[Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL]-Re: SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian Weak keys
Chris Kemmerer
chris at ssl.com
Thu Mar 31 14:42:03 UTC 2022
We are pleased to return to discussion of this proposed ballot, which
we've reprinted immediately below.
Based on the discussion thus far, we've addressed Corey's point by
adding the *bolded *line re: which modulus/exponents a CA MUST check.
(We generally agree with Jaime's suggestion that CAs /should /check the
modulus only but don't see it as crucial to explicitly state this in the
ballot.)
We've also updated the version in the proposal.
If this ballot proceeds the next available designation would be SC55.
Many thanks,
Chris K
=====
--- Motion Begins ---
This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows, based on
Version 1.8.2:
Proposed ballot language:
/4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate /
Replace:
4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can
easily compute the Subscriber’s Private Key based on the Public Key in
the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see
https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys)
With:
4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can
easily compute the Subscriber’s Private Key (such as those identified in
6.1.1.3(4)).
---
/6.1.1.3. Subscriber Key Pair Generation /
Replace:
The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more of the
following conditions are met:
1. The Key Pair does not meet the requirements set forth in Section
6.1.5 and/or Section 6.1.6;
2. There is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the
Private Key was flawed;
3. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the
Applicant's Private Key to compromise;
4. The CA has previously been made aware that the Applicant's Private
Key has suffered a Key Compromise, such as through the provisions of
Section 4.9.1.1;
5. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method to easily compute
the Applicant's Private Key based on the Public Key (such as a Debian
weak key, see https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys).
With:
The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more of the
following occurs:
1) The requested Public Key does not meet the requirements set forth in
Sections 6.1.5 and/or 6.1.6;
2) The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the
Subscriber's Private Key to compromise;
3) The CA has previously been made aware that the Subscriber's Private
Key has suffered a Key Compromise, such as through the provisions of
Section 4.9.1.1;
4) The Public Key corresponds to an industry demonstrated weak Private
Key, in particular:
a) In the case of ROCA vulnerability, the CA SHALL reject keys
identified by the tools available at https://github.com/crocs-muni/roca
or equivalent.
b) In the case of Debian weak keys (https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys),
the CA SHALL reject at least keys generated by the flawed OpenSSL
version with the combination of the following parameters:
i) Big-endian 32-bit, little-endian 32-bit, and little-endian 64-bit
architecture;
ii) Process ID of 0 to 32767, inclusive;
iii) All RSA Public Key lengths supported by the CA up to and including
4096 bits;
iv) rnd, nornd, and noreadrnd OpenSSL random file state.
For Debian weak keys not covered above, the CA SHALL take actions to
minimize the probability of certificate issuance.
*CAs MUST check for Debian weak keys for all RSA modulus lengths and
exponents that they accept.*
--- Motion Ends ---
=====
On 10/28/2021 3:55 PM, Jaime Hablutzel via Servercert-wg wrote:
> It could be helpful to be a little bit more explicit on the fact that
> the required check is against the modulus only as it could avoid
> developers to implement this check against full public keys, which can
> lead to:
>
> * Some CAs could unknowingly embark themselves in the onerous task
> of generating the affected key pairs for each different public
> exponent, which is not really required.
> * Because of the higher amount of work required for
> supporting/maintaining the check in this way, some CAs might
> mistakenly omit checking some subscriber keys, e.g. they might
> have in their blocklists only the affected public keys with the
> public exponent set to 65537, even when they (unintentionally)
> support subscriber keys with other values for the public exponent.
>
>
> On Thu, 28 Oct 2021 at 03:02 Rob Stradling <rob at sectigo.com> wrote:
>
> > I think we can merely state that CAs must check for Debian weak
> keys for all RSA modulus lengths and exponents that they accept.
> Using a comparison of the modulus (or its hash) is essentially an
> implementation detail that we don’t need to explicitly mandate.
>
> Thanks Corey. That makes sense.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:* Corey Bonnell
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 27, 2021 18:43
> *To:* Rob Stradling; Jaime Hablutzel; CA/B Forum Server
> Certificate WG Public Discussion List
> *Cc:* Christopher Kemmerer
> *Subject:* RE: [EXTERNAL]-Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot
> proposal: Debian Weak keys
>
> > Hi Jaime. Ooh, you're right! The affected OpenSSL versions
> generate the same predictable moduli regardless of the public
> exponent value.
>
> Yes, that’s great to know; thanks for pointing it out.
>
> > What's the best way to capture all this in the ballot?
>
> I think we can merely state that CAs must check for Debian weak
> keys for all RSA modulus lengths and exponents that they accept.
> Using a comparison of the modulus (or its hash) is essentially an
> implementation detail that we don’t need to explicitly mandate.
>
> Thanks,
> Corey
>
> *From:* Rob Stradling <rob at sectigo.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 27, 2021 5:31 AM
> *To:* Jaime Hablutzel <jhablutz at WISEKEY.COM>; CA/B Forum Server
> Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Cc:* Corey Bonnell <Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com>; Christopher
> Kemmerer <chris at ssl.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [EXTERNAL]-Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot
> proposal: Debian Weak keys
>
> Hi Jaime. Ooh, you're right! The affected OpenSSL versions
> generate the same predictable moduli regardless of the public
> exponent value.
>
> So yes, the optimal approach seems to be for CAs to use Debian
> weak key blocklists that are based on only the RSA modulus.
>
> Corey's point applies if a CA chooses instead to implement a
> Debian weak key blocklist of (for example) SubjectPublicKeyInfos
> with public exponent 65537.
>
> What's the best way to capture all this in the ballot?
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:*Jaime Hablutzel
> *Sent:* Sunday, October 24, 2021 23:25
> *To:* Rob Stradling; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public
> Discussion List
> *Cc:* Corey Bonnell; Christopher Kemmerer
> *Subject:* Re: [EXTERNAL]-Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot
> proposal: Debian Weak keys
>
> Hi, I might be (very) wrong here, but, shouldn’t blocklists be
> based only on the RSA modulus for different key sizes so
> validation implementations match the module only irrespective of
> whatever the public exponent is? or does the affected prime
> generation random source seed from the public exponent too?
>
>
> On 22 Oct 2021, at 08:58, Rob Stradling via Servercert-wg
> <servercert-wg at cabforum.org> wrote:
>
> > ...my opinion is that we should introduce a new requirement such that CAs
> must check for Debian weak keys for all RSA modulus lengths
> and exponents that they accept. CAs are uniquely positioned to
> prevent the usage of these weak keys in the web PKI, so there
> is a security benefit in mandating such universal checks.
>
> Hi Corey. Yeah, OK. You've persuaded me.
>
> FWIW, my tools athttps://github.com/CVE-2008-0166
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_CVE-2D2008-2D0166&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=gZAtYdIgwjZ_F9FpjPlUFmh9SQve9WXOyzZCTDLhsH4&e=> only
> support 65537 at the moment. I guess I'll just have to wait
> and see if anyone asks for other public exponent values to be
> supported. 🙂
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:*Corey Bonnell
> *Sent:*Tuesday, October 19, 2021 19:48
> *To:*Rob Stradling; Christopher Kemmerer; CA/B Forum Server
> Certificate WG Public Discussion List
> *Subject:*RE: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian
> Weak keys
>
> Hi Rob,
> Comments inline.
>
> >AFAICT, in the affected Debian OpenSSL versions:
> - "openssl req -newkey" had a hardcoded public exponent of
> 65537 (see
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/apps/req.c#L768
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_apps_req.c-23L768&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=Vu5UXlPv7euZNJXCO15ReMLK_k5MyC3YaUliVn6DQcU&e=>).
> - "openssl genrsa" defaulted to 65537, but provided a "-3"
> command-line option to use a public exponent of 3 instead (see
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/apps/genrsa.c
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_apps_genrsa.c&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=MXbwubefERoNQfWd4kC0f7rxRrBl5yB1YZ2Y3OmPQoo&e=>).
>
> As you point out, the command-line tooling bundled with
> OpenSSL 0,9.8 generally restricted the allowed exponent.
> However, the RSA key generation API allowed any exponent to be
> specified [1], so it is possible that a custom application
> passed exponent values besides 3 or 65537 to the RSA key
> generation function.
>
> >Are there any good reasons to continue to permit the public
> exponent 3 ?
>
> Judging from Censys, it appears that there are some publicly
> trusted certificates containing RSA keys with an exponent of
> 3, so there will presumably be a (minor) ecosystem impact if
> an exponent value of 3 were banned. That being said, exponents
> smaller than 65537 are outside the SHOULD-level exponent range
> since BR v1.1.3 (now in section 6.1.6) so perhaps it’s time to
> consider strengthening the SHOULD to a MUST. Probably such a
> change would be outside the scope of this ballot, though.
>
> >The "openssl-vulnkey" tool that Debian used to ship only
> provided blocklists for keys with public exponents of 65537,
> so should we take that as a sign that CAs needn't perform a
> Debian weak key check when the public exponent is anything
> other than 65537 ?
>
> While the precedent set by accepted remediations for incidents
> surrounding Debian weak keys has been for CAs to check the
> lists distributed in the openssl-blacklist Debian package, my
> opinion is that we should introduce a new requirement such
> that CAs must check for Debian weak keys for all RSA modulus
> lengths and exponents that they accept. CAs are uniquely
> positioned to prevent the usage of these weak keys in the web
> PKI, so there is a security benefit in mandating such
> universal checks.
>
> Thanks,
> Corey
>
> [1]https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c#L78
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_crypto_rsa_rsa-5Fgen.c-23L78&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=BZt9wGuErHLlj4PgA-Q_BWX-TmBE7NrL_QZcjyFCmLs&e=>
>
> *From:*Rob Stradling <rob at sectigo.com>
> *Sent:*Tuesday, October 19, 2021 11:31 AM
> *To:*Christopher Kemmerer <chris at ssl.com>; CA/B Forum Server
> Certificate WG Public Discussion List
> <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>; Corey Bonnell
> <Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com>
> *Subject:*Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian
> Weak keys
>
> Hi Corey.
>
> AFAICT, in the affected Debian OpenSSL versions:
> - "openssl req -newkey" had a hardcoded public exponent of
> 65537 (see
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/apps/req.c#L768
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_apps_req.c-23L768&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=Vu5UXlPv7euZNJXCO15ReMLK_k5MyC3YaUliVn6DQcU&e=>).
> - "openssl genrsa" defaulted to 65537, but provided a "-3"
> command-line option to use a public exponent of 3 instead (see
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_8f/apps/genrsa.c
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__github.com_openssl_openssl_blob_OpenSSL-5F0-5F9-5F8f_apps_genrsa.c&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=MXbwubefERoNQfWd4kC0f7rxRrBl5yB1YZ2Y3OmPQoo&e=>).
>
> Are there any good reasons to continue to permit the public
> exponent 3 ?
>
> The "openssl-vulnkey" tool that Debian used to ship only
> provided blocklists for keys with public exponents of 65537,
> so should we take that as a sign that CAs needn't perform a
> Debian weak key check when the public exponent is anything
> other than 65537 ?
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:*Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> on
> behalf of Corey Bonnell via Servercert-wg
> <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Sent:*19 October 2021 15:31
> *To:*Christopher Kemmerer <chris at ssl.com>; CA/B Forum Server
> Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:*Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian
> Weak keys
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the
> organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless
> you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Hi Chris,
> Apologies for the late reply. I noticed that the current
> proposed language has no guidance regarding RSA exponents. I
> think it would be useful to specify the expectations in this
> regard (whether the CA must check for weak keys for all key
> lengths and exponent combinations accepted/supported by the
> CA, or if checking weak key lists for only exponents 3 and
> 65537 is sufficient, etc.).
>
> Thanks,
> Corey
>
> *From:*Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>*On
> Behalf Of*Christopher Kemmerer via Servercert-wg
> *Sent:*Friday, October 15, 2021 10:33 AM
> *To:*Rob Stradling <rob at sectigo.com>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos
> (HARICA) <dzacharo at harica.gr>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate
> WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>; Jacob
> Hoffman-Andrews <jsha at letsencrypt.org>
> *Subject:*Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian
> Weak keys
>
> Thank you, Rob, and shall watch for that update. Meanwhile we
> are doing a final-final pass through our draft language for
> clarity and will send it early next week.
>
> Chris K
>
> Meanwhile, we've cycled our draft language through another
> review and have made IIRC only one or two minor edits for
> clarity (h/t BenW).
>
> On 10/14/2021 9:49 AM, Rob Stradling wrote:
>
> Today I rediscovered that I'd previously generated the
> RSA-8192 blocklists back in December 2009, and that
> they're still available
> athttps://secure.sectigo.com/debian_weak_keys/
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fsecure.sectigo.com-252Fdebian-5Fweak-5Fkeys-252F-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987811664-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DBknvgeWEnZ4pvV0PZHrsqaYgYgzgs4wad1Y3lmy1FWk-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=zzVoaIwOBGmJbK59JUU8ZW6-rpOfDM9LW4-DOaggMQQ&e=>.
> When I compared the old and new RSA-8192 blocklists, I
> found that ~0.8% of the "rnd" keys are different. It
> looks like, for reasons unknown, the "OpenSSL random file
> state" misbehaved occasionally over the 8 month run that
> ended recently.
>
> I'll report back once I've regenerated and verified the
> problematic keys.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:*Rob Stradling<rob at sectigo.com> <mailto:rob at sectigo.com>
> *Sent:*23 September 2021 19:17
> *To:*Christopher Kemmerer<chris at ssl.com>
> <mailto:chris at ssl.com>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos
> (HARICA)<dzacharo at harica.gr> <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr>;
> CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion
> List<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>; Jacob
> Hoffman-Andrews<jsha at letsencrypt.org>
> <mailto:jsha at letsencrypt.org>; Rob
> Stradling<rob at sectigo.com> <mailto:rob at sectigo.com>
> *Subject:*Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian
> Weak keys
>
> > BTW, in case it helps, I'm about half way through generating a
> full set of RSA-8192 Debian weak keys, which (when
> complete) I'll add to thehttps://github.com/CVE-2008-0166
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987811664-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DhEYtpXP81bOYFl0bdDSzbg8zxn7gozJ2bXAzE3ZPLwQ-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=CZuzMqYs2tJKnr9PUCkV8xEr-EQLZuEnpygT0nUUNYQ&e=>repositories.
>
> It took nearly 8 months (using just a single core of a
> fairly modest CPU), but it finally finished! Repositories
> updated.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:*Servercert-wg<servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>on behalf of
> Rob Stradling via
> Servercert-wg<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Sent:*13 May 2021 15:42
> *To:*Christopher Kemmerer<chris at ssl.com>
> <mailto:chris at ssl.com>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos
> (HARICA)<dzacharo at harica.gr> <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr>;
> CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion
> List<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>; Jacob
> Hoffman-Andrews<jsha at letsencrypt.org>
> <mailto:jsha at letsencrypt.org>
> *Subject:*Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian
> Weak keys
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the
> organization. Do not click links or open attachments
> unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> > iii) All RSA Public Key lengths supported by the CA up to and
> including 4096 bits;
> > ...
> > For Debian weak keys not covered above, the CA SHALL take
> actions to minimize the probability of certificate issuance.
>
> Hi Christopher. What sort of "actions" are envisaged
> here? If a CA is processing a certificate request that
> contains a (for example) RSA-4088 public key (i.e., a key
> size not covered by an available Debian weak list), either
> the CA is going to issue the cert or they're not. What,
> concretely, does "minimize the probability of certificate
> issuance" actually mean?
>
> Why not remove that "SHALL" sentence and change point iii
> to: "iii) All RSA Public Key lengths supported by the CA." ?
>
> BTW, in case it helps, I'm about half way through
> generating a full set of RSA-8192 Debian weak keys, which
> (when complete) I'll add to
> thehttps://github.com/CVE-2008-0166
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987821618-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D34YXT3egxh7Xtc5k5gqy8idcbz9cgokAIz7o8Xwbh94-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=taqinDAOLRdSvETy9ob78hR_-KPxttqWcUNY_M86mTY&e=> repositories.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:*Christopher Kemmerer<chris at ssl.com>
> <mailto:chris at ssl.com>
> *Sent:*13 May 2021 15:12
> *To:*Rob Stradling<rob at sectigo.com>
> <mailto:rob at sectigo.com>; Dimitris Zacharopoulos
> (HARICA)<dzacharo at harica.gr> <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr>;
> CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion
> List<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>; Jacob
> Hoffman-Andrews<jsha at letsencrypt.org>
> <mailto:jsha at letsencrypt.org>
> *Subject:*Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal: Debian
> Weak keys
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the
> organization. Do not click links or open attachments
> unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
>
> Hello,
>
> We deeply appreciate the useful discussion in this thread
> regarding this issue. We especially applaud the efforts of
> HARICA and Sectigo to independently generate more
> comprehensive lists of potentially affected Debian weak
> keys. As Rob Stradling observed through his crt.sh
> research
> (20210107,https://gist.github.com/robstradling/a5590b6a13218fe561dcb5d5c67932c5
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgist.github.com-252Frobstradling-252Fa5590b6a13218fe561dcb5d5c67932c5-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987821618-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DQXz4cOmARv-252Fg8-252FJF2NNEW2-252BSbjHJu1pv8X6vjLCx7io-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=EARvfcpJ6O_cJ0KioLW9U0gNj00u2-_njjGSKcTRtE8&e=>)
> of the five most utilized algorithm/key size populations,
> two are ECC (so not impacted by the Debian weak key issue)
> and three are RSA (2048, 4096, and 3072 bit length, in
> that order).
>
> As of their most recent messages it appears that these two
> organizations have independently generated comprehensive
> lists identifying all RSA-2048 and -4096 bit length keys.
> (We understand RSA-3072 length keys are also available.)
> This offers the possibility that complete lists, if
> accepted as authoritative, could be accessed by the
> community to help prevent exploitation of this vulnerability.
>
> It was also noted (by the representative from Let's
> Encrypt) that the ROCA vulnerability is presently
> identified through use of a tool supported externally. It
> was suggested that this resource be archived in a manner
> that ensures availability. (Our proposed language points
> to "https://github.com/crocs-muni/
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252Fcrocs-2Dmuni-252F-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987831575-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DZQMlATqs-252BM7Vr3aIgjdrH06gaOrkgAPTbMkM4gcSROs-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=goTnhfES-zV16ifNjJ90Y_GUk39wftGwqMJiZKuw5aY&e=>roca
> or equivalent.")
>
> We think our present ballot language (reproduced at the
> end of this message) provides appropriately focused
> guidance to CAs. If available, we'd certainly like to also
> see the HARICA/Sectigo lists (which CAs could use for the
> majority of Debian weak key use cases) captured somewhere
> in this ballot language. We are agnostic as to 1) where
> exactly these resources might be maintained and 2) where
> this ballot places directions to these resources - an
> annex to the current requirements, a separate CA/BF
> guidance document or within Sections 4.9.1.1/6.1.1.3
> <http://4.9.1.1/6.1.1.3>.
>
> Our intent is to ensure that 1) clear, accurate guidance
> on CA expectations is provided and 2) any resources
> assisting CAs in meeting these expectations are fully
> described, publicly available (somewhere) and with
> reliable links provided. The language below, we feel,
> meets the first requirement. We'd appreciate input on how
> to best meet the second. (Note thatSSL.com
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__ssl.com_&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=j-4qIhXvNMe9dfS8B8CWq0sSP-IOQRNSRmpjiPXIFZw&m=JnxStoHpP62BM2-15Vtby3qBQbCdQrSyCNPjVNH_IS8&s=SGnteTNpPS1X4ickvt5qbC2WDrpValWXK42R9uvwO04&e=>would
> be happy to support the community by hosting any of these
> as publicly accessible resources, whether solo or
> alongside other organizations.)
>
> Chris K
>
> SSL.com
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__ssl.com_&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=j-4qIhXvNMe9dfS8B8CWq0sSP-IOQRNSRmpjiPXIFZw&m=JnxStoHpP62BM2-15Vtby3qBQbCdQrSyCNPjVNH_IS8&s=SGnteTNpPS1X4ickvt5qbC2WDrpValWXK42R9uvwO04&e=>
>
> =====
>
> --- Motion Begins ---
>
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the
> Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates”
> as follows, based on Version 1.7.4:
>
> Proposed ballot language:
>
> *4.9.1.1 Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate*
>
> Replace:
>
> 4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method
> that can easily compute the Subscriber’s Private Key based
> on the Public Key in the Certificate (such as a Debian
> weak key, seehttps://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fwiki.debian.org-252FSSLkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987831575-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DpXeTXYoS8oYMQteThIRSdhISQokGG4nL-252BHSymGxAwPg-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=ZtytHt-KbbrRxo2oN_oCa2ihhQEPcupL52pOSa3xs9U&e=>)
>
> With:
>
> 4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method
> that can easily compute the Subscriber’s Private Key (such
> as those identified in 6.1.1.3(4)).
>
> ---
>
> *6.1.1.3. Subscriber Key Pair Generation*
>
> Replace:
>
> The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more
> of the following conditions are met:
>
> 1. The Key Pair does not meet the requirements set forth
> in Section 6.1.5 and/or Section 6.1.6;
> 2. There is clear evidence that the specific method used
> to generate the Private Key was flawed;
> 3. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that
> exposes the Applicant's Private Key to compromise;
> 4. The CA has previously been made aware that the
> Applicant's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise,
> such as through the provisions of Section 4.9.1.1;
> 5. The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method to
> easily compute the Applicant's Private Key based on the
> Public Key (such as a Debian weak key,
> seehttps://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fwiki.debian.org-252FSSLkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987831575-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DpXeTXYoS8oYMQteThIRSdhISQokGG4nL-252BHSymGxAwPg-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=ZtytHt-KbbrRxo2oN_oCa2ihhQEPcupL52pOSa3xs9U&e=>).
>
> With:
>
> The CA SHALL reject a certificate request if one or more
> of the following occurs:
>
> 1) The requested Public Key does not meet the requirements
> set forth in Sections 6.1.5 and/or 6.1.6;
> 2) The CA is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that
> exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise;
> 3) The CA has previously been made aware that the
> Subscriber's Private Key has suffered a Key Compromise,
> such as through the provisions of Section 4.9.1.1;
> 4) The Public Key corresponds to an industry demonstrated
> weak Private Key, in particular:
> a) In the case of ROCA vulnerability, the CA SHALL reject
> keys identified by the tools available
> athttps://github.com/crocs-muni/roca
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252Fcrocs-2Dmuni-252Froca-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987841531-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DpVWa4-252Fu9mO6gfEAN2FHOMx83i-252FGSUcG-252BfzyDoHm1xKs-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=6j9rei_kmtaqpNr-93i7Jp1C7q5YNaJtJJ2z3Rn5FzE&e=>or
> equivalent.
> b) In the case of Debian weak keys
> (https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fwiki.debian.org-252FSSLkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987841531-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DfJSWwzvoeepBzwSexsg-252FFSKZKusdynxlt-252F1gItUiii0-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=7VJmjfUviaQVQ3rIxm7xE-dFcYL1TLUk2yNWY4hFx0U&e=>),
> the CA SHALL reject at least keys generated by the flawed
> OpenSSL version with the combination of the following
> parameters:
>
> i) Big-endian 32-bit, little-endian 32-bit, and
> little-endian 64-bit architecture;
> ii) Process ID of 0 to 32767, inclusive;
> iii) All RSA Public Key lengths supported by the CA up to
> and including 4096 bits;
> iv) rnd, nornd, and noreadrnd OpenSSL random file state.
>
> For Debian weak keys not covered above, the CA SHALL take
> actions to minimize the probability of certificate issuance.
>
> --- Motion Ends ---
> On 1/18/2021 3:34 PM, Rob Stradling wrote:
>
> > I'm mid-way through generating the RSA-4096 keys.
>
> The RSA-4096 private keys and blocklists are now
> inhttps://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/private_keys
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fprivate-5Fkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987851488-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3Dt2XnHbMAXRIJHGzz-252BLi4gptSfi957l-252Fkz5fcaUc4PxA-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=iSbz-XCr-uFk_7Y8gJ0DA2ii9QYdRcBI5WcrvGeE55Q&e=> andhttps://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/openssl_blocklists
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fopenssl-5Fblocklists-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987851488-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D-252B-252Fmznq3F0GbWZjrE1G08DqSXBOxYTLtIF1l7pLatjoU-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=-tHYY-qeEG6kULte0FSWXNcttvh6n3BUnjh8PTDXi-c&e=>.
>
> The RSA-2048 and RSA-4096 private keys in
> https://github.com/HARICA-official/debian-weak-keys
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FHARICA-2Dofficial-252Fdebian-2Dweak-2Dkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987861437-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DFb5kG1Ob413KX19BP-252B37xpIahSiKi2FIZ5NfuZ-252FkuPU-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=_lfhBqavAtNpmBCedDWRhR5JY_praNbAngJx0m7i14E&e=> (which
> only covers 2 of the 3 word size / endianness
> combinations) are identical to the equivalents in
> https://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/private_keys
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fprivate-5Fkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987861437-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DoDDkulWGG70BklQLLMR0GsX-252FRIy20y-252FKtw9gGijGyhE-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=yAkqXLZo2IvXlCZvKvbFvweWp1zicZGNjpQ-S6gHQbY&e=>.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:*Dimitris Zacharopoulos
> (HARICA)<dzacharo at harica.gr> <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr>
> *Sent:*14 January 2021 18:39
> *To:*Rob Stradling<rob at sectigo.com>
> <mailto:rob at sectigo.com>; CA/B Forum Server
> Certificate WG Public Discussion
> List<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>; Jacob
> Hoffman-Andrews<jsha at letsencrypt.org>
> <mailto:jsha at letsencrypt.org>; Christopher
> Kemmerer<chris at ssl.com> <mailto:chris at ssl.com>
> *Subject:*Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot proposal:
> Debian Weak keys
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the
> organization. Do not click links or open attachments
> unless you recognize the sender and know the content
> is safe.
>
>
> On 14/1/2021 12:30 π.μ., Rob Stradling wrote:
>
> Thanks Dmitris.
>
> So far I've generated the RSA-2048 and RSA-3072
> keys
> usinghttps://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/key_generator
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fkey-5Fgenerator-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987871399-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D4kKGwenlWGRmGjkIWofWWWnykgyNAgmJj1knMJ9PFz4-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=NAsWm8iu6UPJcqogRr7ZHylAINg9o87jFWyCbM_GxlE&e=> and
> uploaded them
> tohttps://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/private_keys
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fprivate-5Fkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987871399-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DDS2Fb707J-252BWD3UlBsOMtUWBl-252B5JkoU3S9twMJn8eSps-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=wLahGmkoShePVAd3354Vg-KIUIG_bUnevY1465It5Jk&e=>,
> and I've generated the corresponding blocklists
> and uploaded them
> tohttps://github.com/CVE-2008-0166/openssl_blocklists
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FCVE-2D2008-2D0166-252Fopenssl-5Fblocklists-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987871399-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DJtYLdAD8pwpvivoIfMXAeEjofoK0FqoijWEb4Sc9OV4-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=NrxlbUT4xWxoifiZhepNwMg-9wFwdQwvVmKKxNVBuk8&e=>.
> My RSA-2048 blocklists exactly match the ones from
> the original Debian openssl-blacklist package.
> I'm mid-way through generating the RSA-4096 keys.
>
> Let's compare keys when we're both done. 🙂
>
>
> Certainly :-) the RSA-2048 keys already match the
> fingerprints from the openssl-blacklist Debian package.
>
> We did this work several months ago but never found
> the time to make it publicly available. We managed to
> break down the big task and run jobs in parallel which
> made things a bit more interesting.
>
> It's nice we did this independently, I guess it
> increases the accuracy level of the resulted keys :)
>
>
> Cheers,
> Dimitris.
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:*Dimitris Zacharopoulos
> (HARICA)<dzacharo at harica.gr>
> <mailto:dzacharo at harica.gr>
> *Sent:*13 January 2021 21:49
> *To:*Rob Stradling<rob at sectigo.com>
> <mailto:rob at sectigo.com>; CA/B Forum Server
> Certificate WG Public Discussion
> List<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>; Jacob
> Hoffman-Andrews<jsha at letsencrypt.org>
> <mailto:jsha at letsencrypt.org>; Christopher
> Kemmerer<chris at ssl.com> <mailto:chris at ssl.com>
> *Subject:*Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot
> proposal: Debian Weak keys
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the
> organization. Do not click links or open
> attachments unless you recognize the sender and
> know the content is safe.
>
> Dear friends,
>
> HARICA has generated the weak keys (RSA 2048 and
> 4096 bit lengths) from the vulnerable openssl
> package. We will generate 3072 bit keys as well
> and add them soon. The methodology is described in
> the following GitHub repo along with the produced
> keys:
>
> * https://github.com/HARICA-official/debian-weak-keys
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgithub.com-252FHARICA-2Dofficial-252Fdebian-2Dweak-2Dkeys-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987881346-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D61WsoKxsDa5-252FjBab75Y-252FZG4PbcoE3RVkCWg-252BsfY2Aww-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=dWL9G_dD07M3-kQ4faHXjdMzoGF9wF5hEGlN2IrPwiA&e=>
>
> Please review and let us know if you spot any
> issues or problems with our approach and methodology.
>
> As always, please use other people's work at your
> own risk.
>
>
> Dimitris.
>
> On 7/1/2021 2:25 μ.μ., Rob Stradling via
> Servercert-wg wrote:
>
> I've used crt.sh to produce a survey of key
> algorithms/sizes in currently unexpired,
> publicly-trusted server certificates:
>
> https://gist.github.com/robstradling/a5590b6a13218fe561dcb5d5c67932c5
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fgist.github.com-252Frobstradling-252Fa5590b6a13218fe561dcb5d5c67932c5-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987881346-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3D4qveGxYahVQ6FbihVosw69bsGUs7hG1ytgI6YLxqYbY-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=0JiuTeERFFPZRGiB5foBRJZ5kJjHk51DCLjQbBVwSxc&e=>
>
> The four most popular choices are no surprise:
> RSA-2048, P-256, RSA-4096, and P-384.
> openssl-blacklist covers RSA-2048 and
> RSA-4096, and ECC keys are implicitly not
> Debian weak keys.
>
> Fifth most popular is RSA-3072, with over 3
> million unexpired, publicly-trusted server
> certs. openssl-blacklist doesn't cover
> RSA-3072, but ISTM that this is a key size
> that CAs will want to permit.
>
> Some of the lesser used key sizes are mostly
> likely due to Subscriber typos (e.g., 2408 and
> 3048 were probably intended to be 2048, 4048
> was probably intended to be either 2048 or
> 4096, etc), but some of the other ones look
> like they were deliberately chosen (e.g., 2432
> is 2048+384). Is it worth generating Debian
> weak keys/blocklists for any of these key sizes?
>
> https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fnvlpubs.nist.gov-252Fnistpubs-252FSpecialPublications-252FNIST.SP.800-2D57pt1r5.pdf-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987891313-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DrG1bgcAgL7P3RtCaCJ0cZTcYPkcUhTlsR4J6ulGFgso-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=zehaaELHzHzxLDM3dCTeAYaSLMufH4svdbHT74RDcq0&e=> (Table
> 4, p59) permits RSA-2048 until the end of
> 2030, whereas
> https://www.sogis.eu/documents/cc/crypto/SOGIS-Agreed-Cryptographic-Mechanisms-1.2.pd
> f
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com_-3Furl-3Dhttps-253A-252F-252Fwww.sogis.eu-252Fdocuments-252Fcc-252Fcrypto-252FSOGIS-2DAgreed-2DCryptographic-2DMechanisms-2D1.2.pdf-26data-3D04-257C01-257Crob-2540sectigo.com-257Ca8c9d97cd4114ebf508708d9930d343d-257C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7-257C0-257C0-257C637702508987891313-257CUnknown-257CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0-253D-257C2000-26sdata-3DgCbutfTj362g-252BHqbrbYgcpm5etqbhCvUFpp8E2UYinE-253D-26reserved-3D0&d=DwMGaQ&c=euGZstcaTDllvimEN8b7jXrwqOf-v5A_CdpgnVfiiMM&r=-bX5hBm1IdRDykQ-dBR8tsFRCM4v1VXUyG7RZa2WqPY&m=fMDCutmeJbXlHHWIZLMy2UAZB79bm_AVGAAADmUsNAE&s=2FZ19CpL6_a-dWd0zh1d-4HiMpn4pWyZ0lsH3f1k140&e=> permits
> RSA-2048 only until the end of 2025. It is of
> course possible that quantum computing will
> render RSA obsolete before Subscribers need to
> think about which larger RSA keysize they want
> to migrate to; however, it seems prudent to
> also plan for the possibility that RSA will
> survive and that some other RSA keysize(s)
> might become popular.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *From:*Servercert-wg<servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org>on
> behalf of Rob Stradling via
> Servercert-wg<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Sent:*06 January 2021 16:08
> *To:*Jacob
> Hoffman-Andrews<jsha at letsencrypt.org>
> <mailto:jsha at letsencrypt.org>; Christopher
> Kemmerer<chris at ssl.com>
> <mailto:chris at ssl.com>; CA/B Forum Server
> Certificate WG Public Discussion
> List<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> <mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Subject:*Re: [Servercert-wg] SCXX Ballot
> proposal: Debian Weak keys
>
> CAUTION: This email originated from outside of
> the organization. Do not click links or open
> attachments unless you recognize the sender
> and know the content is safe.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
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