[Servercert-wg] [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-gutmann-testkeys-04

Aaron Gable aaron at letsencrypt.org
Wed Jul 19 15:53:15 UTC 2023

On Tue, Jul 18, 2023 at 4:59 PM Clint Wilson via Servercert-wg <
servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:

>    - After exploring these possibilities (and quite probably missing
>    others), I’m personally left with the same conclusion as I shared
>    previously (and it sounds like there hasn’t been immediate disagreement
>    with this as a positive action/next step either?), which is: further
>    specification is a reasonable way to address at least some of the ambiguity
>    around the method and/or means of communication necessary to constitute a
>    CA being made aware of compromised keys.
>       - It further seems to me that this additional specification is
>       probably(?) best suited for the BRs, but I also haven’t come up with a
>       reason a CA couldn’t do something similar themselves in their own
>       document(s). Perhaps some already do this?
The Let's Encrypt CP/CPS contains the following text:

Section 4.9.12: Special requirements re key compromise
Key compromise must be demonstrated via the Certificate Revocation method
of the ACME Protocol defined in RFC 8555, Section 7.6 by signing the
request using the private key corresponding to the public key in the

We do on occasion block keys for other reasons (and in fact have already
blocked the keys in draft-gutmann-testkeys-04), but this section attempts
to state that the ACME API is the only method we accept for being made
aware of key compromise. Perhaps this phrasing could be even clearer.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/attachments/20230719/72234173/attachment.html>

More information about the Servercert-wg mailing list