[Servercert-wg] Ballot SC29v2: System Configuration Management

[Nathalie Weiler]

Thank you very much for being so supportive in extending the discussion!

With best regards,

Nathalie
Von: Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> Im Auftrag von Neil Dunbar via Servercert-wg
Gesendet: Monday, March 23, 2020 2:49 PM
An: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
Betreff: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC29v2: System Configuration Management


Further to the discussion on the last SCWG (2020-03-19) , I'm keeping this ballot alive as a 'heartbeat'. Everyone on the group is in the grip of the coronavirus outbreak, so flexibility is required from all participants.

This begins/extends the discussion period for the Ballot SC29v2: System Configuration Management
Purpose of Ballot:

Two sections of the current NSRs contain requirements for configuration management. Section 1(h) demands a weekly review and Section 3(a) a process to monitor, detect and report on security-related configuration changes.

There was consensus in the discussions of the Network Security Subgroup that unauthorized or unintentional configuration changes can introduce high security risks but the current wording allows CAs to comply with s1(h) without noticing such a change for several days. Whether the weekly human reviews have to be performed every 7 days or just once per week is a matter of interpretation but for the discussion of our proposal this is immaterial. The change we are proposing seeks to encourage CAs to rely on continuous monitoring rather than human reviews because alerts created by a continuous monitoring solution can notify a CA by orders of magnitude earlier than a human review i.e. within minutes not within days.

The question has been raised (at the Bratislava F2F meeting) as to whether this ballot should also cover OS patching, since that involves installing new packages on top of others. The view of the proposers is an unequivocal “yes” - patched packages from OS vendors should go through a CA change management process, and only those patches which are approved for installation should make their way to production systems.


More detailed discussions and considerations can be found in this document, maintained by the NetSec Subgroup: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yyadZ1Ts3bbR0ujAB1ZOcIrzP9q4Un7dPzl3HD9QuCo.
<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Fdocument%2Fd%2F1yyadZ1Ts3bbR0ujAB1ZOcIrzP9q4Un7dPzl3HD9QuCo&data=02%7C01%7Cnathalie.weiler%40swisssign.com%7C2c3f285a7ce24b1c5bdf08d7cf30fda3%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637205681646772884&sdata=9ZJ%2BEOgr5gEE%2B7zNutNWMTsHmck6j3tH1uRh9HMceyY%3D&reserved=0>

[For those unable to view the discussion document, a PDF of the above document is attached to this mail]


The following motion has been proposed by Neil Dunbar of TrustCor and endorsed by Tobias Josefowitz of OPERA and Dustin Hollenback of Microsoft.
--- MOTION BEGINS ---

This ballot modifies the “Network and Certificate System Security Requirements” based on Version 1.3. A redline against the CA/B Forum repository is found here:


https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9b...neildunbar:108e555?diff=split<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fdocuments%2Fcompare%2F16a5a9b...neildunbar%3A108e555%3Fdiff%3Dsplit&data=02%7C01%7Cnathalie.weiler%40swisssign.com%7C2c3f285a7ce24b1c5bdf08d7cf30fda3%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637205681646782836&sdata=rL1pToxv9Vc9rln9Sa1emxzb0aCCL1zzIf%2BFs%2FgTdnU%3D&reserved=0>
(Each CA or Delegated Third Party SHALL)
(...)

Insert as new Section 1(h):

Ensure that the CA’s security policies encompass a Change Management Process, following the principles of documentation, approval and testing, and to ensure that all changes to Certificate Systems, Issuing Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Security Support Systems, and Front-End / Internal-Support Systems follow said Change Management Process;

Remove from Section 3(a):

Implement a Security Support System under the control of CA or Delegated Third Party Trusted Roles that monitors, detects, and reports any security-related configuration change to Certificate Systems;

Insert as new Section 3(a):

Implement a System under the control of CA or Delegated Third Party that continuously monitors, detects, and alerts personnel to any configuration change to Certificate Systems, Issuing Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Security Support Systems, and Front-End / Internal-Support Systems unless the change has been authorized through a change management process.  The CA or Delegated Third Party  shall respond to the alert and initiate a plan of action within at most twenty-four (24) hours.

--- MOTION ENDS ---

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline.

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start Time: 2020-03-23 17:00:00 UTC

End Time: 2020-04-03 17:00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start Time: TBD

End Time: TBD


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