[Servercert-wg] Ballot SC29: System Configuration Management

Mon Mar 23 01:38:21 MST 2020

Representing HARICA I'd like to second this request. We discussed about 
this at our last teleconference and Members can review the draft minutes 
sent to the management list.

With that said, HARICA plans to participate in the discussion of SC29 
with some thoughts and observations related to the patching mechanisms 
and the need to allow a certain level of automation. We are still trying 
to get together (virtually) as a team to have a full analysis and a 
detailed internal discussion before we post our thoughts to the public 
list.

Thank you,
Dimitris.

On 2020-03-23 10:15 π.μ., Nathalie Weiler via Servercert-wg wrote:
>
> Dear all,
>
> On behalf of SwissSign, I would like to request more time for the 
> analysis of the impact of SC-29. The reason is that we did not have 
> time to properly analyze the impact before the Corana-lockdown. The 
> lockdown is expected to last for Switzerland (as for most of Europe) 
> at least until April 20, 2020. In that period we are running as 
> probably most of the other CAs in emergency change only.
>
> Thank you for considering our concerns!
>
> With best regards,
>
> Nathalie
>
> Nathalie Weiler
>
> CISO
>
> Nathalie.Weiler at swisssign.com
>
> *SwissSign Group AG*
>
> Sägereistrasse 25
>
> Postfach
>
> CH-8152 Glattbrugg
>
> *Von:*Servercert-wg <servercert-wg-bounces at cabforum.org> *Im Auftrag 
> von *Neil Dunbar via Servercert-wg
> *Gesendet:* Monday, March 9, 2020 5:39 PM
> *An:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List 
> <servercert-wg at cabforum.org>
> *Betreff:* [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC29: System Configuration Management
>
> This begins the discussion period for the Ballot SC29: System 
> Configuration Management
>
> [Note: this is the resubmission of Ballot SC20, which did not proceed 
> to a voting phase]
>
> Purpose of Ballot:
>
> Two sections of the current NSRs contain requirements for 
> configuration management. Section 1(h) demands a weekly review and 
> Section 3(a) a process to monitor, detect and report on 
> security-related configuration changes.
>
> There was consensus in the discussions of the Network Security 
> Subgroup that unauthorized or unintentional configuration changes can 
> introduce high security risks but the current wording allows CAs to 
> comply with s1(h) without noticing such a change for several days. 
> Whether the weekly human reviews have to be performed every 7 days or 
> just once per week is a matter of interpretation but for the 
> discussion of our proposal this is immaterial. The change we are 
> proposing seeks to encourage CAs to rely on continuous monitoring 
> rather than human reviews because alerts created by a continuous 
> monitoring solution can notify a CA by orders of magnitude earlier 
> than a human review i.e. within minutes not within days.
>
> The question has been raised (at the Bratislava F2F meeting) as to 
> whether this ballot should also cover OS patching, since that involves 
> installing new packages on top of others. The view of the proposers is 
> an unequivocal “yes” - patched packages from OS vendors should go 
> through a CA change management process, and only those patches which 
> are approved for installation should make their way to production systems.
>
> More detailed discussions and considerations can be found in this 
> document, maintained by the NetSec Subgroup: 
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yyadZ1Ts3bbR0ujAB1ZOcIrzP9q4Un7dPzl3HD9QuCo.
> <https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Fdocument%2Fd%2F1yyadZ1Ts3bbR0ujAB1ZOcIrzP9q4Un7dPzl3HD9QuCo&data=02%7C01%7Cnathalie.weiler%40swisssign.com%7Cb790be9914fd4cd4a15408d7c4487358%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637193687780490335&sdata=sAPzOP4mFmqCccAD8%2F81Mys8s8Af2JKQW9gHD8MDnKw%3D&reserved=0>
>
> [For those unable to view the discussion document, a PDF of the above 
> document is attached to this mail]
>
> The following motion has been proposed by Neil Dunbar of TrustCor and 
> endorsed by Tobias Josefowitz of OPERA and Dustin Hollenback of Microsoft.
>
> --- MOTION BEGINS ---
>
> This ballot modifies the “Network and Certificate System Security 
> Requirements” based on Version 1.3. A redline against the CA/B Forum 
> repository is found here:
>
> https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/16a5a9b...neildunbar:108e555?diff=split 
> <https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fdocuments%2Fcompare%2F16a5a9b...neildunbar%3A108e555%3Fdiff%3Dsplit&data=02%7C01%7Cnathalie.weiler%40swisssign.com%7Cb790be9914fd4cd4a15408d7c4487358%7C21322582607f404c82d950ddb1eca5c9%7C1%7C0%7C637193687780500291&sdata=xG%2Baa%2BSsedvP7z%2BUum8j6GQx7YoxReKveu%2F3iTs4ORY%3D&reserved=0>
>
> (Each CA or Delegated Third Party SHALL)
> (...)
>
> Insert as new Section 1(h):
>
> Ensure that the CA’s security policies encompass a Change Management 
> Process, following the principles of documentation, approval and 
> testing, and to ensure that all changes to Certificate Systems, 
> Issuing Systems, Certificate Management Systems, Security Support 
> Systems, and Front-End / Internal-Support Systems follow said Change 
> Management Process;
>
> Remove from Section 3(a):
>
> Implement a Security Support System under the control of CA or 
> Delegated Third Party Trusted Roles that monitors, detects, and 
> reports any security-related configuration change to Certificate Systems;
>
> Insert as new Section 3(a):
>
> Implement a System under the control of CA or Delegated Third Party 
> that continuously monitors, detects, and alerts personnel to any 
> configuration change to Certificate Systems, Issuing Systems, 
> Certificate Management Systems, Security Support Systems, and 
> Front-End / Internal-Support Systems unless the change has been 
> authorized through a change management process.  The CA or Delegated 
> Third Party  shall respond to the alert and initiate a plan of action 
> within at most twenty-four (24) hours.
>
> --- MOTION ENDS ---
>
> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline.
>
> The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
>
> Discussion (7+ days)
>
> Start Time: 2020-03-09 17:00:00 UTC
>
> End Time: 2020-03-16 17:00:00 UTC
>
> Vote for approval (7 days)
>
> Start Time: 2020-03-16 17:00:00 UTC
>
> End Time: 2020-03-23 17:00:00 UTC
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> Servercert-wg at cabforum.org
> http://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg

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