[Servercert-wg] Proposal to Incorporate Mozilla's CRL Revocation Reason Code Requirements into the BRs

Wed Sep 14 17:38:28 UTC 2022

Hi Ben,

It appears the ballot text has potential divergences from the published MRSP:

1.	This ballot prohibits other CRLReasons from appearing in CRLs. This is meaningfully different from MRSP, where the new requirements are applicable solely to revocations that occur on or after the effective date.
2.	There is no requirement to document reason codes in the Subscriber Agreement, whereas there is in MRSP. Is this change intentional?
3.	Regarding 24-hour revocation reason #5: it appears that privilegeWithdrawn is now allowed. According to MRSP, only superseded is appropriate for this case.
4.	Regarding 5-day revocation reason #9: this is not a scenario listed in MRSP. In other words, this revocation scenario must be denoted as “unspecified” as the CRLReason under MRSP. Therefore, it is not possible to satisfy both the proposed BR text and MRSP.
5.	Regarding 5-day revocation reason #10: this appears to be like scenario #7, but it is different in that revocation may be required even if there’s no violation of the CP/CPS. I don’t think this scenario is enumerated in MRSP, so it is not possible to specify a reason code that satisfies both MRSP and this ballot for this scenario.

More generally, the Defined Term “Certificate” should be used throughout the ballot for consistency.

Thanks,

Corey

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Ben Wilson via Servercert-wg
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2022 11:37 PM
To: Ben Wilson <bwilson at mozilla.com>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] Proposal to Incorporate Mozilla's CRL Revocation Reason Code Requirements into the BRs

Here is the most current comparison:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/bbca71465ed8a8a76383086039f52c750009286a..1699612e5157423f607d67cc8ab9dc3a1d52b318

Ben

On Mon, Sep 12, 2022 at 11:00 AM Ben Wilson <bwilson at mozilla.com <mailto:bwilson at mozilla.com> > wrote:

Here is another edit that tries to make minimal changes to BR section 4.9.1.1.

 <http://goog_144053405> 

https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/servercert/commit/94a07d08855cf489a2bdddff7d8a9490969d5d06

Ben

On Mon, Sep 12, 2022 at 9:51 AM Ben Wilson via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> > wrote:

Thanks, Dimitris. I'll work on that approach and get something back to you soon.

Ben

On Mon, Sep 12, 2022 at 2:56 AM Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> > wrote:

Hi Ben,

After a quick reading, I noticed that the subsections are not symmetrical and a bit inconsistent. For example, some of them contain the statement "the CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and MUST revoke a Certificate within 5 days", some do not.

Other examples:

*	4.9.1.1.1, is labeled "Subscriber-Requested Revocation", however there are other subsections that are also "Subscriber-Requested". This separation seems confusing.
*	4.9.1.1.4 is about unreliable validation but most of the remaining subsections are titled after the RFC 5280 revocation reasons.

Finally, it's not very clear when the "unspecified (0)" reason must be used because of section 4.9.1.1.8 (Other Circumstances) which doesn't point to a revocation reason.

>From my perspective, I'm not sure if breaking down each subsection is more helpful for reading the revocation requirements than the current listing. I understand there is a desire to copy the MRSP language as much as possible but perhaps we need to consider a less "intrusive" set of changes to a section that CAs already have a difficult time reading and implementing.

IMO we either need to describe the revocation scenario and point to the RFC 5280 revocation reason (closer to what the BRs have today), or start with the RFC 5280 revocation reasons and enumerate the revocation scenarios (closer to what MRSP has today). I find it confusing to mix the two approaches.

Thanks,
Dimitris.

On 12/9/2022 6:32 π.μ., Ben Wilson wrote:

For review - here is another proposal that takes BR section 4.9.1.1 and puts the 24-hour and 5-day revocation times into subsections that match the CRL reason codes.  

https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/servercert/commit/b185a28fcc20d5853747e4506103823e3dc7c282

Ben

On Thu, Sep 8, 2022 at 12:05 PM Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr> > wrote:

Good point.

s/expected/shall use/

On 8/9/2022 8:26 μ.μ., Tim Hollebeek wrote:

I would prefer standard 2119 language instead of an “expectation”.  There are no documented rules for what it means for a CRLReason to be expected to be a certain value.

-Tim

From: Servercert-wg  <mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2022 3:21 AM
To: Ben Wilson  <mailto:bwilson at mozilla.com> <bwilson at mozilla.com>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List  <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] Proposal to Incorporate Mozilla's CRL Revocation Reason Code Requirements into the BRs

On 7/9/2022 8:22 μ.μ., Ben Wilson wrote:

Good suggestion. I can re-work a proposal that re-writes BR sec. 4.9.1.1 to re-group the revocation reasons into the reason codes that should be used. Is that what you were thinking? 

Yes. We should also try to keep the current BRs prioritization. The section begins with the cases where the Certificate(s) need to be revoked within 24h and then moves to the 5-day revocation cases.

We could walk this list down making sure that all Mozilla cases are listed (add the ones that are not) and add the expected revocationReason for each case. For example:

The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs:

1.	The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate (expected CRLReason:unspecified);
2.	The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization (expected CRLReason:privilegeWithdrawn);
3.	The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (expected CRLReason:keyCompromise);
4.	The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see  <https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys> https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys) (expected CRLReason:keyCompromise);
5.	The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon (expected CRLReason: superseded).

and so on.

Does that work?

Dimitris.

Thanks,

Ben

On Wed, Sep 7, 2022 at 6:01 AM Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> > wrote:

Hi Ben,

I believe the proposal, as written, causes confusion in regards to 4.9.1.1. Some of the reasons described in your proposal are already mentioned in 4.9.1.1. Perhaps we should work some more to "unify" the two sections.

My proposal would be to update 4.9.1.1 and include the expected CRLReason after each case.

Thoughts?
Dimitris.

On 6/9/2022 8:13 μ.μ., Ben Wilson via Servercert-wg wrote:

All,

I'm looking for one more endorser.

Thanks,

Ben

On Fri, Jul 29, 2022 at 12:40 PM Ben Wilson via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org> > wrote:

All,

I have created a proposal in Github to incorporate Mozilla's CRL Revocation Reason Code requirements into the Baseline Requirements.  

See https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/issues/377

https://github.com/BenWilson-Mozilla/servercert/commit/52a480803beff1f96d61c4b6d76570ac7adff4d5

I'm looking for comments, suggestions, and two endorsers.

Thanks,

Ben

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