[Servercert-wg] Compromised/Weak Keys Ballot Proposal

[Clint Wilson]

Hi Wayne,

That was indeed my intent, but I’m happy with the proposal either way.

Thank you,
-Clint

> On Apr 12, 2024, at 12:33 PM, Wayne Thayer <wthayer at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Thank you Clint and Aaron, this is helpful. Here is what I propose:
> 
>> In the case of Debian weak keys vulnerability ([https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys)]), the CA SHALL reject all keys found at [https://github.com/cabforum/debian-weak-keys/] for each key type (e.g. RSA, ECDSA) and size listed in the repository. For all other key types and sizes, the CA SHALL reject Debian weak keys.
> 
> This change can be viewed in context https://github.com/wthayer/servercert/pull/1/files
> 
> This language allows us to add key sizes in the future without updating the TLS BRs.
> 
> Clint Wilson: I did not exclude key sizes larger than 8192 RSA/521 ECDSA bits from the requirements but would be happy to do so if you will confirm that this was your intent?
> 
> Rob Stradling: I would like to import your repo to github.com/cabforum/Debian-weak-keys <http://github.com/cabforum/Debian-weak-keys>. May I have your permission to do so?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Wayne
> 
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 10:11 AM Clint Wilson <clintw at apple.com <mailto:clintw at apple.com>> wrote:
>> Hi Aaron,
>> 
>> Your proposed phrasing sounds good to me and matches what I had in mind as the end result of the changes represented in Set 1, just structured slightly differently.
>> 
>> Cheers,
>> -Clint
>> 
>>> On Apr 11, 2024, at 9:47 AM, Aaron Gable <aaron at letsencrypt.org <mailto:aaron at letsencrypt.org>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Clint Wilson via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>> wrote:
>>>> In other words, I believe it satisfactory to establish a constrained set of Debian weak keys which CAs must block (rather than leaving the requirement fully open-ended), but I don’t believe that should obviate the need for a CA to check uncommon key sizes — which are otherwise in the key size ranges of that constrained set’s key sizes — should a CA allow those uncommon key sizes. 
>>> 
>>> I completely concur. 
>>> 
>>> I don't think that either of your Set 1 / Set 2 proposals quite hits the mark for me, for one reason: they both contain the phrase "CAs must not issue certificates containing Debian weak keys". As long as that statement exists, the requirement is "evaluate everything yourself, and if new sets of weak keys come to light, you're already behind" -- the existence of the github repo is just a nicety.
>>> 
>>> Instead, I would phrase the requirement as "In the case of [list of common RSA and ECDSA key sizes] Debian Weak Keys, the CA SHALL reject keys identified by [link to CABF repository]. For other key sizes, the CA SHALL reject Debian Weak Keys."
>>> 
>>> In other words -- for these common key sizes, the repository is the source of truth. Every key in it is considered compromised and must be blocked, but you don't need to waste time replicating the work of generating all of these keys to prove to yourself that it has been done correctly. If you want to issue for other key sizes, then the onus is on you to do the relevant due diligence.
>>> 
>>> Aaron
>> 

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