[Servercert-wg] Servercert-wg Digest, Vol 43, Issue 18

Fri Jan 21 13:43:39 UTC 2022

Disig votes "YES" on Ballot SC53: Sunset for SHA-1 OCSP Signing.

Regards
Peter Miskovic

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Sent: Monday, January 17, 2022 4:19 PM
To: servercert-wg at cabforum.org
Subject: Servercert-wg Digest, Vol 43, Issue 18

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Today's Topics:

   1. Voting Period Begins on Ballot SC53: Sunset for	SHA-1 OCSP
      Signing (Corey Bonnell)
   2. Re: [EXTERNAL]- Voting Period Begins on Ballot SC53: Sunset
      for	SHA-1 OCSP Signing (Pedro FUENTES)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 14:59:58 +0000
From: Corey Bonnell <Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com>
To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List
	<servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Subject: [Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins on Ballot SC53: Sunset
	for	SHA-1 OCSP Signing
Message-ID:
	<DM6PR14MB2186A5203EEC33E5E7092A5892579 at DM6PR14MB2186.namprd14.prod.outlook.com>

Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

Purpose of Ballot

Weaknesses regarding the use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm for signatures have been known for several years. While there is currently a prohibition on the use of CA Private Keys to directly sign OCSP responses using SHA-1, Private Keys corresponding to OCSP delegated responders may still be used to sign OCSP responses using SHA-1. This ballot establishes a sunset date to prohibit delegated OCSP signing with the SHA-1 hash algorithm.

The following motion has been proposed by Corey Bonnell of DigiCert and endorsed by Ben Wilson of Mozilla and Bruce Morton of Entrust.

Motion Begins

This ballot modifies the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates" ("Baseline Requirements"), based on Version 1.8.0:
MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:

<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/cda0f92ee70121fd5d692685b97e
bb6669c74fb7...637c6959c35bbd93cc451f7b22dfb48ac4255b9f>
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/cda0f92ee70121fd5d692685b97eb
b6669c74fb7...637c6959c35bbd93cc451f7b22dfb48ac4255b9f

Motion Ends

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start time: 2022-01-10 15:00:00 UTC

End time: 2022-01-17 15:00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start time: 2022-01-17 15:00:00 UTC

End time: 2022-01-24 15:00:00 UTC

Thanks,

Corey

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Message: 2
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 15:18:34 +0000
From: Pedro FUENTES <pfuentes at WISEKEY.COM>
To: Corey Bonnell <Corey.Bonnell at digicert.com>, CA/B Forum Server
	Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL]- Voting Period Begins on
	Ballot SC53: Sunset for	SHA-1 OCSP Signing
Message-ID: <84632EAA-4D39-4404-A781-2EE72ECA5B48 at wisekey.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

OISTE votes YES to SC53

On 17 Jan 2022, at 16:00, Corey Bonnell via Servercert-wg <servercert-wg at cabforum.org<mailto:servercert-wg at cabforum.org>> wrote:

Purpose of Ballot
Weaknesses regarding the use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm for signatures have been known for several years. While there is currently a prohibition on the use of CA Private Keys to directly sign OCSP responses using SHA-1, Private Keys corresponding to OCSP delegated responders may still be used to sign OCSP responses using SHA-1. This ballot establishes a sunset date to prohibit delegated OCSP signing with the SHA-1 hash algorithm.

The following motion has been proposed by Corey Bonnell of DigiCert and endorsed by Ben Wilson of Mozilla and Bruce Morton of Entrust.
Motion Begins
This ballot modifies the ?Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates? (?Baseline Requirements?), based on Version 1.8.0:
MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/cda0f92ee70121fd5d692685b97ebb6669c74fb7...637c6959c35bbd93cc451f7b22dfb48ac4255b9f
Motion Ends
This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)
Start time: 2022-01-10 15:00:00 UTC
End time: 2022-01-17 15:00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)
Start time: 2022-01-17 15:00:00 UTC
End time: 2022-01-24 15:00:00 UTC

Thanks,
Corey
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