mozilla.

You can view the GitHub pull request representing this ballot here
<https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co
m%2Fcabforum%2Fservercert%2Fpull%2F518&data=05%7C02%7Cinigo.barreira%40secti
go.com%7C19d28dc7e83549bed1eb08dc94c94304%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7
%7C0%7C0%7C638548839335335981%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLC
JQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=SD8x9DeoFq52
aU6fzxpqGjhmY3IDtR5Bqs4EgogBUho%3D&reserved=0> . 


Motion Begins


MODIFY the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates" based on Version 2.0.5 as
specified in the following redline:

*
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/20af1b271f2b689344ae353d3e78d
c6b772199db...cc88926a3dee348a364542e5e259e9c7cab1f747


Motion Ends


This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
approval of this ballot is as follows:


Discussion (at least 7 days)


*	Start time: 2024-06-10 10:00:00 UTC
*	End time: on or after 2024-06-17 10:00:00 UTC


Vote for approval (7 days)


*	Start time: TBD
*	End time: TBD

 

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