[Servercert-wg] [EXTERNAL] Re: Voting Begins for Ballot SC46: Sunset the CAA exception for DNS Operator

[Bruce Morton]

Entrust votes Yes to ballot SC46.

Bruce.

From: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi via Servercert-wg
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2021 2:30 PM
To: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi at google.com>; CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [Servercert-wg] Voting Begins for Ballot SC46: Sunset the CAA exception for DNS Operator

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Unfortunately, I realized belatedly that I forgot to clearly indicate the Voting End Time.

As such, the previous mail did not officially start voting. Thankfully, as no votes were received, I think we can just say I didn't start it correctly?

Please find the corrected announcement below:

This email begins the voting period for Ballot SC46: Sunset the CAA exception for DNS operator

Purpose of Ballot:

This Ballot addresses security issues with Section 3.2.2.8 regarding CAA checking.

Currently, Section 3.2.2.8 permits a CA to bypass CAA checking if the CA or an Affiliate of the CA is the DNS Operator. This term is referred to through RFC 7719, and involves a precise technical definition regarding how a zone's authoritative servers are configured and expressed (e.g. NS records). While this allows a CA to skip looking up the CAA record, it does not absolve them of the need to look up these other records on every issuance.

As practiced by CAs, this has clearly caused some confusion. For example, some CAs have incorrectly implemented policies that determine they're authoritative based on self-assertion that they are authoritative, which is not consistent with the current requirements.

To avoid these issues, this sunsets the CAA exception on 2021-07-01 for the DNS Operator, simplifying the requirements and reducing ambiguities for CAs performing validation.

The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Sleevi of Google and endorsed by Ben Wilson of Mozilla and Jacob Hoffman-Andrews of ISRG/Let's Encrypt.

It can be viewed on GitHub as https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/271<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/271__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!NFeHHMg2M0PSERtj03rqrCoxas3jZqEeftaCsg3iAoFNIJ7Gmq5rzCN_3XxzPiKIUOI$>

-- MOTION BEGINS --

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 1.7.4:

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/47248d77d371356780b08cfa971b26d88d704ca8..6d34b1d51f645912d2237d5d4b46f4a49e8352ed<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/47248d77d371356780b08cfa971b26d88d704ca8..6d34b1d51f645912d2237d5d4b46f4a49e8352ed__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!NFeHHMg2M0PSERtj03rqrCoxas3jZqEeftaCsg3iAoFNIJ7Gmq5rzCN_3XxztHcKH2U$>

-- MOTION ENDS --

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline.

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start Time: 2021-05-13 20:00:00 UTC
End Time: 2021-05-26 14:00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start Time: 2021-05-26 18:30:00 UTC
End Time: 2021-06-02 18:30:00 UTC
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