[Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL] [cabforum/servercert] Explore & add transition period for CAs not compliant with profiles from SC-062 (Issue #436)

[Clint Wilson]

Hi Bruce,

I agree that this change will likely happen mostly naturally over time, which is really exactly what prompted the submission of the GitHub issue. In my view, it’s a desirable outcome to have extant subCAs which don’t comply with the v2 profiles be phased out (at some point), and it’s something that will happen to some extent regardless, so we should formalize a consensus-based date to ensure that happens completely (rather than risk some long tail of non-compliant CAs with no direction).

Cheers,
-Clint

> On Jun 13, 2023, at 5:59 AM, Bruce Morton <bruce.morton at entrust.com> wrote:
> 
> Hi Clint,
>  
> I am wondering with the move to dedicated PKI hierarchies, the Mozilla plan to retire roots, the Google moving forward direction, the end of 2048-bit RSA, if moving to new CA certificate profiles will just happen naturally over the next few years? 
>  
> My assumption is that all roots being submitted for root embedding should meet the requirement and so should the subordinate CAs. We have been using the draft certificate profile ballot for over a year before it was passed, to ensure our new certificate profiles would match what would be accepted in the future. Also note that the TLS BR certificate profile requirements are easily extended to other certificate type profiles, which may also be occurring.
>  
>  
> Thanks, Bruce.
>  
> From: Clint Wilson <notifications at github.com <mailto:notifications at github.com>> 
> Sent: Monday, June 12, 2023 5:02 PM
> To: cabforum/servercert <servercert at noreply.github.com <mailto:servercert at noreply.github.com>>
> Cc: Subscribed <subscribed at noreply.github.com <mailto:subscribed at noreply.github.com>>
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [cabforum/servercert] Explore & add transition period for CAs not compliant with profiles from SC-062 (Issue #436)
>  
> WARNING: This email originated outside of Entrust.
> DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.
> With the update to v2.0 of the BRs, we have a great number of improved certificate profiles which are only enforced for new certificates issued. Given the improvements represented, it would be beneficial to ensure we have a target end date for ongoing usage of non-compliant (with the new profiles) CA certificates.
> 
> —
> Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/servercert/issues/436__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!acqrEVvAEAAdn8wbYx9RVNctIdzvrE3vWLNORiItiG_YgX50b8yGW5azEmuxht0BgGrWKqKJ0IeLI63bTxUhgm9aqS8$>, or unsubscribe <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/ADFTP5YU3HIXZHAW4VERHS3XK57U3ANCNFSM6AAAAAAZD5LX74__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!acqrEVvAEAAdn8wbYx9RVNctIdzvrE3vWLNORiItiG_YgX50b8yGW5azEmuxht0BgGrWKqKJ0IeLI63bTxUhcHmTxS8$>.
> You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread.Message ID: <cabforum/servercert/issues/436 at github.com <mailto:cabforum/servercert/issues/436 at github.com>>
> 
> Any email and files/attachments transmitted with it are confidential and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If this message has been sent to you in error, you must not copy, distribute or disclose of the information it contains. Please notify Entrust immediately and delete the message from your system.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/attachments/20230615/4cb8005d/attachment.html>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: smime.p7s
Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Size: 3621 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/attachments/20230615/4cb8005d/attachment.p7s>