[Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives"

Tue Jul 16 20:42:59 UTC 2024

HARICA votes "yes" to ballot SC-067 v3.

On 15/7/2024 6:29 μ.μ., Chris Clements via Servercert-wg wrote:
>
> Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3:
>
>
> This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the 
> Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server 
> Certificates(i.e., TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective Issuance 
> Corroboration” (“MPIC”).
>
>
> Background:
>
>
> - MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from 
> multiple Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as 
> described within the Ballot for the applicable validation methods in 
> TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5.
>
> - Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 
> will require using MPIC.
>
> - This work was most recently motivated by research presented at 
> Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed 
> for years prior as well.
>
> - The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for 
> adversaries to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks 
> against the domain validation processes described in the TLS BRs.
>
> - Additional background information can be found in an update shared 
> at Face-to-Face 60 [2].
>
>
> Benefits of Adoption:
>
>
> - Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool 
> domain control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led 
> to the impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][4].
>
> - Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of 
> global BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still 
> pose a significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6].
>
> - Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network 
> perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially 
> reduces the threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the 
> integrity of domain validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8].
>
> - Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of 
> certificates a day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at 
> Internet scale [7][9].
>
>
> Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure:
>
>
> - While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers 
> from Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided 
> academic expertise, and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed 
> research to support Members in drafting this ballot.
>
> - The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not 
> filed for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to 
> do so in the future.
>
> - Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the 
> CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions 
> invented by researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or 
> with the CA/B Forum.
>
> - Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR 
> statement. Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has 
> granted a worldwide royalty free license to the intellectual property 
> in MPIC developed by the researchers and has made representations 
> regarding its lack of knowledge of any other Princeton intellectual 
> property needed to implement MPIC.
>
> - The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in 
> Discussion Round 1.
>
> - For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to 
> replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in 
> the Forum in any capacity.
>
> - Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult 
> their own counsel.
>
>
> Proposal Revision History:
>
>
> - Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation 
> Subcommittee collaboration) [10]
>
> - Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11]
>
>
> Previous versions of this Ballot:
>
>
> -Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13]. Note, 
> some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by 
> other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-069).
>
> - Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15]. 
> Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates 
> made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-072).
>
>
> References:
>
> [1] 
> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf 
> <https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf>
>
> [2] 
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link 
> <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link>
>
> [3] 
> https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600 
> <https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600>
>
> [4] https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis 
> <https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis>
>
> [5] 
> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski 
> <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski>
>
> [6] 
> https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf 
> <https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf>
>
> [7] 
> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee 
> <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee>
>
> [8] 
> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee 
> <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee>
>
> [9] 
> https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html 
> <https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html>
>
> [10] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6 
> <https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6>
>
> [11] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8 
> <https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8>
>
> [12] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487 
> <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487>
>
> [13] 
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5 
> <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5>
>
> [14] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507 
> <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507>
>
> [15] 
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463 
> <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463>
>
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan 
> Dickson of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron Gable 
> (ISRG / Let’s Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly).
>
>
> — Motion Begins —
>
>
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and 
> Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline 
> Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.4.
>
>
> MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:
>
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463 
> <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463>
>
>
>
> — Motion Ends —
>
>
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for 
> approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
>
> Discussion (57 days)
>
> - Start: 2024-05-20 14:30:00 UTC
>
> - End: 2024-07-15 15:29:59 UTC
>
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> - Start: 2024-07-15 15:30:00 UTC
>
> - End: 2024-07-22 15:30:00 UTC
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
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