[Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-59 v2 "Weak Key Guidance"

[Entschew, Enrico]

D-Trust votes NO on Ballot SC-59 v2.

 

Thanks,

Enrico

 

Von: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> Im Auftrag von Tom
Zermeno via Servercert-wg
Gesendet: Thursday, July 6, 2023 6:17 PM
An: Infrastructure Bot via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Betreff: [Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-59 v2 "Weak Key
Guidance"

 

Purpose of the Ballot SC-59

This ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates related to the
identification and revocation of certificates with private keys that were
generated in a manner that may make them susceptible to easy decryption. It
specifically deals with Debian weak keys, ROCA, and Close Primes
Vulnerability. 

Notes:  

.         Thank you to the participants who voiced opinions and concerns
about the previous version of the ballot.  While there were many concerns
about the inclusion of the Debian weak keys checks, we have decided to leave
the checks in the ballot.  Our reasoning is that we wanted to strengthen the
guidance statements, to help CAs ensure compliant certificate generation.
Future reviews of the BRs may cull the requirements, as is required by the
needs of the community. 

.         We believe that the requested date of November 15, 2023, will
allow enough time for Certificate Authorities to enact any changes to their
systems to ensure that they perform the weak key checks on all CSRs
submitted for TLS certificates. 

.         The changes introduced in SC-59 do not conflict with any of the
recent ballots. As observed with other ballots in the past, minor
administrative updates must be made to the proposed ballot text before
publication such that the appropriate Version # and Change History are
accurately represented (e.g., to indicate these changes will be represented
in Version 2.0.1).  

The following motion has been proposed by Thomas Zermeno of SSL.com and has
been endorsed by Martijn Katerbarg of Sectigo and Ben Wilson of Mozilla. 

- Motion Begins -  

This ballot modifies the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" ("Baseline Requirements"),
based on Version 2.0.0. 

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b
68d0224fa0b3...SSLcom:servercert:958e6ccac857b826fead6e4bd06d58f4fdd7fa7a>
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b6
8d0224fa0b3...SSLcom:servercert:958e6ccac857b826fead6e4bd06d58f4fdd7fa7a  

- Motion Ends - 

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7 days) 

. Start time: 2023-06-26 22:00:00 UTC 

. End time: 2023-07-03 21:59:59 UTC 

Vote for approval (7 days) 

  .  Start Time:  2023-07-06 17:00:00

  .  End Time:   2023-07-13 16:59:59 

 

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