[Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives"

Tue Jun 4 19:11:33 UTC 2024

Hi Clint,

Speaking in my personal capacity, I don’t think we should be so quick to discount efforts underway to assist CAs in preparing for MPIC.  While this could be seen as an tangential “external project”, it could actually be how CAs, especially smaller or regional CAs, meet this requirement.  This is going to take substantial development, infrastructure and compliance efforts to deliver a compliant solution.  Permitting sufficient time for open source solutions to be developed, tested and then integrated into CA systems will take time, and there isn’t currently any other open source solutions or service providers that supports most/all of the domain validation methods needing MPIC that I’m aware of.  I see this as a legitimate reason to reconsider the effective date of this ballot as Roman suggests.

Thanks,

Doug

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Clint Wilson via Servercert-wg
Sent: Tuesday, June 4, 2024 10:35 AM
To: Roman Fischer <roman.fischer at swisssign.com>; ServerCert CA/BF <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives"

Hi Roman,

I think it’s because these developments are at an early stage (amongst other reasons) that it doesn’t make sense to postpone the ballot. I don’t see anything super concrete indicating that this project will alter the industry’s approach to MPIC adoption, and I believe something pretty substantive would be necessary in order for it to make sense to adopt this external project as a dependency for updating policy requirements in the TBRs.

Cheers,

-Clint

On Jun 4, 2024, at 12:47 AM, Roman Fischer via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:

Dear all,

I was informed by direct mail about the following which I find very interesting and wanted to share here:

Princeton researchers are working on an open source implementation of MPIC and are looking for collaborators: https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2024/02/13/announcing-the-open-multi-perspective-issuance-corroboration-project/. The first version of the API specification is on github <https://github.com/open-mpic/open-mpic-specification/tree/main> .

As these developments seem to be in an early stage, wouldn’t it make sense to postpone this ballot until at least a first draft of this open source implementation is available? I don’t think it makes sense that each CA invents their own protocols and possibly makes avoidable mistakes coding / implementing this non-trivial topic..

Kind regards
Roman

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Chris Clements via Servercert-wg
Sent: Montag, 20. Mai 2024 16:30
To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> >
Subject: [Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives"

Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3:

This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates (i.e., TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration” (“MPIC”).

Background:

- MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from multiple Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as described within the Ballot for the applicable validation methods in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5.

- Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 will require using MPIC.

- This work was most recently motivated by research presented at Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed for years prior as well.

- The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for adversaries to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks against the domain validation processes described in the TLS BRs.

- Additional background information can be found in an update shared at Face-to-Face 60 [2].

Benefits of Adoption:

- Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool domain control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led to the impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][4].

- Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of global BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still pose a significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6].

- Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially reduces the threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the integrity of domain validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8].

- Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of certificates a day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at Internet scale [7][9].

Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure:

- While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers from Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided academic expertise, and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed research to support Members in drafting this ballot.

- The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not filed for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to do so in the future.

- Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions invented by researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or with the CA/B Forum.

- Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR statement. Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has granted a worldwide royalty free license to the intellectual property in MPIC developed by the researchers and has made representations regarding its lack of knowledge of any other Princeton intellectual property needed to implement MPIC.

- The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in Discussion Round 1.

- For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in the Forum in any capacity.

- Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult their own counsel.

Proposal Revision History:

- Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation Subcommittee collaboration) [10]

- Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11]

Previous versions of this Ballot:

- Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13]. Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-069).

- Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15]. Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-072).

References:

[1]  <https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf

[2]  <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link 

[3]  <https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600> https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600 

[4]  <https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis> https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis 

[5]  <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski  

[6]  <https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf> https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf 

[7]  <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee 

[8]  <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee 

[9]  <https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html> https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html 

[10]  <https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6> https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6 

[11]  <https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8> https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8 

[12]  <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487 

[13]  <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5

[14]  <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507 

[15]  <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463 

The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan Dickson of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron Gable (ISRG / Let’s Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly). 

— Motion Begins —

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.4.

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:

 <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463 

— Motion Ends —

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (at least 11 days)

- Start: 2024-05-20 14:30:00 UTC

- End no earlier than: 2024-05-31 14:30:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

- Start: TBD

- End: TBD

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