[Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives"

Aaron Gable aaron at letsencrypt.org
Thu Jul 18 23:46:03 UTC 2024


Let's Encrypt / ISRG votes Yes on Ballot SC-067 v3.

Aaron

On Mon, Jul 15, 2024 at 8:29 AM Chris Clements via Servercert-wg <
servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:

> Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3:
>
> This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the
> Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates
> (i.e., TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration”
> (“MPIC”).
>
>
> Background:
>
>
> - MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from multiple
> Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as described within the
> Ballot for the applicable validation methods in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and
> 3.2.2.5.
>
> - Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 will
> require using MPIC.
>
> - This work was most recently motivated by research presented at
> Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed for
> years prior as well.
>
> - The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for adversaries
> to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks against the domain
> validation processes described in the TLS BRs.
>
> - Additional background information can be found in an update shared at
> Face-to-Face 60 [2].
>
>
> Benefits of Adoption:
>
>
> - Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool domain
> control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led to the
> impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][4].
>
> - Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of global
> BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still pose a
> significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6].
>
> - Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network
> perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially reduces
> the threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the integrity of
> domain validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8].
>
> - Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of certificates a
> day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at Internet scale [7][9].
>
>
> Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure:
>
>
> - While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers from
> Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided academic
> expertise, and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed research to
> support Members in drafting this ballot.
>
> - The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not filed
> for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to do so in the
> future.
>
> - Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the
> CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions
> invented by researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or with the
> CA/B Forum.
>
> - Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR statement.
> Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has granted a worldwide
> royalty free license to the intellectual property in MPIC developed by the
> researchers and has made representations regarding its lack of knowledge of
> any other Princeton intellectual property needed to implement MPIC.
>
> - The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in Discussion
> Round 1.
>
> - For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to
> replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in the
> Forum in any capacity.
>
> - Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult their
> own counsel.
>
>
> Proposal Revision History:
>
>
> - Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation
> Subcommittee collaboration) [10]
>
> - Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11]
>
>
> Previous versions of this Ballot:
>
>
> - Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13]. Note,
> some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other
> ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-069).
>
> - Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15]. Note,
> some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other
> ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-072).
>
>
> References:
>
> [1]
> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf
>
> [2]
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link
>
>
> [3]
> https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600
>
>
> [4] https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis
>
> [5]
> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski
>
>
> [6]
> https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf
>
>
> [7]
> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee
>
> [8]
> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee
>
> [9]
> https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html
>
>
> [10] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6
>
> [11] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8
>
> [12] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487
>
> [13]
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5
>
> [14] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507
>
> [15]
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463
>
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan Dickson
> of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron Gable (ISRG / Let’s
> Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly).
>
>
> — Motion Begins —
>
>
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
> Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline
> Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.4.
>
>
> MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:
>
>
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463
>
>
>
>
> — Motion Ends —
>
>
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
> approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
>
> Discussion (57 days)
>
> - Start: 2024-05-20 14:30:00 UTC
>
> - End: 2024-07-15 15:29:59 UTC
>
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> - Start: 2024-07-15 15:30:00 UTC
>
> - End: 2024-07-22 15:30:00 UTC
>
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
>
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