[Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-59 v2 "Weak Key Guidance"

[Vijay Kumar M]

eMudhra votes NO on ballot SC-59 v2.

While we concur to strengthen the weak key checks, we suggest the ongoing discussions could be considered before the final ballot.

Regards,
Vijay

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Tom Zermeno via Servercert-wg
Sent: 06 July 2023 21:48
To: Infrastructure Bot via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Subject: [Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-59 v2 "Weak Key Guidance"

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Purpose of the Ballot SC-59

This ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates related to the identification and revocation of certificates with private keys that were generated in a manner that may make them susceptible to easy decryption. It specifically deals with Debian weak keys, ROCA, and Close Primes Vulnerability.

Notes:

  *   Thank you to the participants who voiced opinions and concerns about the previous version of the ballot.  While there were many concerns about the inclusion of the Debian weak keys checks, we have decided to leave the checks in the ballot.  Our reasoning is that we wanted to strengthen the guidance statements, to help CAs ensure compliant certificate generation.  Future reviews of the BRs may cull the requirements, as is required by the needs of the community.
  *   We believe that the requested date of November 15, 2023, will allow enough time for Certificate Authorities to enact any changes to their systems to ensure that they perform the weak key checks on all CSRs submitted for TLS certificates.
  *   The changes introduced in SC-59 do not conflict with any of the recent ballots. As observed with other ballots in the past, minor administrative updates must be made to the proposed ballot text before publication such that the appropriate Version # and Change History are accurately represented (e.g., to indicate these changes will be represented in Version 2.0.1).

The following motion has been proposed by Thomas Zermeno of SSL.com and has been endorsed by Martijn Katerbarg of Sectigo and Ben Wilson of Mozilla.

- Motion Begins -

This ballot modifies the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" ("Baseline Requirements"), based on Version 2.0.0.

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline: https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b68d0224fa0b3...SSLcom:servercert:958e6ccac857b826fead6e4bd06d58f4fdd7fa7a

- Motion Ends -

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7 days)

* Start time: 2023-06-26 22:00:00 UTC

* End time: 2023-07-03 21:59:59 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

  *  Start Time:  2023-07-06 17:00:00

  *  End Time:   2023-07-13 16:59:59

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