[Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-063 V4: “Make OCSP Optional, Require CRLs, and Incentivize Automation”

Wed Jul 12 12:06:57 UTC 2023

Chunghwa Telecom votes “Yes” on Ballot SC-063.

Thanks!

Li-Chun Chen

Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.

From: Servercert-wg [mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org] On Behalf Of
Ryan Dickson via Servercert-wg
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 1:00 AM
To: ServerCert CA/BF <servercert-wg at cabforum.org
<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> >
Subject: [Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-063 V4: “Make
OCSP Optional, Require CRLs, and Incentivize Automation”

Purpose of Ballot SC-063

This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates related to making Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) services optional for CAs. This proposal
does not prohibit or otherwise restrict CAs who choose to continue
supporting OCSP from doing so. If CAs continue supporting OCSP, the same
requirements apply as they exist today.

Additionally, this proposal introduces changes related to CRL requirements
including:

·         CRLs must conform with the proposed profile.

·         CAs must generate and publish either:

o    a full and complete, or 

o    a set of partitioned CRLs (sometimes called “sharded” CRLs), that
when aggregated, represent the equivalent of a full and complete CRL.

·         CAs issuing Subscriber Certificates must update and publish a new
CRL…

o    within twenty-four (24) hours after recording a Certificate as revoked;
and 

o    Otherwise: 

§  at least every seven (7) days if all Certificates include an Authority
Information Access extension with an id-ad-ocsp accessMethod (“AIA OCSP
pointer”), or

§  at least every four (4) days in all other cases.

Finally, the proposal revisits the concept of a “short-lived” certificate,
introduced in Ballot 153
<https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcabforum.
org%2F2015%2F11%2F11%2Fballot-153-short-lived-certificates%2F&data=05%7C01%7
Crealsky%40cht.com.tw%7C83c927adfee54ddee0b508db827555ed%7C54eb9440cf0345fe8
35e61bd4ce515c8%7C0%7C0%7C638247218110057925%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjo
iMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&
sdata=Lakozfrayhc3HJvDY9W9MEQ3MtVGrFXIuTRlHOpWaR8%3D&reserved=0> .  As
described in this ballot, short-lived certificates (sometimes called
“short-term certificates” in ETSI
<https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.etsi.
org%2Fdeliver%2Fetsi_en%2F319400_319499%2F31941201%2F01.04.04_60%2Fen_319412
01v010404p.pdf&data=05%7C01%7Crealsky%40cht.com.tw%7C83c927adfee54ddee0b508d
b827555ed%7C54eb9440cf0345fe835e61bd4ce515c8%7C0%7C0%7C638247218110057925%7C
Unknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLC
JXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=vK69SQsnKCrVnNijja99kYUVCg5%2BYbjH0qkaHbk
roQY%3D&reserved=0> specifications) are:

·         optional. CAs will not be required to issue short-lived
certificates. For TLS certificates that do not meet the definition of a
short-lived certificate introduced in this proposed update, the current
maximum validity period of 398 days remains applicable. 

·         constrained to an initial maximum validity period of ten (10)
days. The proposal stipulates that short-lived certificates issued on or
after 15 March 2026 must not have a Validity Period greater than seven (7)
days.

·         not required to contain a CRLDP or OCSP pointer and are not
required to be revoked. The primary mechanism of certificate invalidation
for these short-lived certificates would be through certificate expiry. CAs
may optionally revoke short-lived certificates. The initial maximum
certificate validity is aligned with the existing maximum values for CRL
“nextUpdate” and OCSP response validity allowed by the BRs today. 

Additional background, justification, and considerations are outlined
<https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.goog
le.com%2Fdocument%2Fd%2F180T6cDSWPy54Rb5d6R4zN7MuLEMShaZ4IRLQgdPqE98%2Fedit&
data=05%7C01%7Crealsky%40cht.com.tw%7C83c927adfee54ddee0b508db827555ed%7C54e
b9440cf0345fe835e61bd4ce515c8%7C0%7C0%7C638247218110057925%7CUnknown%7CTWFpb
GZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C
3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Zxu6GXect2r2IXftp8eYSaHBbbR3YmyttHWDzxynRhw%3D&reserved=
0> here.

Proposal Revision History:

·         The set of updates resulting from the first round of discussion
are presented
<https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co
m%2Fryancdickson%2Fstaging%2Fpull%2F3%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Crealsky%40cht.c
om.tw%7C83c927adfee54ddee0b508db827555ed%7C54eb9440cf0345fe835e61bd4ce515c8%
7C0%7C0%7C638247218110057925%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJ
QIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=Wh2TZF5kK9
I05U78DtYllxYQd1LuSRIJHs3YxfHdWYY%3D&reserved=0>  here.

·         The set of updates resulting from the second round of discussion
are presented here
<https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co
m%2Fryancdickson%2Fstaging%2Fpull%2F5%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Crealsky%40cht.c
om.tw%7C83c927adfee54ddee0b508db827555ed%7C54eb9440cf0345fe835e61bd4ce515c8%
7C0%7C0%7C638247218110057925%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJ
QIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=28hKp%2BGA
iyLf5vdPejqWIqX02XKFucQUXyBneOp4v6E%3D&reserved=0> .

·         The set of updates resulting from the third round of discussion
are presented here
<https://apc01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co
m%2Fryancdickson%2Fstaging%2Fpull%2F7%2Ffiles&data=05%7C01%7Crealsky%40cht.c
om.tw%7C83c927adfee54ddee0b508db827555ed%7C54eb9440cf0345fe835e61bd4ce515c8%
7C0%7C0%7C638247218110057925%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJ
QIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=ImXJ5qQk5R
Ki3eQ7m7fui7jTgh%2BAsWPgGSCIsB5mGRA%3D&reserved=0> . 

The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Dickson and Chris Clements of
Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Kiran Tummala of Microsoft and
Tim Callan of Sectigo.

— Motion Begins —

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”),
based on Version 2.0.0.

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline: 

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a0360b61e73476959220dc328e3b6
8d0224fa0b3..b8a0453e59ff342779d5083f2f1f8b8b5930a66a 

— Motion Ends —

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (13+ days)

·  Start time: 2023-06-22 20:30:00 UTC

·  End time: 2023-07-06 15:59:59 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

·  Start time: 2023-07-06 16:00:00 UTC

·  End time: 2023-07-13 16:00:00 UTC

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