[Servercert-wg] Voting Begins for Ballot SC46: Sunset the CAA exception for DNS Operator

[Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA)]

HARICA votes "yes" to ballot SC46.

FWIW, we've had slight discrepancies in our processes in the past and we 
managed to overcome without too much additional administrative overhead. 
I believe we can overcome the effective date problem with a cleanup 
ballot following this ballot. With that said. I don't see violating any 
Bylaws or Charter rules on having an effective date on a requirement 
which pre-dates the completion of the IPR period.

Dimitris.


On 26/5/2021 9:30 μ.μ., Ryan Sleevi via Servercert-wg wrote:
> Unfortunately, I realized belatedly that I forgot to clearly indicate 
> the Voting End Time.
>
> As such, the previous mail did not officially start voting. 
> Thankfully, as no votes were received, I think we can just say I 
> didn't start it correctly?
>
> Please find the corrected announcement below:
>
> This email begins the voting period for Ballot SC46: Sunset the CAA 
> exception for DNS operator
>
> Purpose of Ballot:
>
> This Ballot addresses security issues with Section 3.2.2.8 regarding 
> CAA checking.
>
> Currently, Section 3.2.2.8 permits a CA to bypass CAA checking if the 
> CA or an Affiliate of the CA is the DNS Operator. This term is 
> referred to through RFC 7719, and involves a precise technical 
> definition regarding how a zone's authoritative servers are configured 
> and expressed (e.g. NS records). While this allows a CA to skip 
> looking up the CAA record, it does not absolve them of the need to 
> look up these other records on every issuance.
>
> As practiced by CAs, this has clearly caused some confusion. For 
> example, some CAs have incorrectly implemented policies that determine 
> they're authoritative based on self-assertion that they are 
> authoritative, which is not consistent with the current requirements.
>
> To avoid these issues, this sunsets the CAA exception on 2021-07-01 
> for the DNS Operator, simplifying the requirements and reducing 
> ambiguities for CAs performing validation.
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Sleevi of Google and 
> endorsed by Ben Wilson of Mozilla and Jacob Hoffman-Andrews of 
> ISRG/Let's Encrypt.
>
> It can be viewed on GitHub as 
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/271 
> <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/271>
>
> -- MOTION BEGINS --
>
> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and 
> Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline 
> Requirements”), based on Version 1.7.4:
>
> MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:
>
> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/47248d77d371356780b08cfa971b26d88d704ca8..6d34b1d51f645912d2237d5d4b46f4a49e8352ed 
> <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/47248d77d371356780b08cfa971b26d88d704ca8..6d34b1d51f645912d2237d5d4b46f4a49e8352ed>
>
> -- MOTION ENDS --
>
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline.
>
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
> Discussion (7+ days)
>
> Start Time: 2021-05-13 20:00:00 UTC
> End Time: 2021-05-26 14:00:00 UTC
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> Start Time: 2021-05-26 18:30:00 UTC
> End Time: 2021-06-02 18:30:00 UTC
>
> _______________________________________________
> Servercert-wg mailing list
> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg

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