[Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-59 v2 "Weak Key Guidance"
Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)
dzacharo at harica.gr
Mon Jul 10 17:34:57 UTC 2023
HARICA votes "yes" to ballot SC-59 v2.
Based on the information that has already been disclosed in the course
of this ballot, we believe that the tools are available for every CA to
achieve the goal of protecting Subscribers and Relying Parties from
using Debian weak keys, without too much effort. HARICA
<https://github.com/HARICA-official/debian-weak-keys> has shared some of
that work and the same applies for Sectigo
<https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/private_keys>. We consider the
clarifications provided in this ballot very useful and they should be
adopted as soon as possible.
We would also like to echo that the value of protecting specifically
against Debian weak keys in 2023, is very minor and we would support
removing this requirement (for Debian weak keys) in the future.
On 6/7/2023 7:17 μ.μ., Tom Zermeno via Servercert-wg wrote:
> *Purpose of the Ballot SC-59*
> This ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the
> Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates related to
> the identification and revocation of certificates with private keys
> that were generated in a manner that may make them susceptible to easy
> decryption. It specifically deals with Debian weak keys, ROCA, and
> Close Primes Vulnerability.
> * Thank you to the participants who voiced opinions and concerns
> about the previous version of the ballot. While there were many
> concerns about the inclusion of the Debian weak keys checks, we
> have decided to leave the checks in the ballot. Our reasoning is
> that we wanted to strengthen the guidance statements, to help CAs
> ensure compliant certificate generation. Future reviews of the
> BRs may cull the requirements, as is required by the needs of the
> * We believe that the requested date of November 15, 2023, will
> allow enough time for Certificate Authorities to enact any changes
> to their systems to ensure that they perform the weak key checks
> on all CSRs submitted for TLS certificates.
> * The changes introduced in SC-59 do not conflict with any of the
> recent ballots. As observed with other ballots in the past, minor
> administrative updates must be made to the proposed ballot text
> before publication such that the appropriate Version # and Change
> History are accurately represented (e.g., to indicate these
> changes will be represented in Version 2.0.1).
> The following motion has been proposed by Thomas Zermeno of SSL.com
> and has been endorsed by Martijn Katerbarg of Sectigo and Ben Wilson
> of Mozilla.
> *- Motion Begins -*
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
> Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline
> Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.0.
> MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following
> *- Motion Ends-*
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
> Discussion (7 days)
> • Start time: 2023-06-26 22:00:00 UTC
> • End time: 2023-07-03 21:59:59 UTC
> *Vote for approval (7 days)*****
> * • Start Time: 2023-07-06 17:00:00***
> * • End Time: 2023-07-13 16:59:59*****
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
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