[Servercert-wg] Discussion Period Begins - Ballot SC-063: “Make OCSP Optional and Incentivize Automation”

Ryan Dickson ryandickson at google.com
Thu May 11 16:05:33 UTC 2023


Hi Aaron,

I think this concern might already be addressed in this
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/commit/2ab659ca36ab0f72318c5b9bec1121cd389f1035>
commit (where I was responding to a comment from Wayne), which is part of
an updated branch
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/tree/make-ocsp-optional-updates>
that I plan on merging <https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/3>
into the initial effort
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/tree/make-ocsp-optional> to kick
off a second round of discussion (either tomorrow or early next week).

To further help prevent confusion, I collapsed
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/commit/7012dafedd523d975d10a218f10998ef36f2c69c>
the separate crlDistributionPoints rows in the updated 7.1.2.7.6 into one,
with a note
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/commit/0cb0ce3175e8863873b74f64d685b6495bafdc7e>
indicating that the extension's presence is dependent upon the contents of
Section 7.1.2.11.2 ("CRL Distribution Points").

In summary, the latest draft of the ballot text (not yet introduced for
discussion):

   - 1.2.2 ("Relevant Dates"): Indicates that effective 3/15/2024, CAs must
   generate and publish CRLs (as described in the updated 4.9.7).  [unchanged
   from original draft]
   - 7.1.2.7.6 ("Subscriber Certificate Extensions"): Indicates CRLDP must
   not be marked critical and points to 7.1.2.11.2 ("CRL Distribution Points)
   for additional context. [changed from original draft]
   - 7.1.2.11.2 ("CRL Distribution Points"): Indicates that the
   crlDistributionPoints extension MUST be present in Subordinate CA
   Certificates and Subscriber Certificates that 1) are not Short-Lived
   Subscriber Certificates or 2) do not include an Authority Information
   Access extension with an id-ad-ocsp accessMethod. [changed from original
   draft]


If you disagree, please let me know!

Thanks,
Ryan

On Tue, May 9, 2023 at 8:09 PM Aaron Gable <aaron at letsencrypt.org> wrote:

> Hi Ryan,
>
> In reviewing this ballot, I've noticed another aspect of it that I believe
> is unintended.
>
> The ballot amends Section 1.2.2 Relevant Dates to say that "CAs MUST
> generate and publish CRLs" effective 2024-03-15.
>
> However, it also amends 7.1.2.7.6 Subscriber Certificate Extensions to say
> that the crlDistributionPoints extension MUST be included in all
> non-Short-Lived Subscriber Certificates. This section was introduced in
> ballot SC-062, and (as noted in Section 7.1 Certificate Profile) has an
> effective date of 2023-09-15.
>
> Therefore this ballot would actually require CAs to include CRLDP URLs
> (and therefore to generate and publish CRLs) as soon as September of this
> year, which I do not believe is this ballot's intent.
>
> Thanks,
> Aaron
>
> On Thu, Apr 27, 2023 at 6:30 AM Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg <
> servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:
>
>> Purpose of Ballot SC-063:
>>
>> This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the
>> Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates related to
>> making Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) services optional for
>> CAs. This proposal does not prohibit or otherwise restrict CAs who
>> choose to continue supporting OCSP from doing so. If CAs continue
>> supporting OCSP, the same requirements apply as they exist today.
>>
>>
>> Additionally, this proposal introduces changes related to CRL
>> requirements to include:
>>
>>    -
>>
>>    Establishing a detailed CRL profile, consistent with the certificate
>>    profiles introduced in Version 2.0.0 of the Baseline Requirements.
>>    -
>>
>>    CAs MUST generate and publish either:
>>    -
>>
>>       a full and complete CRL; OR
>>       -
>>
>>       partitioned CRLs (sometimes called “sharded” CRLs), that when
>>       aggregated, represent the equivalent of a full and complete CRL.
>>       -
>>
>>    CAs MUST include the corresponding HTTP URI for either the full and
>>    complete or partitioned/sharded CRL in the CRL Distribution Point
>>    extension of subscriber certificates.
>>    -
>>
>>    CRLs MUST be updated and reissued once daily.
>>
>>
>> Finally, the proposal revisits the concept of a “short-lived”
>> certificate, introduced in Ballot 153
>> <https://cabforum.org/2015/11/11/ballot-153-short-lived-certificates/>. As
>> described in this ballot, short-lived certificates (sometimes called
>> “short-term certificates” in ETSI specifications
>> <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/319400_319499/31941201/01.04.04_60/en_31941201v010404p.pdf>)
>> are:
>>
>>    - optional. CAs will not be required to issue short-lived
>>    certificates. For TLS certificates that do not meet the definition of a
>>    short-lived certificate introduced in this proposed update, the current
>>    maximum validity period of 398 days remains applicable.
>>    - *constrained to an initial maximum validity period of ten (10)
>>    days.* The proposal stipulates that short-lived certificates issued
>>    on or after 15 March 2026 must not have a Validity Period greater than
>>    seven (7) days.
>>    - not required to contain a CRLDP or OCSP pointer and are not
>>    required to be revoked. The primary mechanism of certificate
>>    invalidation for these short-lived certificates would be through
>>    certificate expiry. CAs may optionally revoke short-lived
>>    certificates. The initial maximum certificate validity is aligned with the
>>    existing maximum values for CRL “nextUpdate” and OCSP response validity
>>    allowed by the BRs today.
>>
>>
>> Additional background, justification, and considerations are outlined
>> here
>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/180T6cDSWPy54Rb5d6R4zN7MuLEMShaZ4IRLQgdPqE98/edit>
>> .
>>
>>
>>
>> The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Dickson and Chris Clements
>> of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Kiran Tummala of
>> Microsoft and Tim Callan of Sectigo.
>>
>>
>> — Motion Begins —
>>
>>
>> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
>> Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”),
>> based on Version 2.0.0.
>>
>>
>> MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:
>>
>>
>> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b68d0224fa0b3..6ff4a7b332f46a8a54cc36e16d1299373d31efe9
>>
>>
>>
>> — Motion Ends —
>>
>>
>> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
>> approval of this ballot is as follows:
>>
>>
>> Discussion (14+ days)
>>
>>    -
>>
>>    Start time: 2023-04-27 13:30:00 UTC
>>    -
>>
>>    End time: Not before 2023-05-11 13:30:00 UTC
>>
>>
>> Vote for approval (7 days)
>>
>>
>>    -
>>
>>    Start time: TBD
>>    -
>>
>>    End time: TBD
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Servercert-wg mailing list
>> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
>> https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
>>
>
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