[Servercert-wg] SC-59 Weak Key Guidance

Fri May 26 15:45:07 UTC 2023

Hi Tom, Dimitris,

I continue to be opposed to the SCWG trying to limit effective dates to 2 per year. I think it’s entirely reasonable to align on a day of the month (I think the 15th has broadly been the only one I’ve heard proposed). I think it’s reasonable to try to avoid January and December. I also think there may be value in trying to reduce the overall number of effective dates somewhat. The dates I’m personally in favor of aligning on are February, April, June, August, and October 15th.

If there’s a particular penchant towards March and September, however, then I’d be unopposed to March, May, July, September, and November 15th. 

For this ballot in particular, I think October 15 or November 15 2023 are feasible targets for implementing these changes and would greatly prefer closing this issue (open now for more than 3 years) sooner than later, especially given the number of incidents we’ve seen in the last years related to weak key vulnerabilities and CAs issuing certificates with weak keys.

Thanks,
-Clint

> On May 26, 2023, at 7:37 AM, Tom Zermeno via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:
> 
> Hello Dimitris,
>  
> Thank you for the input.  We feel that September 15th does not provide enough time for CAs to implement these changes, but we are not against the March 15,  2024 effective date, if there is consensus from the Community. 
>  
> Thank you,
>  
> Tom
> SSL.com <http://ssl.com/>
>  
> From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>> On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg
> Sent: Friday, May 26, 2023 1:54 AM
> To: servercert-wg at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] SC-59 Weak Key Guidance
>  
> 
> Hi Tom,
> 
> Historically, the SCWG has been trying to avoid effective dates during January or December. I recommend using September 15, 2023 or March 15, 2024 as possible effective dates. These two dates seem to be more favorable <https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1oTGVYqggQpQMR4Lktbu_L6DhuBVJzeuiFGd9EAU1zsE> than others. 
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> Dimitris.
> 
> On 25/5/2023 10:51 μ.μ., Tom Zermeno via Servercert-wg wrote:
> Purpose of Ballot SC-059 V3 
> 
> Several events within the community have led to concerns that the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates (BRs) lacked a specificity required to properly guide CAs on matters dealing with the identification and processing of digital certificates based on private keys considered weak, or easy to ascertain.  In the hopes that elaboration and clarity on the subject would be beneficial to the community, we are presenting updates to §4.9.1.1(“Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate) and §6.1.1.3 (Subscriber Key Pair Generation) of the BRs. 
> 
> The first update is to §4.9.1.1 and is made to expand the scope of easily computable Private Keys from “Debian weak keys” to “those listed in section 6.1.1.3(5)”.  While the initial language in the BRs did not exclude other concerns, the use of a single example could be interpreted to mean that other easily computable Private Keys are few and far between.  The next update was to §6.1.1.3(5), wherein we added specific actions to be taken for ROCA vulnerability, Debian weak keys - both RSA and ECDSA – and Close Primes vulnerability.  We also added a link to suggested tools to be used for checking weak keys. Finally, an implementation date of December 1, 2023 was added to allow CAs time to update processes to meet the requirements.  
> 
> The following motion has been proposed by Thomas Zermeno of SSL.com <http://ssl.com/> and endorsed by Ben Wilson of Mozilla and Martijn Katerbarg of Sectigo. 
> 
> --Motion Begins— 
> 
> This ballot is intended to clarify CA responsibilities regarding weak key vulnerabilities, including specific guidance for Debian weak key, ROCA and Close Primes attack vulnerabilities, and modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on Version 2.0.0.  
>  
> Notes: Upon beginning discussion for SC-59, the then-current version of the BRs was 1.8.4; since that time several ballots have been approved, leading to the increment of the version to 1.8.7 and eventually 2.0.0, which is the latest approved version of the BRs.  The changes introduced in SC-59 do not conflict with any of the recent ballots. As observed with other ballots in the past, minor administrative updates must be made to the proposed ballot text before publication such that the appropriate Version # and Change History are accurately represented (e.g., to indicate these changes will be represented in Version 2.0.1). 
> 
>   
> 
> MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline: https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b68d0224fa0b3...SSLcom:servercert:3b0c6de32595d02fbd96762cda98cdc88addef00 
> 
>   
> 
> --Motion Ends— 
> 
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows: 
> 
> Discussion (11+ days) • Start time: 2023-05-25 19:00:00 UTC • End time: 2023-06-08 18:59:00 UTC 
> Vote for approval (7 days) • Start time: TBD • End time: TBD 
> 
>  
> 
> 
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