[Servercert-wg] Draft ballot SC-XX: Profiles cleanup ballot

Mon Aug 21 18:39:50 UTC 2023

Infrastructure certificates are certs that are required for the
operation of the CA - they may be things like a certificate used to sign
the CA's system audit logs so there is an integrity check of these logs, or
certificates issued to trusted roles for MFA to the CA.
If the BRs (which are supposed to BASELINE Requirements - not totally
prescriptive, suddenly remove that specific line in the BRs that allow
these type of certificates to be signed by the offline root CA then you are
basically prescribing that the offline root now needs connection to another
PKI in order to be able to validate any certificates used for these
purposes, or less securely it now needs to just accept any such
certificates as being valid without being able to check the current status.

Wendy

Wendy Brown

Supporting GSA

FPKIMA Technical Liaison

Protiviti Government Services
703-965-2990 (cell)

On Fri, Aug 18, 2023 at 12:48 PM Clint Wilson <clintw at apple.com> wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> Is anyone able to identify the product in question such that we can review
> its documentation and behavior in greater detail and collectively determine
> whether (and if so, how) the certificates it’s issuing should fit into or
> be accounted for by the BRs?
> The profiles ballot — version 2.0 of the BRs — has been momentous in
> moving us towards clearer, more comprehensive definitions of what exists
> with any relation to the Web PKI’s TLS hierarchies, but as this ballot
> represents, there were some oversights that yet require addressing. It’s
> a tad difficult for me, personally, to view the continued allowance of
> these infrastructure certificates as justified without having a
> *substantially *clearer understanding of exactly what they are and how
> they relate to the trusted TLS Root CA Certificates (and their keypairs)
> subject to the BRs.
>
> I’m hopeful we can have greater clarity and transparency around
> infrastructure certificates which need to chain to publicly trusted Root
> CAs. Until then, I remain supportive of the current ballot removing them
> from the BRs.
>
> Thank you,
> -Clint
>
> On Aug 2, 2023, at 11:57 AM, Wendy Brown - QT3LB-C <wendy.brown at gsa.gov>
> wrote:
>
> Clint,
> I'll have to defer to others in terms of available documentation on the
> product.
> But the certs & keys created are definitely the result of explicit CA
> personnel actions - the first action being the establishment of a new
> self-signed Root CA.  Personnel authentication certificates also must be
> issued through explicit commands.
> These aren't things that just happen after the CA has been up and running
> , it doesn't make a decision on its own to issue new certificates.
> It is a CA that has been widely used on very secure PKIs.  And being
> self-sufficient like that is a good implementation for an offline Root CA
> so as to minimize the number of supplemental systems that might be required
> to support it.
>
> thanks,
>
> Wendy
>
>
> Wendy Brown
>
> Supporting GSA
>
> FPKIMA Technical Liaison
>
> Protiviti Government Services
> 703-965-2990 (cell)
>
>
> On Wed, Aug 2, 2023 at 2:07 PM Clint Wilson <clintw at apple.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Wendy,
>>
>> Thanks for this additional information and context. Is there publicly
>> available documentation for the product and this functionality? I think
>> that might be the most efficient way to answer some of the questions
>> arising around this. If not, I have a few follow-on questions. In what ways
>> and to what extent can the profiles be adjusted prior to issuance? Is the
>> TLS certificate issued directly by a Root, or a subordinate CA? Is the OCSP
>> signing certificate generated even if no OCSP responders are configured or
>> expected to be used? What are the default profiles used for each of the
>> certificates, if not adjusted prior to issuance?
>>
>> I’d like to understand better how these events occur — and why within the
>> context of the product — but currently it seems the described product is
>> not well-suited to operations within the Web (or any Public) PKI. While
>> it’s promising that the profiles are configurable, it remains quite
>> concerning that a CA/HSM would issue certificates automatically, without
>> the initiation and explicit input of CA personnel being prerequisite.
>>
>> Cheers,
>> -Clint
>>
>>
>> On Aug 2, 2023, at 10:52 AM, Wendy Brown - QT3LB-C via Servercert-wg <
>> servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:
>>
>> Corey -
>> For at least 1 CA product that I am aware of, issuance of these
>> certificates is automatic, and we don't believe that issuance can be
>> disabled, or that a separate private PKI can be used to issue these
>> certificates instead.  In the event a separate, private PKI is used for CA
>> infrastructure, it would be important that the private PKI at a minimum
>> meets the same security and monitoring requirements of the CA for which it
>> issues infrastructure certificates.  In a situation where a CA requires
>> these certificates, it would be more secure to have optional Baseline
>> profiles than stand up a separate private PKI to avoid the certificates.
>>
>> While the issuance is automatic, the profiles can be adjusted prior to
>> issuance.  The profiles required would be for a Trusted Role authentication
>> certificate (unless the two factor authentication requirement is waived and
>> password authentication is used instead), audit log signing certificate,
>> OCSP signing certificate, TLS certificate (for the local web interface of
>> the CA), and a subsystem certificate so the certificate manager subsystem
>> can communicate with the CA subsystem for issuance/revocation/Trusted Role
>> authentication, etc.
>>
>> In addition, for an offline Root CA - requiring the use of a separate
>> internal PKI might also require network capability each time the Root is
>> activated so the Root CA can validate the current status of those
>> externally issued certificates.
>>
>> thanks,
>>
>> Wendy
>>
>>
>> Wendy Brown
>>
>> Supporting GSA
>>
>> FPKIMA Technical Liaison
>>
>> Protiviti Government Services
>> 703-965-2990 (cell)
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Aug 1, 2023 at 2:27 PM Corey Bonnell <Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Wendy,
>>>
>>> Do you know if the automatic issuance of such certificates can be
>>> disabled, and a private PKI be used for infrastructure purposes instead?
>>> Based on the discussions during the development of the profiles ballot, it
>>> was clear that private PKI should be used for CA infrastructure. However,
>>> prohibiting such use on a short timeframe would likely cause migration
>>> issues, so such issuance may need to continue to be permitted for at least
>>> some time.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I’m wondering whether it’s feasible to create a “infrastructure
>>> certificate" profile in the BRs that can allow for the continued issuance
>>> of these types of certificates while also establishing some guard rails. Do
>>> you happen to know whether these certificates share a profile that is
>>> roughly like one another? I personally haven’t used CA software that
>>> exhibits this “automatic issuance” behavior, so I’ll lean on others who do
>>> have experience.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Corey
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Wendy Brown - QT3LB-C <wendy.brown at gsa.gov>
>>> *Sent:* Friday, July 21, 2023 8:24 AM
>>> *To:* Corey Bonnell <Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com>
>>> *Cc:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <
>>> servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
>>> *Subject:* Re: [Servercert-wg] Draft ballot SC-XX: Profiles cleanup
>>> ballot
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Corey -
>>>
>>> not according to some CA products - these additional certificates are
>>> created automatically at the time a new CA is established - so if they are
>>> not excluded those products are no longer eligible for use as Root CAs.  It
>>> was my understanding that the original language that you are proposing to
>>> eliminate was put there so these products could continue to be used.
>>>
>>>
>>> Wendy
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Wendy Brown
>>>
>>> Supporting GSA
>>>
>>> FPKIMA Technical Liaison
>>>
>>> Protiviti Government Services
>>>
>>> 703-965-2990 (cell)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Jul 21, 2023 at 8:19 AM Corey Bonnell <
>>> Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Wendy,
>>>
>>> The intent behind the certificate profiles ballot was that the profile
>>> of all allowed certificate types issued from a BR-compliant CA were
>>> completely specified within the BRs. Adding a carve-out to allow the
>>> issuance of certificates whose profile is not specified and not intended
>>> for use outside the CA’s infrastructure would seem to go against that goal.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Is the use of a private PKI not feasible for these internal
>>> infrastructure certificates?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Corey
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Wendy Brown - QT3LB-C <wendy.brown at gsa.gov>
>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, July 19, 2023 3:54 PM
>>> *To:* Corey Bonnell <Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com>; CA/B Forum Server
>>> Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
>>> *Subject:* Re: [Servercert-wg] Draft ballot SC-XX: Profiles cleanup
>>> ballot
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I would not like to see #3 exclusion for Root CAs removed
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Some CA products when a new CA is established, automatically create some
>>> internal certificates that are necessary for the operation of the CA
>>> including possibly a key pair used to sign audit logs with a certificate
>>> signed by the Root CA that can be used to verify the integrity of the logs
>>> by verifying the signature. In addition to enabling cert-based
>>> authentication for trusted roles needing to access the CA, including for
>>> actions like manually instigating the issuance of a subordinate CA
>>> certificate or manually issuing a new CRL when there has not been a
>>> revocation.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This change would make it so those products could not be compliant with
>>> the BRs, even though such certificates would never be seen outside the
>>> supporting infrastructure.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If the rationale is there are no profiles for internal certificates,
>>> then I suggest a better fix would be to add the word public in the
>>> conflicting language in 7.1.2, as the internal certificates that have no BR
>>> profile should never be seen outside the CA's infrastructure. But removing
>>> the allowance would potentially trigger a non-compliance during an audit.:
>>>
>>> “If the CA asserts compliance with these Baseline Requirements, all
>>> *public *certificates that it issues MUST comply with one of the
>>> following certificate profiles, which incorporate, and are derived from RFC
>>>
>>> 5280.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Wendy
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Wendy Brown
>>>
>>> Supporting GSA
>>>
>>> FPKIMA Technical Liaison
>>>
>>> Protiviti Government Services
>>>
>>> 703-965-2990 (cell)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 10:16 AM Corey Bonnell via Servercert-wg <
>>> servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> While adding support for SC-62 linting for TLS certificates in pkilint,
>>> a few issues were identified with the current language in section 6 and 7
>>> of the BRs. To address these issues, I created a draft ballot on Github.
>>> The draft ballot text can be viewed here:
>>> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/SC63..CBonnell:servercert:sc62-cleanup
>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Chris Clements of the Chrome team reviewed and offered to endorse, so
>>> we’re looking for one more endorser to push this ballot forward.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Please let me know if you have any feedback on the proposed language or
>>> if you’d be willing to endorse.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>>
>>> Corey
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Servercert-wg mailing list
>>> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
>>> https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>> Servercert-wg mailing list
>> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
>> https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
>>
>>
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/attachments/20230821/c8d10ab0/attachment-0001.html>